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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 62 DECEMBER 1962 
THE GRAVAMEN OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT 
HOWARD LESNICK* 
No. 8 
"The gravamen of a secondary boycott," Judge Learned Hand has told 
us, "is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to 
the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to 
compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce 
the employer to give in to his employees' demands."1 That is the Law, from 
the pen of one of its major prophets; what follo-ws is an attempt at 
commentary. 
Federal regulation of secondary pressure is embodied in Section 8 (b) ( 4)­
(B) of the National Labor Relations Act,2 a section aptly described as "surely 
* Assi stant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
1 .  International Bhd. of E!ec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 ( 2d Cir. 1950 ) .  
2 .  6 1  Stat. 141  ( 1947) , 29 U .S .C. § 1 5 8 ( b )  (4) ( 1958) , as amended, 29 U.S .C 
§ 158 ( b )  (4)  ( B )  ( S upp. I I I, 1962) , amending 49 Stat. 452 ( 1935 ) .  The relevant portions 
of § 8, as amended by 73 Stat. 542 ( 1959 ) ,  presently read as follows : 
( b )  I t  shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its 
agents-
( 4) (i ) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any i ndividual employee! 
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to 
engage in, a strike or a refusal in  the course of  his employment to use, manu­
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles ,  
materials, or commodities or to  perform any services ; or  (ii )  to threaten, coerce, 
or  restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com­
merce, where in  either case an obi ect thereof i s-
( B )  forcing or requir ing any person to  cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, 
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, 
or forcing or requiring any other employer to recogni ze or bargain with a labor 
organization as the representative of his  employees unless s uch labor organization 
has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions. 
of section 9 : 
Pro·uided, That nothing contained in this clause ( B )  shall be construed to make 
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful , any primary strike or primary picketing; 
Pro<•ided, That nothing contained in this subsection ( b )  sha l l  be construed' 
to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any 
employer (other than his own employer). if the employees of  such employer are 
engaged in  a s trike rati fied or approved by a representative of such employees 
whom such employer is  required to recognize under this act . . . .  
In addition, §§ 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( A )  and 8(e )  contain provisions relevant to areas of secondary 
pressure not the concern of  this uticle. See note 7 infra. 
Prior to 1959, what i s  now the fi rst portion of subparagraph (13) was found in  
subparagraph ( A) ; accordingly, many of the pre-1959 cases refer to  § 8 ( b )  ( 4) (A), whi le  
more recent references are  to § 8(b)  ( 4) (B). To aYoicl confusion I have referred, except 
in (juotations, s imply to § 8 (b) ( 4) ; i t  wi l l  of course be understood that I am only 
encompassing thereby the secondary boycott provisions of that paragraph. 
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one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal labo 
. 
statute."3 The text of the statute condemns refusals to perform any service�
r 1 
or the inducement of such refusals, when an object thereof is forcing 0 ' ·1 ne, 
empl�yer to cea�e doing business with anoth�r. �;thou�h the focus of con- J 
gresswnal attentiOn was on the secondary stnke- a stnke against employer 1 
A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with :! 
employer B . . . (with whom the union has a dispute) "4-the language, 
i 
reaches picketing, which is typically calculated to "induce or encourage" such j 
a strike, as well. vVhile the act does not use the term, it has been more or less j 
generally recognized since its passage that boycott action5 must be "secondary" j 
in character to fall within the bar of Section 8(b) ( 4), and since 1 959 this· l 
limitation has been explicit in the proviso declaring section 8 (b) ( 4) (B) in-
: 
applicable to "any primary strike or primary picketing." The content of the 
dichotomy thus made relevant, between primary and secondary picketing­
"unquestionably the area of greatest difficulty and importance in the admin­
istration of the statute"6-is the subject of this article.7 
3. Aaron, The Labor-Management Report-ing and Disclosure Act of 1959 (pt. 2), 73 
HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1 1 13 ( 1960). 
4. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 ( 1947), in 1 NLRB, L EGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 428 (1948) [hereinafter 
cited as LMRA LEG. HIST.]. The employer with whom the union has a dispute is 
typically, and will be here, referred to as "the primary employer"; the other, with whom 
he does business and who is the object of the boycott pressure, is "the secondary 
employer." 
5. One may, I believe, accurately differentiate the following terms: A "boycott" 
is a refusal to deal, whether by an employee or a customer (or, more rarely, a seder); 
a "strike"-a refusal to \VOrk-is then a variety of boycott; "picketing" is ordinarily an 
attempt, by means of patrolling at a site with a message of some kind on the picket sign, 
to instigate a boycott on the part of those seeing the picket. 
6. Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strik es and Boycotts-Another Chapter, 
59 CoLuM. L. REv. 125, 129 ( 1959). 
Although Congress has devoted much attention to secondary boycotts and generally 
exhibited httle reticence in expressing its feelings about them, one can hardly say that 
the legislators have demonstrated even general agreement on the identity of the creature 
in question. See, e.g., Senator Ellender's definition: 
A secondary boycott, as all of us know, is a concerted attempt on the part 
of a strong union to compel employers to deal with them, even though the em­
ployees of that employer desire to be represented by other unions, or not to be 
represented at all. 
93 CoNG. REc. 4255 (daily ed. April 28, 1947), in 2 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 1056. 
7. Significant issues involving this dichotomy, and the extent to which the statute 
(particularly § 8(e)) respects it, are raised in cases not involving picketing, principally 
those in which the dispute itself concerns the business relationship between the em})loyer 
of the employees in question and another employer. E.g., International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n (Board of Harbor Comm'rs), 137 N.L.R.B. No. 1 17 (July 3, 1962); Local 5, 
United Ass'n of Journeymen (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (June 26, 
1962); Glaziers Union (E. l<rank rduzny), 137 N.L.R.B. f\o. 25 (June 4, 1962); 
Local 19, Longshoremen Union (J. Duane Vance), 137 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (May 15, 1962); 
Local 1066, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Wiggin Terminals, Inc.), 137 N.L.R.E. No. 3 
(May 2, 1962); Milk Drivers Union (Minnesota Milk Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961); 
Highway Truck Drivers (E. A. Gallagher & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B. 925 (1961), enforced, 
302 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Retail Clerks Ass'n (Food Employers Council, Inc.), 
127 N.L.R.E. 1522 ( 1960), modified, 296 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Washington-Oregon 
Shingle Weavers (Sound Shingle Co.), 101  N.L.RB. 1159 (1952), enforced, 211 F.2d 
149 (9th Cir. 1954). These issues are not considered here. · The primary-secondary dichotomy is similarly drawn in question in cases in which 
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The setting of the problem can be no more succinctly provided than by 
borrowing the words of Professor, now Solicitor General, Archibald Cox : 
Historically, a boycott i s  a refusal to have dealings with an 
offending person. To induce customers not to buy from an offending 
grocery store is to organize a primary boycott. To persuade grocery 
stores not to buy Swift products is also a primary boycott. In each 
case the only economic pressure is levelled at the offending person­
in terms of labor cases, at the employer involved in the labor dispute. 
The element of "secondary activity" is introduced when there 
is a refusal to have dealings with one who has dealings with the 
offending person. For example, there is a secondary boycott when 
housewives refuse to buy at any grocery store which deals with 
Swift & Co. For members of the Plumbers Union to refuse to work 
for any contractor who buys pipe from the United States Pipe Co. 
is ,  strictly speaking, a secondary strike but i s  called a secondary 
boycott and is, of course, the only kind of secondary activity which 
was prohibited under the Taft-Hartley Act [prior to the 1 959 amend­
ments ] .  Thus, there are two employers in every secondary boycott 
resulting from a labor dispute. 
Picketing at the scene of a labor dispute often requires the draw­
ing of fine distinctions between primary and secondary activities. 
NLRA section 8 ( b )  (4 )  ( A )  obviously makes it unlawful for the 
Teamsters Union to induce the employees of the ABC Express Co. 
to refuse to transport furniture delivered at the ABC terminal by the 
Modern Furniture Co., some of whose employees are on strike, for 
one of the Teamsters Union's obj ectives would be to force the 
express company to cease doing business with the furniture com­
pany. Suppose, however, a second case, where the furniture com­
pany telephones the express company to pick up the furniture at 
the factory, but the strikers dissuade the express company's drivers 
from entering. The refusal to cross the picket line, not the strike, 
applies the economic pressure. The words of section 8 (b )  ( 4) ( A )  
are equally as applicable as i n  the first case . . . .  8 
\i\Thether the act bars the conduct described in the prototype case put by 
Cox, or in more complex variations of it, is a problem that the Board and 
courts-including, on two occasions, the Supreme Court-have struggled 
with for more than a dozen years. Time, however, has not yielded a growing 
agreement on an approach to the problem. Through the many shifts of em­
phasis and approach manifested by the precedents, perhaps the most stable 
element has been discord ; whatever the result, one can ordinarily expect Board 
decisions in this field to be divided. In these pages I will endeavor, after 
describing the experience with the problem,9 to analyze the contending ap-
the union, having a dispute with the primary employer, asserts that it also has a dispute 
with the allegedly secondary employer, so that the taking of strike action against it i s  
primary and lawful.  Such cases merely raise issues of fact. See, e.g., Roanoke B ldg. 
T rades Council ( Kroger Co. ) ,  1 17 N.L.R.B. 977 ( 1957)  ; Chauffeurs Union ( Rei l ly 
Cartage Co. ) ,  1 10 N.L.R.B. 1 742 ( 1954 ) . 
8. Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 
44 MrNN. L. REv. 257,  271  ( 1959 ) .  
9 .  The reader who i s  fami l iar with the l i tigation i n  this area, o r  who i s  reluctant to 
1366 COL UMBIA LAW RE VIE W 
_j � [ Vol. 62 : 1363 . �1 
I 
proaches to the primary-secondary dichotomy as applied to picketing, 
offer a suggested rationale. 
and to ;: J '"· � 
I .  THE SHIFTING CuRRENTS oF BoARD DocTRINE, 1 949- 1962 
A. Picketing at the Primary Employer's Place of Business 
The Board first seriously considered the effect of section 8 ( b) ( 4) on 
assertedly primary activity in Oil Workers (Pure Oil Co. ) .10 The respondent 
union, engaged in a contract-renewal dispute with Standard Oil Company, 
picketed a dock leased to Standard for loading oil .  Pure Oil had the 
right to use the clock for the same purpose, and when the strike made the 
Standard employees who ordinarily loaded Pure as well as Standard Oil 
products unavailable, Pure Oil sought to have its own employees do the 
loading work. They refused to cross the picket line at the dock. In addition, 
the respondent advised the National Maritime Union's local port agent by 
letter that Pure Oil's cargo was "hot" at the Standard Oil dock but that it 
was nonetheless "cleared" for loading by Standard foremen. 
The Board, in dismissing the complaint, held that, because the picketing 
was carried on at the primary employer's premises, and the appeal to boycott 
contained in the National Maritime Union's letter referred only to services 
to be performed at those premises, the union's actions were "primary" rather 
than "secondary." The Board stated that "the appeals contained in the letters, 
no less than the appeals inherent in the picketing of the dock and in the signs 
which were posted adjacent to the picket line, thus amounted to nothing more 
than a request to respect a primary picket l ine at the Employer's pre111ises. 
This is traditional primary strike action."11 This being so, the fact that it 
induced secondary employees to refuse to handle Pure Oil products, in order 
to force Pure Oil to cease doing business with Standard Oil, was not decisive. 
"A strike, by its very nature, inconveniences those who customarily do busi ­
ness with the struck employer. Moreover, any accompanying p icketing of the 
employer's premises is necessarily designed to induce and encourage third 
persons to cease doing business with the picketed employer. It does not follow, 
however, that such picketing is therefore proscribed by Section 8 ( b )  (4 )  ( A )  
o f  the Act."1� Senator Taft had made i t  clear, the Board reasoned, that the 
section applied to secondary activity only, and that primary strikes ·were not 
condemned. "'All this provision of the bill does,'" the Senator had said, "'is 
read a substant ial number of essentially descriptive pages , is urged to skip at leas t  to 
the discussion of the Supreme Court's Geueral Electric decis ion, see text accompanying 
notes 110-36 infra, and perhaps to t he end of Part I .  A detailed description of the course 
of the precedents i s  included because I found it impossible to come to grips  with the 
substantive i s sues unti l I hac! careful ly worked through the cases. 
10. 84 N.L.R.B. 31j (1949). 
11. !d. at 319. 
12. Id. at 318. 
l ·1 
; · i t 
rJl 1 • 
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I 
1 I i 
' 
to reverse the effect of the law [ the Norris-LaGuardia Act] as to secondary . 
' "13 
boycotts. 
The Board thus squarely adopted the view-often described as the 
''primary situs" doctrine-that the act does not bar primary, but only sec­
ondary, activity, and that inducement of secondary employees to refuse to 
work at the primary employer's premises is primary activity. The Board, 
however, was apparently not content to stop there, but attempted to accom­
modate its decision to the language of the statute: 
Moreover, on the facts of this case we would be compelled to 
dismiss the complaint on yet another ground, because we are not 
persuaded that an object of the Union's activity was forcing or 
requiring Pure Oil  to cease doing business with Standard Oil . . . .  
The fact that the Union's primary pressure on Standard Oil may 
have also had a secondary effect, namely inducing and encouraging 
employees of other employers to cease doing business on Standard 
Oil premises, does not, in our opinion, convert lawful primary 
action into [unlawful] . . . secondary action within the meaning of 
Section 8 (b )  ( 4 )  (A).H 
This alternative holding, foreshadowing similar statements in future cases, 
trails a full portion of problems.  Apparently the terms "secondary effect'' 
and "consequence" vvere meant to suggest an unintended result, as contrasted 
with an "obj ect." But such a view hardly seems consistent with the evi­
dence15 or, more broadly, with the earlier statement that picketing is "neces­
sarily designed" to cause third persons to boycott the primary. 
For a time the uncertainties regarding the rationale and scope of the 
J.lternative ground in Pure Oil remained latent. In several cases decided in 
1949 and 1950, the Board relied entirely on the idea that, regardless of its 
language, the act did not apply to primary activity, and that activity at the 
primary site was perforce primaryY' In one of these-United Elec. vVorkers 
13. Ibid., quoting 93 CoN G. REc. 4323 (daily eel. April 29, 1947), in 2 LMRA LEG. 
HrsT. 1106. 
14. 84 N.L.R.B. at 319-20. 
15. For example, when Pure Oil's superintendent sought to obtain union approval 
of use of Pure Oil employees to load at the clock, the international representative "com­
mented that Pure had no employees who operated the facilities of the pipe lines and the 
dock used in loading cargo, and that no provision for such employees was included in 
the current contract between the Union and Pure. He suggested that the easiest way for 
Pure to get the desired results was for Frank [the superintendent] to help get the strike 
with Standard settled." I d. at 325 (intermediate report). 
16. See Lumber ·workers (Santa Ana Lumber- Co.), 87 N.L. R.B. 937 ( 1949) : 
International Bhd. of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Wine Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 720 (1949), afj'd 
s11b 110111. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2cl 642 (DC. Cir .) . rrrt. denied, 
342 U.S. 869 (1951 ) ; Deena Art11·arc, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949). 1!10difird. 198 F.2d 
645 (6th Cir. 1952). ccrt. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953): United Elcc. Workers (Ryan 
Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949) : International Bhd. of Teamsters (International 
Rice Milling Co ) . 84 ?\T .LR.B. 360 ( 1949), J-e<>'d, 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950), rc<-<'d, 
341 U.S. 665 (1951). 
In Ne1vspaper Deliverers' Union (Tnterborough News Co.). 90 ?\.LR.B. 2135 (1950), 
the Board, following P�trc Oil. held that inducement of secondary employees to refuse 
to deliver ne\\·spapers to the primary's newstancl was primary, because the action induced 
was to take place at the primary site. 
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(Ryan Constr. Corp. ) -the facts made the union's obj ect unusually c1 
Ryan, a general contractor engaged for a four-month period in  constructin ·· 
an addition to the Bucyrus-Erie Company plant, had access to the site throug� ­
a special gate used only by Ryan personnel and suppliers. When the respond:, 
ent union called a strike against Bucyrus it picketed the entire plant, including,; 
the "Ryan gate." The contractors refused to cross the line, and construction . 
work stopped. The resulting section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  complaint was dismissed by 
the Board: 
Section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( A )  was not intended by Congress, as the legislative 
history makes abundantly clear, to curb primary picketing. It  was 
intended only to outlaw certain secondary boycotts, whereby unions 
sought to enlarge the economic battleground beyond the premises of 
the primary Employer. When picketing is wholly at the premises of 
the employer with whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute, it 
cannot be called "secondary" even though, as is virtually always the 
case, an obj ect of the picketing is to dissuade all persons from enter­
ing such premises for business reasons.H 
� . . 1 ·1 1 ;i 
1 
Despite the relative ease with which the Board in  these cases transcended j 
the statutory language, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit balked at ·j 
the result. In  reviewing the dismissal, in International Rice Milling Co. v. j 
N LRB, 18 of a section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  complaint against union picket line conduct j 
designed to turn railroad cars operated by secondary employees away from j ! 
the primary premises, the court viewed with skepticism the Board's "fine 1 
distinction" between primary and secondary activity. Confessing that it 
knew of "no accurate definition for the term 'secondary boycott,' '' the court 
rested its reversal on the language of the act: 
The statute clearly provides a remedy for the type of conduct 
engaged in by the union, without resort to any distinction between 
primary and secondary activities. If the union's activities come within 
the language of the statute, they constitute an unfair labor practice, 
regardless of whether they might have been considered a true 
"secondary boycott" under the old common law or under any of the 
modern and popular theories.19 
The rej ection by the Fifth Circuit of so central a principle in the ad­
ministration of section S(b )  ( 4 ) ,  particularly in light of its acceptance by the 
17. 85 N.L.R.B .  417, 418 (1949). 
18. 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 665 (1951), reve1·sing 85 N . L.R.K 
360 (1949). 
19. 183 F.2d at 26. The court went on, however, to merge its l iteral construction 
with at least the skeleton of the doctrine that the act forbids only secondary activity: 
[I] t is apparent to us that the union was attempting to induce and encourage 
the employees of the [neutral] . . .  to refuse to transport or otherwise handle the 
goods and commodities of the rice mills . . . .  It  seems to us that these activities 
became secondary when the strikers attempted to induce and encourage the 
employees of this neutra 1 ;employer 
Ibid. 
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,20 made the question appropriate 
for Supreme Court resolution. Although the issue was clearly drawn, and ' 
fully briefed,21 the Supreme Court sidestepped the problem by upholding the 
dismissal on the dubious ground22 that the inducement was not to "concerted" 
refusals to work, as then was required by the statute. Language in the 
Court's opinion, however, tended to support the Board's view23 and perhaps 
offset the doubts that would otherwise have been generated by the Court's 
refusal to adopt the Board's analysis. 
The erosion of the primary-situs doctrine is familiar history.24 Although _ 
·
some cases continued to treat primary site picketing as primary,25 several 
important decisions found violations in picketing at the primary's place of 
business .  In Local 55, Carpenters Council (Professional & Business Men's 
Life Ins. Co . ) ,26 the union picketed a construction site in support of a dispute 
with the landowner, who was acting as his own general contractor. Although 
the picketing was at the primary site, and the instances of direct secondary 
pressure against several subcontractors did not constitute violations of the act 
as then written,27 the Board held that the picketing was secondary because 
"directed beyond PBM" at the neutral subcontractors.28 
In Retail Fruit Clerks' Union ( Crystal Palace M ar!ut) ,29 the primary 
dispute was with the owner of a building that housed retail fruit and vege­
table stands, most of which were leased to secondary employers. The primary 
employer offered to permit the union to enter the market and picket each 
20. See Denver B ldg. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326, 332-34 ( D. C. Cir. 
1950 ) ,  rev'd, 341 U.S. 675 ( 1951). 
21. For a summary of the Board's argument to the Court see Koretz, Federal 
Regulation of Secondary Strihes and Bo;;cotts-A New Chapter, 37 CoRNELL L.Q. 
235, 245-48 ( 1952 ) . 
22. See id. at 250-52. 
23. There were no inducements or encouragements applied e lsewhere than on 
the picket l ine. The l imitation of the complaint to an i ncident in the geographi­
cally restricted area near the mil l  is s ignificant, although not necessarily con­
clusive. The picketing was directed at the [primary] . . .  employees and at their 
employer in a manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that, in itself, was 
not proscribed by § 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) . Insofar as the union's efforts were directed beyond 
that and toward the [secondary] employees . . .  there is  no suggestion that the 
union sought concerted conduct by such other employees. Such efforts also fall 
short of the proscriptions i n  § 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) . 
NLRB v. International Rice Mil l ing Co., 341 U.S .  665, 671 ( 1 95 1 ) .  
The Court also referred with approval t o  the idea that § S ( b )  ( 4 )  d id not "seek . . .  
to interfere with the ordinary strike," id. at 672, citing, inter al-ia, Pnre Oil and Ryan, 
and to the concern of the provision with "secondary boycotts." It also relied on § 13 ,  
although only for its insistence that there be i nducement of "concerted" action. I d. at 
672-73. 
24. See Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strihes and Boycotts-Another 
Chapter, 59 Cow"r. L. REv. 125, 136-41 ( 1959) ; Note, 45 Gm L.J. 614 ( 1957 ) .  
25 .  See District 50, UMW ( Marion Machine Works ) ,  1 1 2  N.LR.B.  348 ( 1955 ) ; 
General Teamsters Union ( Crump, Inc. ) ,  1 12 N .L.R.B. 3 1 1  ( 1955 ) ;  cf. United Ass'n 
of Journeymen ( Columbia-So. Chern. Corp. ) ,  110 N .L.RB. 206 ( 1954 ) . 
26. 108 N.L.RB. 363, enforced, 2 1 8  F.2d 226 ( lOth Cir. 1954) (PBM) . 
27. Clause ( i i )  of § S ( b )  ( 4 )  was added to the statute i n  1 959. For the prior law 
see Local 1 976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S .  93, 98-99 ( 1958) . 
28. 108 N.L.R.B.  at 367-70. 
29. 1 16 N.LR.B.  856 ( 1956) , enforced, 249 F.2d 591  ( 9th Cir. 1957 ) .  
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stand involved m the dispute, but the union picketed the entrances to th�, 
market proper. A divided majority of the Board found a violation of the a t c .  
Two members held that the rules governing "common situs'' picketino-ao· · 
. & 
should apply even though the picketed premises were owned by the primary 
employer; under those rules, the union was obliged to picket at the prin�ary 
stands (where the impact on secondary employers vvould be greatly mini­
mized) if, as was true here, access to them was possible. The concurrincr <!:> 
member relied simply upon his affirmative answer to the question whether the 
union's object was to appeal to the lessees' employees to refuse to work. 
Finally, in Local 618, Autonwt·ive Employees Union ( Incorporated Oil 
Co.) ,31 the primary's operations similarly were closed, but under somewhat 
different circumstances. \!\!hen a contract-renewal dispute at Site Oil's gaso­
line stations led to a strike, Site Oil replaced the strikers and continued opera­
tions. For two years intermittent picketing continued; when Site Oil engaged 
a building contractor to rebuild one of its stations, the union picketed that 
location, and construction work ceased. Thereafter, Site Oil closed the station, 
>vithclrew the employees and removed its signs, and had the contractor's 
employees return. The union resumed picketing, and this latter picketing the 
Board held unlawful, on reasoning similar to the concurring opinion in 
Crystal Palace. 
These cases might have been merely a response to the "accumulating 
experience" of "unfolding variant situations."3� The language of the opinions, 
however, suggests a rejection of the primary situs doctrine. Crystal Palace, 
citing P BNJ as precedent, describes as "common situs" picketing all picket­
ing of premises "jointly occupied by primary and secondary employers.":J:J 
Earlier cases had regarded the common situs rules as conditions for permis­
sible secondary site picketing, rather than as restrictions on picketing at all 
jointly occupied premises.31 Crysta l  Palace concerned lessees of the prim::try, 
with a regular place of business at the primary site, who might therefore be 
thought to stand in a different position. If secondary employers whose con­
nection with the premises was less enduring than that of a lessee vvoulcl be 
considered as joint occupiers with the primary, the principle expressed in the 
opinion would go far to subject most primary site picketing to the restrictions 
30. These rules, discussed in the next section, see text accompanying notes 62-70· 
ii!jra, were originally evolved to regulate picketing at the secondary site  at a ti me when 
primury empioyees \\"ere p resent. In Crystal Palace, they 11·ere applied to the re1-crse 
situation. 
31. 116 N.L.R.B. 1 844 ( 1956) ,  rcv"d, 249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1 957). 
32. Local 761 ,  Int'l Union of Elec. Wo rkers v. N LRB, 366 U.S .  667, 674 (1961 ) 
(Frankfurter, J . ) .  PBM perhaps might h ave rested, as the court of appeals '  decision 
granting enforcement may have rested, see NLRB v. Local 55, Carpenters Counci l ,  218 
F.2cl 226, 231 ( lOth Cir. 195 4) , on a factual Ending that the union 11·as s eeking to induce a 
boycott of the subcontractors b y  an appeal not limited to thei r  employees 11·orking at 
the primary s ite. See 1 08 N.L.R.B.  at 367. 
33. 1 16 N.L.R .B .  at 858. 
34. See id. at 870-7 1  ( dissenting opinion) .  
1 
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5' of the common situs rules. Incorporated Oil goes even further, as does the ·
,concurring opinion in Crystal Palace, and limits even the common situs situa­
, tion to instances when primary and secondary employees are behind the '
picket line ; primary site picketing at a time when only secondary employees 
'are present is unlawful without regard to compliance with the common situs 
rules.35 The rationale is apparent from the Board's discussion: 
The essence of the relevant proscription embodied in the lan­
guage of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act is to outlaw any induce­
ment of employees to cease work where an object of such conduct is 
to interrupt the business carried on between their employer and any 
other company. In simple terms, therefore, the burden of the com-
plaint is sustained if it is shown that ( 1) the picketing ... induced 
[the contractor's] ... employees to cease work, and ( 2) an object 
of the inducement \vas to compel [the contractor] . . . to cease 
doing business with Site.:>G 
This test embodies a wholly literal approach to the statutory provision, 
not substantially different from that taken by the Fifth Circuit in Interna­
tional Rice Nfilling,37 and is a root-and-branch rejection of the primary situs 
doctrine. Despite the court of appeals' sharply vvorded reversal of Incorporated 
Oil,38 there \vas no retreat. It became increasingly clear that the Board ap­
praised union action challenged under section 8 (b) ( 4) against the dual 
criteria found in the statutory language: Did the picketing indt;ce secondary 
employees to refuse to perform services? Vvas an object of the picketing to 
force the disruption of business between the secondary and primary (or 
between two secondary) employers ?39 This became the theory on vvhich 
subsequent cases were litigated. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. vVorlcers 
(General Elec. Co.) ,40 which was to become the vehicle for further Supreme 
Court consideration of the primary-secondary dichotomy, presented essentially 
the same situation as Ryan-a picket line at all entrances to the struck prem­
ises, including a gate reserved for the exclusive use of contractors and their 
employees and suppliers. The Board, without referring to Ryan or its progeny, 
found the picketing unlawful on reasoning resting four-square on the literal 
construction of the act macle explicit in !11corporated Oz:t.H 
35.  1 16 N.L.E.B.  at 1 847-48. 
36. I d. at 1 845-46. 
37. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. 
38. Local 618, Automotive Employees Union v. NLRB, 249 F2d 332 ( 8th Cir .  
195 7). 
39. A footnote i n  Cr}·stal Palace purported to recognize the need for "more 
lati tud e" for picketing at premises "occupied solely by the primary employer . . .  than 
at premises occupied i n  part (or  entirely) by secondary employers . "  The cases ci ted 
for this proposition involved primary site picketing which  turned away deliverymen. 
1 16 N.L.R.B.  at 860 n . 10. 
40. 123 N.L.R.B. 1547 ( 195 9 ) ,  re7/d, 366 U.S. 667 (1961 ) .  
41. 123 N.L.R.B.  at 1 550-51. :Member Fanning concurred, but on the ground that 
the rules governing common s i tus p i cketing should be applied to primary s i te p icketing 
at a gate re scrYed for the use of secondary employees, and that those rules had not been 
complied with. !d. at 1 552-53. 
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When, as in Incorporated Oil and General Electric,42 no primary ern-· 
ployees worked behind the picket line in question, the inference that th , e 
picketing was designed to appeal to neutrals followed inevitably.43 But tile . , . � 
potential reac� of � literal approach 
_
is �f course not limited to such cases, and
'. ' : ,,� \ two cases dec1ded 111 August 1 960, md1cated that the Board was prepared to. - ·it l 
follow the implications of that approach a good bit further. In Union de 
J · 
Trabajadores ( Gonzalez Chen-t. Indus . )  ,44 the striking union picketed the sole 
gate and orally appealed to all persons, including employees of a construction 
contractor, Lummus, not to enter. A majority of the Board held that the 
rules governing common situs picketing were applicable, although the premises 
were owned by the primary employer, because the secondary was "engaged 
in work for a relatively extended period of time at the premises" of the 
primary.45 This was a significant extension of Crystal Palace, which con­
cerned a lessee of the primary. While a construction contractor l ike Lummus 
may have had no more "regular" a place of business than the Gonzalez site, 
it becomes difficult, unless construction men are to be put i n  a class apart, to 
draw a line between "relatively extended" connections with the primary site, 
entitling the neutral to the protection of the act, and relatively transitory 
visits. 
Two weeks before, a substantially longer step had been taken in Chauf­
feurs Union ( McJunkin Corp . ) .46 The acts in question involved union induce­
ment of employees of carriers not to make their scheduled pickups or deliveries 
at the picketed primary premises. The Board had previously regarded such 
acts as permissible primary action, vvhether the inducement was actually 
made by the pickets themselves at the primary premises, or by letter or tele­
phone prior to the planned pickup or delivery.47 The Board, without pur­
porting to overrule any prior cases, held that the record established that the 
union's "whole course of conduct" was aimed at inducing employees of neutrals 
not to handle McJunkin's goods, with the "immediate obj ect" of forcing a 
cessation of business between them and the primary. This factual finding 
42. In a subsequent case much like Gene-ral Elec tric on i ts facts, the Board gave 
expression to what was already apparent-i.e. ,  that Ryan was overruled.  Local 36, Int'l 
Chern. Workers ( Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp. ) ,  126 N .L.R.B. 905 ( 1 960 ) . 
43. See United Steelworkers ( United States Steel Corp. ) ,  127 N .L.R.B.  823, 824-27 
( 1960) , enforced as modified, 294 F.2d 256 (D.C .  Cir .  1 961 ) ; Radio B roadcast Technicians 
( Rollins Broadcasting, Inc. ) ,  1 17 N.L.R.B.  1491 ( 1957 ) .  
44. 128 N.L.R.B.  1 352 ( 1960 ) ,  rev'd sub n om. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 293 
F.2d 881 ( D.C .  Cir .  1961 ) .  
45. 128 N.L.R.B.  at 1354. Applying the common situs rules, the B oard found that 
the oral appeals to secondary employees demonstrated that the dispute extended beyond 
the primary, and rendered the picketing unlawful. For a case applying the common 
situs rules to a l essee of a company j oi ntly owned with the primary see Highvvay Truck­
drivers Union ( Riss & Co. ) ,  130 N.L.R.B.  943 ( 1961 ) ,  enforced, 300 F.2d 3 1 7  ( 3 d  Cir.  
1962 ) .  
46. 128 N.L.R .B .  522 ( 1960) , re,id per curiam, 294 F.2cl 261 ( D.C.  Cir. 1961 ) .  
47. See the discussion of the Pure O il case at text accompanying note 1 1  supra ; cf. 
Chauffeurs Union ( Milwaukee P lywood Co. ) ,  126 N.L.R.B. 650, aff'd, 285 F.2d 325 
( 7th Cir. 1960) . 
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�. , was based on the nature of the primary picketing-confined to McJunkin's f trucking entrance, and found to be for the " immediate, principal purpose" of ,11 . �prealing to employees of neutrals-and on the union's acts in advising 
common carriers with whom it had "hot cargo" agreements that its members l would refuse to handle McJunkin's goods. ( In addition, there was one instance 
f of such refusal at a secondary employer's premises, which was found to 
1 · �;��tj��i��?;fcfi::�I�S:�f ;�;�:���u:�;:���:�ijlT2:Ji�i:�;���2 I tended to accomplish a proscribed obj ective by inducements of secondary em-. ployees, then each particular inducement, being a component part of that total effort, must be adjudged as unlawful."48 Apparently-although this was not I made explicit-all picketing was to end.49 Unless the Board's analysis were to be applied only to cases where, as in . Mcfun!;:in, the specific acts of inducement did not actually take place on the 
picket line itsel£,50 it cast a threatening shadow over virtually every primary 
picket l ine.51 McJunkin and Gonzalez, however, marked high water for the 
literal approach. Before considering the present state of the law as to primary 
48. 128 N.L.R.B. at 525. 
49. The B oard's order d id  not make this clear, and only specific acts of inducement 
were alleged in the complaint to have violated the act. But the Board's reasoning seems 
to apply to the picket l ine itself. See id. at 530 n . 17  ( dissenting opinion) ; cf. Inter­
national Bhd. of Teamsters ( Alexander Warehouse & Sales Co. ) , 128 N . L.R.B. 9 16, 
922 n . 13  ( 1960 ) . 
50. One trial examiner d id  l imi t  the case to such a situation. Teamsters Union 
( Chas. S.  Wood & Co. ) ,  1 32 N.L.R.B .  1 17 ( 1961 ) ,  enforced, 303 F.Zd 444 ( 3d Cir.  1 962 ) . 
No exceptions were taken to the portion of his recommended order resting on that 
holding, and it was adopted by the Board pro forma. 1 32 N.L.R.B. at 1 1 7  n . L  On 
principle, it i s  difficult to support such a d istinction, as the Board itself recognized in  
Chauffeurs Union (Milwaukee Plywood Co. ) ,  126 N.L.R.B.  650, aff'd, 285 F.Zd 325 
( 7th Cir. 1960 ) ,  at least when, as in i'vf chmkin, the inducements were made in response 
to telephone calls by secondary employees rather than by a union official's visit to the 
secondary s ite. But cf. International Bhd.  of Teamsters (Alexander Warehouse & Sales 
Co. ) , supra note 49, at 9 1 7- 18, a case in  which the trial examiner ruled that, w here a 
union maintaining a picket l ine at the primary s ite followed neutral vehicles from that 
site to secondary premises, and there induced employee refusals to handle goods, an in­
ference of unlawful object could  be made as to the primary site picket l ine. The Board, 
in a decision rendered two weeks after 111 chmkin by a three-man panel ( including the 
two dissenters ) ,  reversed this finding, and held that the picket l ine was lawfuL Jv[ chmllin 
was not cited. 
5 1 .  Member Fanning reminded the majority in his dissenting opinion : 
The maj ority approach to 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  in this case is that the paramount consi dera­
tion in  determining the lawfulness of the Union's conduct is i ts object. Having 
found that the obi ect was not restricted solely to the inducement of  Me] unkin's 
employees, the majority i s  satisfied that a violation of Section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( A )  
has been established b y  conduct otherwise lawfuL . . .  I f  [the maj ority i s  not 
mistaken] . . .  then v irtually all picketing must be forbidden under this section 
. . . .  Ten years ago the Board said in Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc., . . .  : 
"Plainly, the object of all picketing at al l  times is to influence third persons to 
withhold their business or services from the struck employer. In  this respect 
there is  no difference between lawful primary picketing and unlawful secondary 
p icketing proscribed by Section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( A ) ." 
128 N.LR.B.  at 531 .  
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site picketing, the development of Board regulation of picketing 
secondary employer's premises must be examined. 
B .  Picket·ing Away From the Primary Site 
Picketing the premises of a secondary is of course a prototype secondary . 
boycott, forbidden by the act.52 \Nhen, in International Bhd. of Teamsters 
(Schultz Refrigerated Serv. ,  Inc. ) ,53 the Board first came to consider the
·-'"' 
effect of section 8(b ) (4 ) on picketing of a secondary site at a time when 
primary employees were present, it had already embraced the idea that the 
section barred secondary, but not primary, action.54 "vV ithin the area of 
primary conduct," the Board reiterated in Schultz, "a union may lawfully . 
persuade all persons, including in this case the employees of Schultz's cus­
tomers and consignees, to cease doing business with the struck employer."55 
Schultz had relocated its terminal from New York City to New Jersey, 
refused to renew a collective bargaining agreement with respondent, and dis­
charged its drivers who formerly worked out of the New York terminal ; it 
hired new drivers in New Jersey, and recognized another Teamsters local 
there . Members of respondent union followed Schultz's trucks making de­
liveries in New York, and picketed around them while ( but only while) they 
were stopped to make pickups and deliveries . As in Ryan and Pure Oil, de­
cided only shortly before, the Board emphasized the pervasiveness of a literal 
52. One possible exception should be noted, although the point is apparently un­
settled. The second half of § 8 ( b) (4) ( B )  condemns secondary pressure to achieve 
recognition, except by a certified union. This clause is  largely or  entirely redundant, in 
view of the initial portion of paragraph ( B ) .  However, the question arises whether the 
permission i mpliedly given secondary recognition efforts on behalf of a certifi ed union 
operates to legalize them entirely, that is, whether the exception applies to the initial 
"cease doing business" clause ( which, until 1959, was in subparagraph ( A ) ) as well .  
There is legis lative history mildly in support of such a view, see S .  REP. No. 105 ,  80th 
Cong., 1st  Sess. 22 ( 1947 ) ,  in 1 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 428, but the Board has apparently 
not ruled on the point. Cf. General Drivers ( Stephens Co. ) ,  1 33 N .L.R.B.  1 393 ( 1961 ) ; 
Chauffeurs Union ( Light Co. ) ,  12 1  N.L.R.B.  221 ,  233 ( 1958 ) ,  e1 1forc cd, 274 F.2d 1 9  ( 7th 
Cir .  1 960 ) ; International Bhd. of Teamsters ( D i  Giorgio Wine Co. ) ,  87 N.L.R.B.  720, 
748-49 ( 1949) ( intermediate report) , aff'd sub 1 1om. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 
191 F.2d 642 ( D.C. Cir . ) , cert .  denied, 342 U.S.  869 ( 19 5 1 ) : Koretz, Federal Rc.r;ulatian 
of Scco11darv Strikes a 1 1 d  Bowotts-A New Chapter, 37 Con xELL L .Q.  235, 239 n.25 
( 1952) . B ttt
.
cf. Retail Clerks Union v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 375 ( D .C.  Cir. 196 1 )  ( by 
implication ) .  
53 .  87 N .L.R.B.  502 ( 1949 ) .  
54. Prior to the Pure Oil decision, the Board had found violation of § 8 ( b )  ( 4) , 
without discussi on of any primary-secondary dichotomy, in several i nstances of picketing 
the site of a construction proj ect where an "unfair" subcontractor was employed. See, 
e.q . ,  Denver B ldg. Trades Council  ( Gould & Preis ncr ) , 82 l\'.L R . B .  1 195 ( 1949 ) , ri'zC d, 
186 F.2d 326 ( D . C. Cir  1950 ) , rev'd, 341 U .S .  675 ( 195 1 ) : International Bhd. of Elec. 
\il/orkers ( Samuel Langer ) ,  82 N .L R . B .  1028 ( 1949 ) ,  cn iorccd, 181 F.2cl 60 ( l Oth Cir .  
1950 ) , ajj"d, 341 U.S. 694 ( 195 1 ) .  Although the early decis ions evidenced no uneasiness 
over a literal construction, see, e.g., the analysis in  United Bhd. of Carpenters ( \Vacls­
worth B ldg. Co. ) .  81 N.L.R.B.  802. 805-08 ( 1949 ) ,  the Board easily fit the results in  
these cases into the subsequently developed primary-secondary dichotomy. See B rief 
for the NLRB as Petitioner, pp. 35-4 1 ,  NLRB v.  Denver Bldg. Trades Counci l ,  341 
U.S. 675 ( 1 95 1 ) .  
55 .  87 N .L.R.B.  at 504. 
1 � 
l 
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� constntction. "Plainly, the object of all picketing at all times IS to influence \"'
third persons to vvithhoid their business or services from the struck employer. 
In this respect there is no distinction between lawful primary and [ un] lawful 
· secondary picketing . . . . "56 The Board, in holding the picketing to be primary 
· even though carried on at the secondary site, relied on two considerations . It 
1 was impressed first by the fact that, although in the "ordinary" case the 
primary employer carried on business at a fixed geographical location, here 
its only premises was a New Jersey terminal, "removed from all contact 
with its customers and consignees." The Board continued : 
[ I ] n  view of the roving nature of its business, the only effective 
means of bringing direct pressure on Schultz was the type of picket­
ing engaged in by the Respondent . It would have been pointless, 
indeed, of the Respondent to establish a picket line at the New Jersey 
terminal and yet allow Schultz to carry on its extensive business 
activities in New York City, unhampered by the Respondent's pro­
testing voice at the very scene of their labor dispute. Section 8 (b ) ­
( 4) (A ) does not, in our opinion, require that the Respondent limit 
its appeal to the public in so drastic a manner.57 
The second factor was the limited nature of the pickets' activities . The Board 
deemed it "most important" that the picketing was limited strictly to the 
area of the primary's trucks and to the time that they were at the secondary 
site,58 that the employees involved in the primary dispute had worked for 
Schultz in New York, and that Schultz was engaged there in his normal 
business of transportation. To the Board, the picketing did not go beyond 
the immediate vicinity of the operations in dispute , and the interference with 
the business of the neutral was regarded as "incidental. " 
Both the rationale and the scope of the S chults principle permitting some 
picketing at the secondary site were further expounded in the landmark case 
of Sa ilors' Union ( Moore Dry D o c k  C o . ) .G9 The S . S .  Phopho, with whose 
owner respondent was engaged in a representation dispute, had been sent to 
Moore for conversion by its employees ; the crew of the Phopho, however, 
was aboard the vessel undergoing training for the voyage. Respondent, 
which had unsuccessfully sought permission from Moore to picket alongside 
the ship, did so at the entrance to the dry dock. The Board, as in Schult:::, did 
not question that the picketing was in part aimed at Moore's employees, and 
regarded the issue as whether, and to what extent, the principle of the primary 
SG. Id. at 505.  A union ofticial admi tted that "of course,  we hoped that the men . 
wouldn't unload the trucks in front of the picket l ine." !d. at 5 1 0  ( di:;senting opinion ) . 
57.  I d. at 506. 
58. Compare I nternational Bhd. of Teamsters ( Sterling Beverages, I nc . ) ,  90 N .L. R B .  
4 0 1  ( 1 950 ) ,  decided shortly after Sclzults, and in which the picketing began before the 
p rimary's trucks arrived and continued for fifteen mi nutes a fter they left, and the l oading 
platform was inside the plant gates, preventing the pickets from getting any closer to 
the trucks than the entrance to the plant proper. The Board held the picketing unl awful.  
59. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 ( 1950) . 
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situs �ascs was applicable." . 
The pcoblem was to deter'." inc the location of."l1 the s
.
1tus of t�e pnmary d1s�u�e . �n the usual ca.se 1� was the prima� �-� \ premises, and m such a case picketmg of the premises IS also picketing of . -1 "l 
the sit.us," and is gov.
erned by P�tre Oil 
.
and Ryan. Where the employe2s. ·,.i .1 
operations are not statwnary, the situs too 1s ambulatory : the truck in Schultz ;' � 
the ship in Moore Dry D ock.  The situs may "come to rest" at the premises of · �· j a neutral, intended by the act to be free of secondary pressure. But if "the .,�.-; J 
only w�y :o p �cket that. situs i s in fr.ont of t�e secondary employer's premises," � . , the umon s nght to p1cket the pnmary s1tus must be accommodated :  "the· < . 
right of neither the union to picket nor of the secondary employer to be free '· .. 1�. · 
from p icketing can be absolute ."61 . . . 
In Moore Dry Dock the Board further articulated and somewhat modified .·. 
the conditions under which secondary site-or, as it came to be called, common · '· 
situs-picketing would be permitted : l'· . In the kind of situation that exists in this case, we believe that picket-
ing of the premises of a secondary employer is primary if it meets ! l the following conditions : ( a )  The picketing is strictly limited to 1 times when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's I premises ; (b )  at the time of the p icketing the primary employer is 1j1 
engaged in its normal business at the situs ; ( c )  the picketing is 
limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and 
( d )  the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the 
primary employer. 62 
Thus were launched the M. oore Dry Dock rules . The Board did not 
elaborate on the reasons underlying each "rule," but the requirements as to 
the l imits of time and place, and disclosure of the identity of the offending 
employer, were evidently thought necessary to create conditions analogous, 
in their impact on the secondary, to primary site picketing.63 The "normal 
business" requirement doubtless drew on the discussion in Schultz of the 
pickets' interest in the operations of the primary being carried on at the 
secondary site. Comparing, however, the seeming content of the rules as 
formulated with the arguments in Schultz and 1l!Ioore Dry Dock for permit­
ting some secondary site picketing, three areas of possible difficulty could be 
seen. First, what is the relation between the requirement-in the fourth test 
in Moore Dry Dod�-that the picketing clearly show that the dispute is with 
the primary alone, and the oft-repeated observation that an obj ect of all 
picketing is to appeal to secondary employees to refuse to work behind the 
picket line ? A clear case of noncompliance with this rule, for example, was 
60. Id. at 548-49. 
6 1 .  I d. at 549. 
62. Id. at 549. 
63. Note the permission given to picketing outside the secondary premises proper 
where closer access to the primary's employer is not possible. Cf. International Bhd.  of 
Teamsters ( Sterling Beverages, Inc. ) ,  90 N .L . R B . 401 ( 1950 ) ,  d iscussed in note 5 8  
supra. 
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'1 �:' iffternational Bhd. of B oiler Ma!?ers (Richfield Oil Co . ) ,64 in which the 
pickets indirectly suggested to the employees of third parties, seeking to enter 
the secondary site on business unrelated to the presence of the primary's 
operations, that they should not cross the line. This is secondary pressure 
ill its purest form.65 But would a union meet the demands of the fourth test 
if it appealed, openly or tacitly, to (but only to ) those secondary employees 
,who were due to unload the primary's truck, or work on the primary's ship ?66 
Second, the idea of the primary dispute having a "situs" that "roves" and ; f "comes t� rest" h
_
as s�ch a large ing_redient_ of me;,a�hor that un�ertainty over · 1· ·
.
'
.
its meamng was mev1table. In particular, IS the Situs of the dispute" found 
' ·· anywhere that primary employees are at work67 or is it necessary that the ' .. 
employees in  question be themselves involved in the primary dispute, as was 
. , true in Moore Dry D ock, and heavily emphasized in Schultz ?68 Finally, and .·.1 so��what related to the pr�c
-
eding �robl:m, a maj
_
or  support of the Schultz 
. opmwn seemed to be the futJhty of piCketmg the pnmary anywhere but at the 
• secondary site. But unless a "necessity" requirement was embodied in the 
concept of the "situs of the dispute" being at the secondary site, the Moore 
1 Dry Dock rules seemed to look only to the minimization of pressure on the i 
I 
I 
secondary, following the idea that, so minimized, the pressure was "incidental" 
and not secondary. In the 1 95 1  Richfield Oil case, the Board, having found 
the picketing to be secondary on other grounds, 69 referred in a footnote to an 
"additional" fact "which, though not controlling, is significant" : the presence 
of a regular place of business where the primary could be picketed.70 This 
principle, so prominent in the Schultz opinion, possibly discarded in the 
language of the 1'vf oore Dry Dock rules, and rather timidly advanced in 
Richfield Oil, was to emerge, full-blown and significantly modified in rationale,  
as the most strenuously litigated doctrine in the area of common situs 
picketing. 
The case in which this principle was first made the ground of decision, 
Brewery Drivers ( Washington Coca-Cola Bottl-ing Works, Inc. ) ,71 was a 
routine example of "roving situs" picketing-following the primary's trucks 
to customer's places of business and picketing near them while deliveries were 
being made-except that, as in Richfield Oil, there was evidence of use of the 
64. 95 '\T.L.R.B. 1 191  ( 195 1 ) .  
65. See also Teamsters Union ( U  & M e  Transfer) , 1 1 9  N.L.RB.  852 ( 1957) , 
where the facts were not so clear. 
66. For an early recognition of the possibi l i ty of a negative answer see Torbert, 
Section S ( b )  (4) (A ) of the Taft-Hartley Law : A Study in Sta tutory Interpretation, 8 
RuTGEP.S L. REv. 344, 375 ( 1954 ) .  
67. This much i s  clearly required. See United Marine Division ( New York Ship­
ping Ass'n ) ,  1 07 N.L.RB. 686, 706-07 ( 1954) ( intermediate report) . 
68. At least one case, decided not long after Moore Dr31 Doc!?, rests i n  part on 
such a requirement. United Constr. vVorkers ( Kanawha Coal Operator's A ss'n ) ,  94 
N.L.R.B .  1 731 ,  1 733 n.6 ( 195 1 ) ,  enforced, 198 F.2d 3 19  ( 4th Cir.  1952) . 
69. See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
70. 95 N .L.R. B .  at 1 193 n.4. 
7 1 .  107 N.L.RB.  299 ( 1953 ) ,  enforced, 220 F.Zd 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955) .  
1378 C O L UMBIA LA W RE VIE W 
picket line to cause the boycotting of Coca-Cola's customers. In holdinrr o · 
picketing unlawful in reliance on such evidence, the Board found },f oore 
Dod: and Schultz not "apposite" on the ground that in those cases the 
employer had no permanent place of business as did Coca-Cola in the case' 
before it ,  "where the union could publicize the facts concerning its dispute."72- · 
The opinion thus did not seek to accommodate the resul t  to the NI oore Dry 
Doc!? rules themselves , but s eemed simply to hold those rules applicable only:· 
to cases where primary site picketing was not f easible.73 Very shortly there- . 
after, hovvever, an attempt at  amalgamation was made.  
General Drivers ( Otis 1VI assey Co.) 74 involved a dispute between 
a company and its drivers and warehousemen employed at the company's. 
warehouse. The picketing activity embraced several construction sites where 
various craftsmen, employed by the primary and repres ented by another union:' . 
were at work. Because the employees involved in the p rima ry dispute were 
not employed at the construction sites and only rarely w ere present  there, the 
Board held that the situs of the dispute was not at the construction sites but, 
was at the warehouse, which the union could adequately picket. Thus the 
first 111  oore Dry Doc!� rule-requiring the situs of the dispute to b e  on the 
secondary employer's premises-v as not satisfiecl.75 Although the idea of an 
adequate opportunity to picket was relied on, with an appropriate  citation to· 
T1Vashington Coca-Cola , the heart of the finding of violation was the concept 
that secondary site picketing is allowable only when the primary employees. 
personally involved in the dispute are at that site. Only if such a requirement 
is met do questions of the adequacy of the opportunity to picket elsewhere 
arise.76 Brotherhood of Pain ters (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.) ,77 however, 
coming shortly after 0 t is ill! ass e)', s eemed to say that vvhen the first  ll1 oore 
Dry Doc!� rule was complied with, the existence of an adequate opportunity 
to picket the primary site was i rrelevant. There, a union representing Pitts­
burgh glaziers, some of whom worked at the company plant and some at 
"outs ide" construction sites where other craf ts were also working, picketed 
both the plant and the sites in support of a strike. The Board upheld the 
72. 107 N.L.R.B.  at 303. The Cola-Cola plant 11 h i c h  1vas being picketed vvas in 
the center o f  to1n1, and the drivers entered and l eft at  least four times dai ly. vVith Schultz 
in mind, the Board referred to a permanent place of business "within t h e  State in which 
the labor dispute arose." Ibid. 
73. Indeed, the two recently named appointees, Chairman Farmer and �I embe:r 
Rodgers, declined to express a view as to the validity of Moore Dry Dock and Schult:::. 
I d. at 303 n.6. 
74. 109 N .L .R.B . 275 ( 1 954 ) ,  rnforccll len t den ied, 225 F.2d 205 ( 5 th Ci  r. ) , c crt. 
den ied, 350 U.S .  9 1 4  ( 1955 ) . 
75.  See also Associated ::\Jusicians ( Gotham B r oadcasting Corp. ) ,  1 1 0 N . L R B .  
2 1 66 ( 1954) , cHforccd, 226 F.2d 900 ( 2cl C i r .  1955 ) ,  ccrt. denied, 3 5 1  U . S .  949 ( 1956) ; 
20 NLRB AN.cL REP. 1 10 - 1 1  ( 1955 ) . 
76. If there is not an adequate opportunity to picket the primary employees involved 
in the dispute at  the primary s ite, picketing may be permissible a t  the s i te where they 
are regularly present, but not at the s ite occupied by other primary employees.  
77. 1 1 0  N.L.R. B .  455 ( 1954 ) . 
i 
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distinguishing Washington Coca-Cola on the grounds that the 
opportunity to a?peal to_ the "ou_tside:_' �lazi_ers ( and to the p�blic at large)  by 
, jcketing the pnmary s1te was msuffi.Clent, , s  and that the pnmary employees r�volved spent nearly the entire working day at the construction sites, so that 
sites could be said to be the situs of the dispute. 0 tis Massey was read 
have held the Washington Coca-Cola doctrine inapplicable when this concli­
first of the 1111 oore Dry Doc!? rules-was met. 
As thus stated, the requirements of vV ashington Coca-Cola and the first 
:. :Moore Dry Doc!? rule appear to be wholly interdependent ; a single factor-
the degree of involvement of the affected primary employees with the sec­
>� .ondary s ite-determines the compliance status of the picketing under both . 
e is, on this analysis, no separate "fifth rule ." However, i t  i s  plain that 
no such general relationship in fact exists. Employees can enter and depart 
from their employer's main establishment several times daily, providing an 
opportunity to picket them there, and still spend nearly the entire work day 
at the secondary site, thereby constituting it the "situs of the dispute. "70 
Inquiry into the nexus between the primary employees and the secondary 
site is thus insufficient to limit J.11 oore Dry Doch to cases in which secondary 
.site picketing is necessary if primary employees are to be reached ; there is ,  
for such a purpose, a need for a true "fifth rule ."  
A true "fifth rule" the vV ashington Coca-Cola doctrine soon became, and 
with none of the tentativeness of the early cases .  A series of cases made clear 
the Board's view that secondary site picketing was lawful only if no adequate 
opportunity to picket at the primary site were present. s o  Indeed, the Board in 
darifying i ts position went so far as to modify trial examiners' conclusions in 
cases that based a finding of violation on noncompliance with the 1111 oore Dry 
Dock rules, in order to rest the il.nclings on vVash ington Coca-Cola . s 1  The 
rationale of this stance was not, hmvever, simply what hac! been intimated 
earlier ; the reasoning in these cases does not rest on the principle, seemingly 
the basis  of the Moore Dry Doc!:: decision, that secondary site picketing is 
primary when carried on in such a manner that the impact on neutrals I S  
78. I d. at 457. 
79. S ee, e.g., S heet Metal Workers ( W. H. Arthur Co. ) ,  115 N.L.R.B.  1137 ( 1956) ; 
Sales D rivers Union ( Campbell Coal Co. ) ,  110 N.L.R.B.  2192 ( 1954 ) ,  order set aside, 
.229 f.'.Zcl 5 14 ( D . C .  Cir .  1955 ) ,  ccrt. den ied, 351 U . S .  972 ( 1956 ) . 
80. See Local 657, Int' l  BhcL of Teamsters ( Southwestern ?\'Iotor Transport, Inc. ) ,  
115 N .L.RB . 981 ( 1956) ; Seattle Dist .  Counci l  of Carpenters ( Ci sco Constr.  Co. ) , 114 
N.L.RB.  27 ( 1 955 ) ; Local 612, Int ' l  Bhcl. of Teamsters ( Goodyear Tire  & Rubber Co. ) ,  
112 N.L .RB.  30 ( 1955 ) ;  Truck D r i vers Union ( N<�tional Trucking Co. ) .  1 1 1  ::\.L .RB.  
483 ( 195 5 ) ,  enforc ed, 228 F.2d 791 ( 5th C i r .  195 6 )  ; Sales D r i vers Union ( Campbel l  
Coal Co. ) , supra note 79. 
8 1 .  See Commission House D ri vers Union ( Eu c l i d  Foods,  Inc. ) ,  l l8 1\ .L .R.B.  1 30 
( 1957 ) ; Local 1 1 7, United Glass Workers ( Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. ) ,  1 1 7  N.L.RB .  
622 ( 1957 ) ; United Steelworkers ( Barry Controls ,  I nc . ) , 116 N .L.R.B.  1470 ( 1956 ) ,  en­
forced, 250 F.2cl 1 84 ( 1st Cir .  1957 ) ; Sheet ?\fetal vVorkers ( W. H. Arthur Co. ) .  115 
N.L.R.B .  1137 ( 1956 ) .  But cf. Local 313, Int ' l  Bhcl .  of Elcc. ·workers ( Furness Elcc. 
Co. ) .  1 1 7 N.L.R.B.  437, 460 n.23 ( 195 7 ) , enforced, 254 F.Zd 221 ( 3d Cir.  1958) ( inter­
mediate repor t ) . 
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minimized. Nor does i t purport to draw on the idea, suggested by the opinion '-,,, in Schultz, that secondary site picketing should be permitted when appeals t"' Jil 
primary employees are otherwise not possible, as an "exception of necessitj� ,. .�4 
Rather, the Board's application of the "fifth rule" proceeds from the same -· ��� l i�eral constru�tion of the ��t that
. 
can�e to th� �ore in the prim�ry site cas'e./· �, _1. 
d1scussed earher.82 The except10n, perm1ttmg secondary s1te picketing: , when no other means of putting pressure on the primary exists, is an excep-i· 'lirr l 
tion to the generally made factual inference that secondary site picketing is 11 . 
aimed, at least in part, at employees of neutrals, and for that reason is ge�-;. t. ,, if.: erally unlawful. ·when primary site appeals are not feasible, such an inference · · 
is no more warranted than in the case of routine primary site picketing.sa Of� 1 
course, the Board had previously-and as late as Moore D ry D ock itsel£84_:: : '; ·1 
reiterated the view that, if its task were solely to infer the objects of the}·� ;1 
picketing, the inference of a secondary object was always warranted. As with'
'
.
· i! 
the primary site cases, the Board in the mid-1950's gave no direct considera- · ·· J. : 1 tion to the accuracy of this contention or its implications. Thanks, however, . 
to a curious turn of events, subsequent cases, while continuing to ignore the · 
point, gave testimony to its truth. The impetus was two decisions of the 
courts of appeals. 
0 tis Massey was reversed by the Fifth Circuit, in part on the ground that 
a union could appeal to all employees of the primary-some of whom could 
not have been reached at the primary site-not merely those involved in the 
dispute.85 However, the court devoted some space to the thought that the 
statute required a finding, "based upon substantial evidence, that the unlawful 
objective denounced by the statute actually existed,"86 and that such a finding 
could not be grounded simply on the presence of what the Board considered 
an "adequate" opportunity to picket elsewhere. This reasoning, and indeed 
the very language, was approved by the District of Columbia Circuit in Sales 
Drivers Union v. NLRB ( Campbell Coal) .87 There it was conceded that 
Moore Dry D ock, if applicable, was complied with : the employees in question 
spent one-half of their time at the secondary site and twenty-five per cent of 
their time at the primary site. The court found no statutory basis for the 
per se rule, making the existence of an alternative site conclusive ; it paid 
but slight attention to the claim-if indeed one was made88-that that factor 
82. See text accompanying notes 36-5 1 supra. 
83. For the Board's ful lest explanation of i ts reasoning see Local 657, Int'l Bhcl. of 
Teamsters ( Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc. ) , 1 1 5 N .L.R .B .  981 ,  983-84 ( 1956) . 
See also Drivers Union ( Dixie Janitor Supply Co. ) , 120 N .L.R.B.  486, 492 ( 1958) 
( intermediate report ) .  
84. 92 N .L.R.B. at 548. 
85. NLRB v. General D rivers Union, 225 F.2cl 205, 210- 1 1  ( 5th C ir. ) ,  cert. denied, 
350 U.S .  9 14  ( 1955 ) .  
86. 225 F.2cl at 209. 
87. 229 F.2cl 5 1 4  ( D . C. C ir. 1955 ) ,  cert. denied, 3 5 1  U .S .  972 ( 1956 ) . 
88. The case was cleciclecl before Local 657, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters ( Southwestern 
Motor Transport, Inc. ) ,  1 1 5  N.L.R.B.  981 ( 1956 ) ,  was announced, and the Board's 
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,':'� proved the existence of the forbidden obj ect, but its approval of the O tis "· j[assey analysis suggested that such a claim would not have met with j udicial 
1 
1 l 
! 
favor. 
. If specific evidence of a secondary object was required in each case the 
Board readily provided it. In a number of cases, secondary site picketing vvas 
{ound unlawful, first, by application of the Washington Coca-Cola doctrine 
.and, second, on a recital of the particular facts-including (but not limited to ) 
the existence of an opportunity for primary site picketing-leading the Board 
to infer the unlawful object.89 A variety of acts have been held to imply this 
.0bj ect,90 but the more significant fact seems to be that in no case found did 
the Board fail to discern grounds for concluding that the picketing was de­
signed, at least in part, to appeal to a neutral's employees. This development 
suggests the weakness of trying, as the courts of appeals did, to dispute the 
"rigidity" of Washington Coca-Cola by viewing the Moore Dry D ock rules 
as guides to the union's object. The search for "an object" is  destined to 
succeed, and the "flexibility" is apparent only. In point of fact, the catalogue 
of evidence in these cases was solely a safeguard against reversal,91 for the 
Board continued to follow its own view.92 
It was to be expected that the reformulation of the basis of Moore Dry 
Docl�, articulated in response to attacks on Washington Coca-Cola, but reflect­
ing changing views as to the meaning of the act, would affect application of 
position, as stated by the court of appeals, does not c learly make the factual argument. 
See 229 F.2d at 517. 
89. Campbell Coal itself yielded to this approach in a second decision. Sales D r ivers 
Union (Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. ) ,  116 N.L.R.B.  1020 ( 1956) , 
enforced sub nom. Truck D rivers Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 ( D.C.  Cir .  1957 ) , cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 958 ( 1958 ) . See Dallas Gen. Drivers Union ( Macatee, Inc. ) ,  124 
N.L.R.B. 696 ( 1959 ) ,  modified on denial of rehearing, 281 F.2d 593 ( 5th Cir .  1960) , cert. 
denied, 365 U.S.  826 ( 1961 ) ; Amarillo Gen. Dr ivers Union ( Crowe-Gulde Cement 
Co. ) ,  122 N.L.R.B. 1275, ajj'd, 273 F.2d 519 ( D .C. Cir .  1959 ) ; Drivers Union ( District 
Distribs., Inc. ) ,  122 N.L.R.B. 1259 ( 1959)  ; Chauffeurs Union ( Babcock & Lee Petroleum 
Transporters, Inc. ) ,  117 N.L.R.B. 1344 ( 1957 )  ; International B hd. of Teamsters ( Ready 
Mixed Concrete Co. ) ,  117 N.L.R.B.  1266 ( 1957 ) ; General Truck D rivers Union ( Diaz 
Drayage Co. ) ,  117 N.L.R.B .  885 ( 1957 ) , enforced, 252 F.2d 619 ( D. C. C i r. ) , cert. denied, 
356 U . S. 931 ( 1958) ; General Drivers Union ( Caradine Co. ) , 116 N.L.R.B.  1559 ( 1956 ) ,  
enforced, 251 F.2d 494 ( 6th Cir .  1958 ) ; International Bhd. o f  Teamsters ( Ready :tvi ixed 
Concrete Co. ) , 116 N.L.R.B .  461 ( 1956 ) ; Sheet 11Ietal Workers ( W. H. A rthur Co. ) , 
115 N . L.R.B.  1 137 ( 1956 ) . 
90. See Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes mzd B oycotts-Anoth er 
Chapter, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, 141 & nn.83-88 ( 1959 ) ,  for a l i sting of some of them. 
91. For the success of this tactic see, in  addition to the second Campbell Coal decision,  
Sales D rivers Union, 116 N.L.R.B.  1020 ( 1956 ) ,  enforced sub nom. Truck Drivers Union 
v.  N LRB, 249 F.2d 512 ( D.C. Cir .  1957 ) , cert.  denied,  35 5  U.S. 958 ( 1958) , the following 
cases : NLRB v. Dallas Gen. D rivers Union, 281 F.2cl 593 ( 5th Cir. 1960) , ccrt .  
den ied, 365 U.S.  826 ( 1961 ) ,  enforcing as m odifi.:d 124 N.L.R.B. 696 ( 1959 ) ; Amarillo 
Gen. Drivers Union v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 519 ( D C. Ci r . ) ,  enfo rcing 122 N.L.R.B.  
1275 ( 1959 ) : General Truck Drivers Union v.  KLRB, 252 F.2d 619 ( D .C. Cir . ) ,  cert. 
denied, 356 U.S. 931 ( 1958) , enforcing 117 N.L.R.B.  885 (1957) ; NLRB v. General 
D rivers Union, 251 F.2cl 494 ( 6th Cir. 1958) , enforcing 116 N.L.R.B.  1559 ( 1956 ) . 
92. After a time, whether from a renewal of boldness or for other reasons, opin;ons 
came once again to rely solely on the TV ash ington C oca-C a la doctrine, expressed as \vhat 
amounted to an inevitable inference of fact. See Local 560, Int'l B hd. of Teamsters 
( Pennsyh·ania R.R. ) , 127 N.L.R.B .  1327, 1329 ( 1960) ; Teamsters l.�nion ( Cal i fornia 
Ass'n of Employers ) , 120 N .L.R.B. 1 161, 1163 ( 1958) . 
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the lVI oore Dry Doc/:: rules in cases in which the Washington Coca-Cola 
ciple was plainly not called into play. Those rules, as j ustified and 
in the lVI oore Dry D ock decision, seemed to have as their purpose the rnil)i:_ 
mization of the impact of the challenged picketing on  secondary employer; 
They proved sufficiently flexible, however, so that, with the words 
�· 
they could be used as a means of determining the object of the picketing. At 
the outset, the rules in effect demanded simply that the pickets refrain from 
seeking to boycott the secondary by, for example, urging employees of third .� 
persons, coming to the secondary site on business unrelated to the primary,.,;· 
not to enter.03 The Board shrank from inquiring into the actual obj ect of . 
secondary site picketing that met these obj ective requirements.94 As the
'
: 
Board, however, came to embrace a l iteral approach to the statute the rule 
came to require a finding that the picketing was not in fact aimed at secondary .l� 
employees, and when the context would lead those employees to understand
. �. , 
th�t the �ickets vvanted them to obser�e the l i�e ,  the req�1isite inducement and ·' j obJeCt ex1sted and the act was held v10lated.9') In  practice, the search for the : picketing's obj ect vvas central, its status vis-a-vis the Moore Dry D ock: rule& 
almost an afterthought. This approach, manifested in several contexts,96 took 
its potentially most far-reaching form in Seafarers' Int'l Un-ion (Superior 
Derrick: )  ,07 in  which the Board indicated that if prior acts made it apparent 
that the pickets, regardless of the content of the picket signs, could "reasonably 
anticipate" that secondary employees would not cross the line, they were 
93. S ee, e.g., United Ass 'n  of Journeymen ( Columbia-So. (hem. Corp. ) ,  11(} 
N.L.RB. 206 ( 1954) ; Chaufieurs Union ( Hoosier Petroleum Co. ) ,  106 N.L.RB. 629 
( 1953 ) ; International BhcL of Boiler Makers ( Richfield O i l  Co. ) ,  95 N .L.RB .  1 191 
( 1 95 1 ) ,  discussed at text accompanying note 64 su.pra ; I nternational Bhd.  of Teamsters 
( Sterling B everages, Inc. ) ,  90 N.L.RB.  401 ( 1950 ) ,  d iscussed i n  note 58 supra. Bllt cf. 
Torbert, supra note 66, at 375. Recent instances of union conduct violating such a 
requi rement are Building Trades Counci l ( Apartment B ldg. Realty Trust ) ,  1 36 N .L.RB. 
No. 1 04 ( A pr i l  1 7, 1962) ; Local 20,  S heet Metal Workers ( B ergen D rug Co. ) ,  1 32 
N .L .R B . 73 ( 1 961 )  ; I nternational  Hod Carriers Union ( Gi l more Constr. Co. ) ,  1 27 
N.L.RB. 5 4 1 ,  enforced as modified, 285 F.2d 397 ( 8th Cir .  1 960 ) , ccrt. denied, 336 U .S. 
903 ( 1 96 1 )  ; \Vilmington B ldg. Trades Council  ( ]ames H. ·wood ) ,  126 N.L.R.B.  621 
( 1 960 ) .  
94. Sec text accompanying note 60 supra ; Baltimore Bldg. T rades Co11nci l  ( S tover 
Steel Serv. ) , 1 08 N.L.R. B .  1 575 ( 1 954 ) , rev'd sub nom. Piczonki v. NLRB, 219  F.2d 
879 ( 4th Cir. 1 955 ) .  
95.  See United Ass'n of Journeymen ( B i shop P lumbing & Elec. Co. ) ,  126 N .L.R.B .  
1 142, 1 148-49 ( 1960)  ( intermediate report ) ; Journeymen Barbers Un ion ( Chicago & 
I l l .  Hairdressers Ass'n ) ,  120 N.L.R.B.  936, 939-40 ( 1958) ( alternative holdin g ) . 
96. If "roving s i tus" p ickets entered a store and spoke di rectly to secondary em­
ployees about to accept a del ivery from the picketed truck, the requisite obj ect w a s  
prm·ed ; jl;f o o r e  Dr_v Docl/s third requi rement, that picketing be reasonably clos e  to the 
primary's vehic le, was not met. See International Union of  United B rcwerv \Vorkers 
( Adolph Coors Co. ) ,  121  N.LR.B.  2 7 1 . 273 ( 1958) , rc<id. 272 F.2cl 8 1 7  ( 1 0th .C i r . 1959) . 
Simi larly, i f  picketing of the primary's ship at a repair drv dock continued after the 
primary's nonsupervisory employees were temporarily removed from the vessel .  an obi ect 
w a s  necessari ly to appeal to secondary employees ; the primary being deemed no l onger 
eng;J gec! in its normal business at the drydock, the second 11l o o re Dn• Ooch rule \Yas 
violated. See Seafarer's Union ( Salt  Dome Prod. Co. ) , 1 1 9 N. L.R . B .  1 638, 1 64 1  ( 1 958 ) , 
1-c,•'d. 265 F.2d 58.1 r D.C. Cir. 1 95 9 ) . 
97. 1 22 N.L.RB. 52 ( 1 958) , 273 F.2d 891 ( 5th C i r. ) ,  ccrt. den ied, 364 US 816  
( 1 960) . 
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�·�, ;equired, in order to avoid a finding of the forbidden obj ect, to "make clear" 
�· 'to approaching secondary employees that they were not being solicited to 
1 •· refuse to cross ; otherwise, the picketing would not clearly disclose t hat the 
, dispute was with the primary, as the fourth Moore Dry Dock rule requires.98 
··But, if the material issue is the union's object, as demonstrated by its activity 
'· · in the light of reasonable expectations as to the response of secondary em­
ployees to the picket line, there are no logical grounds for limiting this 
reasoning to cases in which the specific apprisal by past experience comes, as 
in Superior Derrick, from the particular dispute in question; the experience 
that has taught the Board that "the mere appearance of a picket is frequently 
akin to a strike signa1' '99 is not foreign to picketing unions. The Fifth Circuit, 
in enforcing the Board's order in Superior D errich ,100 accepted the Board's 
reasoning with such v1gor that hardly any room for qualification appeared f left : It is not, as the l\Joore Drydock doctrine phrased it, merely a ques­tion of negativing the existence of a disp l f te vvith the secondary em­
ployer. The activity, including the picket line, must be conducted in 
such a way that the normal appeal of a picket line is overcome. It 
must be clone so that all secondary employees will know that the 
primary union does not seck wllat the law forbids-pressure on the 
primary employer through pressure from the secondary employer 
because of concerted pressure of secondary employees on that sec­
ondary employer. 101 
The reaction of the District of Columbia Circuit to these v1ews was a 
pole apart. In reversing Seafarers Union ( Salt D o me Prod. Co. ) ,w2 the 
court first brushed aside the Board's attempt to fit its finding within the 
skeleton of the 111 oore Dry D oc/;; rules. 1 03 Curiously regardi ng the issue as 
separate from the question of compliance ,,·ith il1 oore Dry Dock, it then con­
sidered the Board's finding of inducement of secondary employees with the 
forbidden object. The court stated the problem in terms that sounded con­
sistent with the Board's approach to the statute,104 but its analysis of the 
statutory issue showed a deep disagreement with the Board's then current 
98. 122 N . L R . B .  at 55 -56, see B rotherhood of Painters ( Paint & Decorating Con­
tractors ) ,  1 09 N.L. R B .  1 163 ( 1 954 ) . 
99. 1 22 N . LR.B. at 5 5 -56.  
1 00.  S uperior Derrick Corp. v .  NLRB, 273 F.2d 89 1 ( Sth C i r. ) ,  ccrt.  denied, 364 
u.s. 8 1 6  ( 1 960 ) . 
1 0 1 .  273 F.2d at 897. 
1 02. 1 1 9 N . L R B .  1 638 ( 1 958) , rr�:d, 265 F.2d 585 ( D .C. Cir .  1 9 59 ) .  
1 03. !d. a t  589-90 ; see note 96 supra. 
1 04. In the case at  bar, if  the obj ective of the strike encompassed Salt Dome 
[ the primary] only, it was l egal .  If its  obj ective was partly Todd or i ts em­
ployees, i t  was i l legaL The difference i s  in w hether the e ffect on Todd's \YOrkers 
was an obj ective o f  the s trike or was merely an incident of i t  
2 6 5  F.2cl at 5 9 0 .  This statement of the is sue suggests t hat a reversal ,,·ou l d  r e s t  on a 
mere factual disagreement with the B oard. See Koretz. Federal Regulation of Secondary 
Stril:rs and Boyro lls-A n o thcr Chap ter, 59 CoLUCIL L REv. 125 ,  1 � 0-41 ( 19 59 ) . For 
reasons immediately to be given, I regard the suggestion as misleading. 
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view of the basis of Moore Dry Dock. Indeed, one would have to go back ·to· 
the M oore Dry Dock decision itself for a similar approach.105 The court said : 
In this case Todd [ the secondary] was under economic pres­
sure, because one of its drydocks -v as unusable and i t  could not go 
forward with one piece of business . . . .  The mere fact that Todd 
felt some pressure from the picketing of the Pelican [the primary's 
vessel] is not dispositive of the problem under Section 8 ( b )  ( 4) . 
The critical consideration is that the pressure thus put upon Todd 
was not different from that felt by servicers or suppliers under the 
most ordinary circumstances when a customer of theirs is picketed. 
The question which remains is : Did the Union intend a more 
direct effect on Todd ? The statute makes the "obj ect thereof" the 
critical factor. Did the Union intend to place a boycott on Salt 
Dome [ the primary] alone, with only an incidental economic effect 
on Todd and Gulf, or did it intend to place a boycott on Todd and 
Gulf along with Salt Dome ? . . .  All the concrete evidence nega­
tives an obj ective on the part of the Seafarers Union to force or 
require Todd to do anything . . . .  Vve do not view the acts of the 
Union as evidencing an obj ective to affect Todd any more than any 
picket line might affect a servicer or supplier of the picketed em­
ployer.l06 
The "object" the court is  speaking of is  not any appeal directed toward 
secondary employees, but a union-induced boycott of the secondary, broader 
in scope than its work on the primary's ship . This rationale is ,  as the court 
is aware and so fully explains, a reflection and an application of the primary 
situs doctrine, as first expounded by the Board a decade earlier.107 It is 
absolutely at odds with the later Board's approach to section S ( b )  ( 4 ) . 
As has been true in the primary site area, since 1 959 the strength-or 
at least the rigor-of the l iteral approach has waned. For a time, the Board 
pursued a somewhat unsteady path,108 although the dominant tone was as 
before.109 Today, however, the tone is far different, by reason of developments 
now to be examined. 
105.  See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra. 
106. 265 F.2d at 591 -92. 
1 07. See text accompanying notes 10-17  supra. 
108. Com pare International O rganization of Masters ( Chicago Calumet Stevedoring 
Co. ) ,  125 N .LR.B.  1 1 3  ( 1959) , in which the Board found Moore Dry Dock complied with 
despite evidence of  appeals to secondary employees, id. at 1 14 n . 1 ,  the trial examiner 
relying spec ifically, id. at 126 n.7, on the S aft Dome reversal, with Local 299, Sheet Metal 
Workers ( S . M.  Kisner & Sons ) ,  1 3 1  N.L.R.B. 1 1 96, 1200-01 ( 1961 ) ( alternative hold­
ing) , requiring disclaimers of any desire to have secondary employees respect the picket 
l ine, and Highway Truckdrivers Union ( Riss & Co. ) ,  130 N.L.RB.  943, 949-50 ( 1961 ) ,  
enfo;·ced, 300 F.Zcl 3 1 7  ( 3cl Cir .  1962) , i n  which employees of secondary employers that 
carried the primary's freight from premises j ointly occupied by them were held insulated 
by Moore Dry Dock from direct appeals not to enter or leave the premises while carry­
ing such freight See also Teamsters Union ( Chas. S. ·wood & Co. ) ,  1 32 N.L.R.B. 1 1 7, 
124-25 ( 1961 ) .  enforced, 303 F.2d 444 ( 3d Cir. 1962) ( intermediate report) .  
109.  See Plumbers Union ( Piggly-Wiggly) , 1 33 N.L.R.B.  307 ( 1 96 1 ) ,  in  which i t  
was said that the  trial examiner could conclude that 111 oore Dry Dock was inapplicable 
when the union's "demonstrated obi ective" ·was to force the secondary to cease doing 
business with the primary. Id. at 3 14  n.S. The Board found Moore D ry Dock not com­
plied \Yith, and did not pass on the point. Id. at 308. 
j . 1 l 
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The General Electric Decision 
.. ·J  ·when the Supreme Court agreed to review the General Electric decision, .�':the opportunity was presented for definitive settlement of many of the ques­tions that had been vexing Board members and circuit court j udges for a 
(!ecade. The respondent union "freely admitted" that its picketing of the 
•reserved gate110 was intended to appeal to employees of neutral contractors 
to stay away from the struck plant ; it rested its case on the validity of this 
fundamental proposition : "it is a permissible obj ect of primary picketing in 
. ··a labor dispute to induce employees of customers, suppliers and others who 
. _, · perform services of benefit to the primary employer at his place of business " ;j · to refrain during the labor dispute from rendering such services to him.' '1 1 1  ·;·�� - This principle was j ustified largely on arguments drawn from the legislative 
history of the Taft-Hartley Act and from certain factual assertions as to the 
role and nature of primary and secondary activity.U2 The aim of the legis­
lators, the union argued, was to outlaw "secondary boycotts," and although 
Congress rej ected defenses of certain kinds of secondary pressure,113 a "com-
mon understanding" at common law was that appeals to neutral employees 
to respect a picket line at the primary site were primary in character, designed 
to bring about a "sympathetic primary boycott," and not a "secondary boy-
cott." Congress desired to do "nothing to outlaw" primary strikes, and there-' . fore "not merely the right to cease work, but all of the traditional means by which strikers exert primary economic pressure" were to remain unimpaired j by the restrictions of section 8 (b ) ( 4) . Picketing the primary employer's 
' business, the "most traditional" of these means, is , the union contended, 
essential to the right to engage in primary strikes. In applying these prin­
ciples, the guiding consideration is whether the secondary employees, the 
object of the pickets' appeal, are performing work of benefit to the primary 
employer. If so, as in the case of all primary site picketing ( except that which 
seeks to induce secondary employers to refuse to do any work for their em­
ployer) and of secondary site picketing limited as originally contemplated by 
the Moore Dry D ock rules,114 the picketing is primary and lawfuL 
The brief submitted on behalf of the NLRB was, at the least, a signifi­
cant reformulation of the Board's approach to section 8 (b) ( 4) ; at most, it 
was an outright abandonment. The Board admitted the l imitation of the 
1 10. For a discussion of the facts of the case see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
1 1 1 . Brief for the International Union of Elec. Workers as Petitioner, p. 20, Local 
761 ,  Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S .  667 ( 1961 ) .  
1 12. The following description of the union's argument is based on pp. 22-37 of its 
brief, supra note 1 1 1 .  
1 1 3 .  The defenses, grounded o n  a n  asserted "unity o f  interest" between primary and 
secondary employers or employees, were said to have been accepted by some courts. The 
reference was principally to boycotts of struck goods, as in Duplex Printing Press Co. 
v. Deering, 254 U.S.  443, 479 ( 1921 )  ( B randeis ,  ] . ,  dissenting) , and construction site 
boycotts seeking  to remove a nonunion contractor from the j ob. 
1 14. See text accompanying note 60 su.pra. 
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section to "secondary" activity, but t>oted the uncertain content of that terrn 
at common law, and emphasized the congressional concern with "classi� 
cases" of secondary activity when the primary and secondary employers' worl{ 
sites were separated. The legislative history did not, the Board asserted 
explain "where the l ine between primary and secondary activity is to b�/ 
drawn in the situation here, where both employers are at work on the same 
premises ."115  But "the Board recognizes," it was stated, "that a picket line ij 
may legitimately appeal to the employees of neutral employers." The criteria 
for determining in what cases such an appeal was permissible were, however, : · · 
not those advanced by the union, which were said to be inconsistent with the _ · 
congressional ban on partial, as w·ell as total, refusals to work ; rather a test ·· 
framed in terms of the need of the secondary for protection was put forward :  
The important consideration, in the Board's view, i s  whether a 
neutral employer uses the premises, along with the primary em­
ployer, in a substantial and continuous manner as a regular work 
place ; if he does, his interests are entitled to protection there, no 
less than those of the primary employer. 1 1 6 
In such "shared-\vork" situations, the Board asserted, picketing must be con­
fined "to the primary employer's business" ; if there is a "direct and substan­
tial" extension of the dispute to the neutral's employees that does "nothing 
to facilitate" the appeal to the primary employees, the picketing is unlawfuL 
Such a situation can be shown by the existence of an adequate opportunity 
to reach the primary employees at the primary site, as in vV ashington Coca­
C ala ; of a separate gate, as in the present case ; or, in the absence of a separate 
gate, by the existence of different reporting times and identifying markings 
separating primary and secondary employees, as in Gonzalez. The facts in 
General Electric were said to establish the secondary employers' sufficiently 
enduring and intimate connection with the primary site to entitle them to the 
protection of the 111 oore Dry Dock rules ; for in such circumstances, unlike 
those involving deliverymen or maintenance personnel appearing briefly at 
the site, the picketing could be expected to have a substantial impact on the 
contractor's employees.n7 
It is apparent that this approach was not that on which the Board had 
been proceeding since 1 955 _ 118 It fell to the charging party to speak up in 
1 1 5 .  B rief for the NLRB as Respondent, pp. 1 4- 1 5  n.3, Local 761 ,  Int' l  Union of Elec. 
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 ( 1961 ) .  
1 1 6. B rief  for the NLRB as Respondent, supra note 1 1 5 ,  at 19. 
1 1 7. Id. at 32-33. 
1 1 8. For example, i t  does not explain the result in  111 clunk in,  see text accornpanyinrr 
notes 46-49 supra, nor is it consistent with the rationale of Local 657. Tnt'! Bhd. of 
Teamsters ( Southwestern :Motor Transport, Inc . ) ,  1 1 5  N .L.R.B.  981  ( 1 956) ,  see notes 
80-83 supra and accompanying text, or Incorporated O il, discussed at text accompanyina 
notes 3 1 -39 supra. It is closest to the Gon:o:aie::: case i n  approach, see text accompanyin� 
notes 44-45 supra, and is an extension of \\'hat may be thought to be the theory of 
Crystal Palocc, see text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. 
1 
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defense of the literal approach. Its brief emphasized the lack of any consensus j,� ong the legislators as to just what a secondary boycott was,119 argued that 
' . : 1959 proviso specifically protecting "primary" strikes and picketing does 
1 not provide a criterion for defining that term, and rested its case squarely 
· ·00 the statutory language.120 
, With three well-defined and sharply divergent analyses, the Supreme 
., · Court was in an unusually good position to clarify the proper application of 
·� , '�ection 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) .  The Court's opinion, a curious blend of reticence and ;£ t assertion, hardly does that-at least not on its face. It begins by accepting 
the primary-secondary dichotomy and the proposition that section 8 ( b )  ( 4)  :c ;;could not be literally construed ; otherwise i t  would ban most strikes his­
,' J; torically considered to be lawful, so-called primary activity" ;121 but j ust what 
., is embraced by the condemned literal construction, or  what strikes are his­
: .. ,., . torically considered primary, we are not told. The general theme of the ' 
. ·. primary-secondary dichotomy is developed through a series of oft-quoted but 
, only slightly helpful excerpts from several Board and court decisions.122 In 
· recounting the Board's developing criteria, the Court impliedly criticizes the 
Ryan decision123 for applying the situs test "regardless of the special circum­
'l stances involved,"124 without saying what those circumstances were, or how l they were relevantly "special ." 
1 In approving the PBM and Crystal Palace decisions,125 the Court does f give a rationale, but a very different one from that employed by the Board, j either in those or later decisions or in argument before the Court : 
vVhere the work done by the secondary employees i s  unrelated to the 
normal operations of the primary employer, i t  i s  difficult to perceive 
how the pressure of picketing the entire situs is any less on the 
neutral employer merely because the picketing takes place at prop­
erty owned by the struck employer.12u 
The focus seems to be not on the union's obj ect, but on the kind of "pressure" 
felt by the secondary ; and the assertion is that the relation of the work done 
by the secondary to the primary's operations affects that pressure. Such a 
pronouncement fairly demands exposition and j ustiftcation, but none is pro­
vided. ·when the Court, unexplainedly suspending its historical survey with 
1 19. B rief for the General Elec. Co. as Respondent, pp. 28- 3 1 ,  Local 76 1 ,  Int'l Union 
of Elec. Vvorkers v. NLRB, 366 U . S .  667 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  quoting, inteT a lia, S enator Ellender's 
definition of the term. See note 6 supra. 
120. B rief  for the General Elec. Co., as Respondent, supra note 1 19, at 1 5 .  
1 2 1 .  Local 761 ,  I nt ' l  Union o f  Elec. Workers v .  N LRB, 366 U . S .  667, 672 ( 1961 ) .  
1 22.  The Court does assert, as the early Board cases so often emphasized, that "the 
obj ectives of any picketing include a desire to influence others from withholding from 
the employer thei r service or trade," id. at 673, but the setting of the statement indicates 
that rel iance on it  to infer general agreement \\· ith the p rimary situs doctrine is 
unwarranted. 
1 23. See text accompanying note 1 7  supra. 
124. 366 U.S.  at 676. 
125 .  See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra. 
1 26. 366 U.S. at 679. 
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the 1956 Crystal Palace case, elaborates its approach, attention is shifted f "" ' !'. 
the impact on the neutral to that on the picketing union's dispute with
r��:.' 
primary. Posing the question as whether the Moore Dry Dock rules couia . . be applied to reserved-gate picketing at the primary site, 127 the Court turned:···. 
aside union contentions that an affirmative answer would permit the primar. -?'· 
employer to insulate himself from picketing. First, it invoked the court �­
appeals' reversal of Incorporated Oil128-a case which, we have seen, was an:� . 
important prop of the Board's rationale in General E lec tric129-for the prop.''' .. !'
osition that
_ 
withdrawal 0� all
_ 
primary employees fron: the
. 
site could not: 
render previously lawful p1cketmg unlawful.130 Second, 1t demed the applica� , 
bility of a reserved-gate doctrine to suppliers and customers of the struck: ·. l 
plant : · ·� 
I 
� l The key to the problem is found in the type of work that is being performed by those who use the separate gate. . . . [ I ]  f a separate 
gate were devised for regular plant deliveries, the barring of picket­
ing at that location would make a clear invasion on traditional pri­
mary activity of appealing to neutral employees whose tasks aid 
the employer's everyday operations.131 ' � 
Summing up, the Court adopted, as "controll ing considerations," the ij 
criteria for application of Moore Dry Doell in cases like General Electr·ic laid 1 l 
down only shortly before by Chief Judge Lumbard for the Second Circuit : 'j 
There must be a separate gate marked and set apart from other 
gates ; the \Vork done by the men who use the gate must be unrelated 
to the normal operations of the employer and the work must be of a 
kind that would not, if clone Vv·hen the plant were engaged in its 
regular operations, necessitate curtailing those operations .132 
127. Thus the Board's holding that the picketing was unlawful without regard to 
�1oore D ry Doch because no p rimary employees used the gate, see note 4 1  and text 
accompanying notes 41-43 supra, was impl iedly rejected without discussion. But cf. 
note 266 infra. 
128. Local 618, Automotive Employees Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 332 ( 8th Cir. 
1 95 7 ) . 
129. See text accompanying notes 37-41 sHPra. 
1 30. One may therefore wonder how the Court could say that "the basis  of the 
Board's decision in this case [ Gcne·ral Electric] would not remotely have that effect," 
366 U . S .  at 680, having j ust c ited the reversal of a Board decis ion with precisely that 
e ffect. Surely the "basis" of the Board decision in  Gen eral Elec tric was not that of the 
Eighth Circuit's reversal in Incorpora ted Oi l ! Although the Cour t  was c learly modifying 
s ignificantly the permissible basis of General Electric, it for some reason seems to pretend 
that no change was being worked. 
1 3 1 .  366 U.S.  at 680-81 .  The Court supported this vie\v by referring to the proviso, 
added in  1959, protecting a "primary strike or primary picketing" : 
The proviso was directed against the fear that the removal of "concerted" from 
the statute might be interpreted so that "the picketing at the factory violates 
section 8 (b )  ( 4 )  ( A )  because the pickets induce the truck drivers employed by 
the trucker not to perform their usual services where an obi ect is to compel the 
t rucking firm not to do business with the . . .  manufacturer during the strike." 
Analvsis of the bill prepared by Senator Kennedy and Representative Thompson, 
105 Cong. Rec. 16589. 
Id. at 681 .  
1 32. United Steelworkers v .  N L R B ,  289 F.Zcl 591 ,  5 9 5  ( 2 cl  C i r .  1961 ) .  
1 
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J .. e';he case was ordered remanded to the Board for consideration of the nature 
: · of the work done by General Electric's contractors ; if a substantial amount 
, of work were found to be "conventional maintenance work necessary to the 
··1 l 
I 
i 1 ! ; 
I 
l 
· �orrnal operations of General Electric, the use of the gate would have been 
a rningled one outside the bar"133 of the statute. Otherwise, the order to 
.. cease and desist was entitled to be enforced. · 
The reaction of a reader of the General Electric opmwn might well be 
like that of a visitor to Delphi who suddenly realizes that the Oracle has d is­
·'· closed all it will, and the portion already dispensed, so almost-illuminating 
and perplexing, is the entire message. The Court, by holding that i t  is primary 
to appeal to neutral employees "whose tasks aid the employer's everyday 
operations," squarely rej ected the view that only appeals to primary employees 
·. are primary. But on what rationale ? vVas it nothing more than the legislative 
history of the 1 959 proviso ?134 If  so, was that enactment to be taken to have 
narrowed the reach of section S ( b )  ( 4 ) ? And why then is the union's posi­
tion, permitting appeals to all secondary employees whose activities aid the 
primary's operation, also rej ected ? vVhy may only aids to "everyday" activities 
be aimed at ? Why is the nature of the work crucial ? Is i t  because of its 
significance to the secondary, the primary, or the picketing union ? Finally, 
given a test framed in terms of the nature of the work done, of what possible 
relevance is a separate gate ? If  the 1\II oore Dry Dock rules are to be applied, 
they can do service at a "mingled" gate as well ; indeed, they were originally 
designed for such a case. Of course, their impact will vary. Some picketing 
of the gate will be permitted, but it must be limited in  time and manner to 
appeal to certain primary and secondary employees only. But the seeming 
promulgation of an independent requirement that there be a separate gate sug­
gests that 1\II oore Dry Dock: would be inapplicable merely because of mingled 
use of the gate. vVas such a position in fact taken by the Court ? 135 If  so, on 
what ground ? 
I do not mean to suggest that these questions, or any of them, can not 
be satisfactorily answered.136 However, unless they are answered, unless 
the seeming ipse d ixit of General Electric is  integrated with the i ssues of 
the primary-secondary dichotomy, the scope and meaning of that case can 
not be understood, and it may well unsettle more than it clarifies. 
133. 366 U.S. at 682. 
134. See note 1 31 supra. 
135. There is some ground for believing that "the decision is predicated upon the 
fact that there is a reserved gate, rather than establishing the criterion that there must 
be one." Zimmerman, Secondary Picketing and t l1 e  Rescn}ed Gate : Thr Gen eral Elec­
tric Doctrine, 47 VA. L. REv. 1164, 1 1 79 ( 1961) . However, the manner in which the 
court stated the three "co:1trolling considerations," and its characterization of a "mingled 
gate" at the primary site as "outside the bar of § 8 ( b )  (4) ( A) ," 366 U.S. at 682, suggest 
that there is indeed a reCluircment of a separate gate. Cf. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 
293 F.2d 881 m . C. Cir. 1961) . 
136. Indeed. l essay a rationale. within the frame11·ork of GCilcral Electric's pro­
nouncements, in Parts III  ami IV infra. 
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D .  The Approach o f  the ((Kennedy Board" i ' l 
Although the Board has had few occasions to consider the impact of the .�.1 
Supreme Court's ruling on primary site picketing, those occasions indicate;;:.
� 'l 
that tribunal's willing acc:ptanc� of General Electric's l iri_1itations on a lit�ral ,, .�f-1 
approach. I n  Local 589J , Umted Steelwor!?ers ( Carner Corp . ) ,  the re- :J'l :pondent union, by pick
_
eting and by physical obstruction and threats, ,�,rJ 
mduced employees of a ra1lroad, whose track ran onto the plant premises at �· 1 � ' 
a gate used solely by the road, not to handle the primary' s  products_137 There ' ' .l 
was, of course, no doubt as to the union's object, but the Board held the 1.' ; ·j 
picketing primary and lawful on the ground that, as the services rendered "J i 
by the railroad were provided "in connection with the normal operations" of :;lj . ' 
the primary, General Electric was controlling. The maj ority refused to dis-
. 
tinguish the case on the ground that the right-of-way on which the pickets 
stood, having been conveyed to the railroad, was not actually O\vnecl by the 
primary .138 
Carrier raised no substantial question as to the content of the idea of 
work being clone "in connection with the normal operations" of the primary. 
That issue was at the heart of the General Electric litigation, as it once again 
came before the Board ; the new decision, however, hardly suggests that an 
uncertain question was being settled. Noting that work done by secondary 
employees ( sufficient in magnitude to take it out of the "de 1nini1nus" category) 
was identical or substantially similar to that customarily performed by pri­
mary employees, the Board i n  the second General Electric case simply deduced 
its conclusion : 
S ince this work . . . had previously been performed by GE em­
ployees, we find that such \vork was part 0f GE's normal operations. 
I t  follows therefore that this work . . .  was necessarily related to 
GE's normal operations.139 
Neither a substantive exposition or defense of these asserted implications was 
provided, nor any treatment of the function of the rules la id down by the 
Court in distinguishing primary and secondary activity. 
The shift away from a literal approach has been more markedly mam-
137 .  132 N.L.RB. 1 27 ( 1961 ) .  The acts of v iolence were found to violate 
§ 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A ) , 61 Stat. 41 ( 1947 ) ,  29 U . S.C.  § 1 5 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A) ( 1958) . 
138. The court of appeals reversed the decision on this ground. Carrier Corp. v. 
NLRB, 5 1  L .RR1-I . 2338 ( 2d Cir .  Oct. 1 8, 1 962 ) .  There was no opinion of the court ; 
the principal opinion, per Judge \Vaterman, deemed General E lectric's l imitations on a 
literai approach to reflect only a "special policy of greater latitude" for primary site 
picketing. Id. at 2348. As Chief Judge Lumbard demonstrated in dissent, such a narrow 
reading of the Supreme Court's rationale seems difficult to square vvith its opinion. I d. 
at 2352-53. A petition for rehearing en bane is presently pending. 
1 39.  Local 761 , Int'l Union of Elec. Workers ( General Elec. Co. ) ,  1 38 N.LRB. 
No. 38, 1962 CCH NLRB D�:c. � 1 1 556, at 1 7953 ( Aug. 28, 1962 ) . 
· l i 
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{ested m the area of secondary site picketing. Although the parties, when 
the General Electric case first was before the Board, sought to frame their :-· f arguments in  terms that �voul_d . affect the �V ashington � oca-C ola doctrine, · ' the Court's G eneral Electr·1c opm10n made no reference to 1t. Even the 11/I oore 
�-i� Dry Dock rules themselves were only briefly described, with very little indica­.::" t tion given as to their true rationale and virtually none as to their proper scope. 
. i The recent erosion of Washington Coca-Cola has resulted, however, more '" _} from changes in Board membership than from any implications spun out J·� · from the Supreme Court's opinion in General Electric. After several deci­
sions foreshadowed its abandonment,l40 the actual step was taken i n  Local " I. !:��:: 1 :::�n�f :r 1 ':o:::: '::tt�0 l;::�::i::ec ���:;;ic�:' w���e�:ct:p::��n; 
nearly the entire work day at the secondary site, but who reported to the ·-� primary's regular place of business in the morning before leaving for the j ob 
site. In  overruling vVashington Coca-Cola as a "rigid" requirement, the f Board purported to rest wholly on  the rej ection of that doctrine by three 
I 
circuit courts142 and on the Supreme Court's "recent criticism of the Board's 
reliance on 'per se' doctrines in lieu of analysis of the particular facts of each 
case."148 No answer on the merits was given to the dissent's assertion  of the 
soundness of the reasoning underlying 1/Vaskington Coca-Cola, as elaborated 
in the opinion in Local 657, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters ( Southwestern Motor 
Transport, Inc. ) .144 Nor was any attempt made to say, if "rigidity'' only was 
being abandoned, when, if ever, the existence of an opportunity for primary 
site picketing would bar such action at the secondary site.  The Board simply 
held, for no stated reason, that "in the instant case," the primary site was not  
the sole permissible one, and that the secondary site picketing was  governed 
by the NI oore Dry Dock rnles .l45 Cases following Plauche have done l ike-
140. Member Fanning had for some time opposed resort to a fixed "fifth rule," see ,  
e .g. ,  Teamsters Union ( California Ass'n of Employers ) ,  120 N.L.R.B.  1 16 1 ,  1 17 1 -72 
( 1958) ; cases cited in Local 861 ,  I nt ' l  B hd. of Elec. ·workers ( Plauche Elec., I nc . ) , 1 3 5  
N .L.R.B .  N o .  41 ,  1962 C C H  NLRB DEc. � 1 0830, at 16840 n .5  ( Jan. 1 2, 1962 ) ,  and he  
and Member B rown several times pointedly avoided relying on the  T'Vashing ton Coca­
C ola principle i n  cases in which union picketing fai l ed to comply with 111 oore Dry Dock 
itself .  See  Local 861 ,  Int ' l  Bhd .  of  Elec. ·workers ( Cleveland Constr. Corp . ) ,  1 34 
N.L.R.B.  No. 62 ( Nov. 22, 1961 ) ; Local 3, Sheet l\-Ietal \,Yorkers ( Sieb ler  Heating & 
Air  Conditioning, Inc. ) .  133 N.L.R.B .  650 ( 1961 ) ; Teamsters Union ( Chas. S .  \Vood & 
Co. ) ,  1 32 N.L.R.B .  1 1 7  ( 1961 ) ,  enfo1·ced, 303 F.2d 444 ( 3d Cir. 1962 ) . See also Local 
662, Radio Eng'rs ( Middle So. Broadcasting Co. ) ,  1 33 N .L.R.B.  1 698 ( 1961 ) ,  in  which a 
McCulloch-Fanning-Brown maj ority, finding tl1e Washing ton Coca-Cola p rinciple in­
applicable, express ly decl ined to pass on i t s  val idity. Id. at  1702 n .5 .  
141 .  1 35 N.L .R.B .  No. 4 1 .  1962 CCH NLRB DEc. � 1 0830 ( Jan. 1 2, 1962 ) . 
142. These were the O tis J11assey and Campbell Coal decisions, see text accompany­
ing notes 85-88 sl tpm, and NLRB Y .  Local 294, Int'l B hd. of Teamsters, 284 F.2cl 887 
( 2d CiJ·. 1960 ) 0 
143. 1962 CCH NLEB DEc. at 1 684 1 .  The reference was to Local 357, Int' l  Bhd .  of 
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 671 ( 1 961 ) ,  the reversal of the A1 o unta in Pac ific 
doctrine regubting- exclusiYe unicn hir ing hal l s .  See N LRB v. Associated Gen'l Con­
tractors, Inc., 270 F.2cl 425 (9th Cir.  1959)  ( Af o untain Pacific ) .  
1 44. 1 1 5  N.L.R.B.  981 ( 1956) ; see text accompanying note 83 supra. 
1 -:15. 1 962 CCH NLRB DEc. at 1 6842-43. 
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wise.146 To date, the cases applying Moore Dry Dock have involved e 
ployees who spent most of their work day at the secondary site ; unless 
line is to be drawn at that point,147 Washington Coca-Cola is entirely 
That the overruling of the Washington Coca-Cola doctrine was not sol�ly. 
a result of deference to the views of the courts of appeals may be seen fro� 
the recent substantial ( albeit tacit ) revision of the demands of the M 0��e'· 
Dry Dock rules. The Board has begun to return to the original applicatio'n " 
of those criteria. Rather than asking whether the union sought to appeal to 
neutrals, and using Moore Dry Dock "as a guide or tool to facilitate a deter­
mination of the objective of the picketing,"148 the Board is  apparently once 
again employing the four rules as objective limitations on secondary site · 
picketing, finding picketing that meets its requirements lawful without regard
, 
to its actual obj ect.149 For the first time in many years, even picketing of a 
construction site by a union having a dispute with a subcontractor has been 
found to comply with Jl;I oore Dry Dock.l50 As with the first metamorphosis, 
no change was announced, and the verbal form of IV! oore Dry D oc!? remained 
inviolate ; in application, however, the test was once again ·what it had been at 
the outset.l51 How the courts of appeals will react remains to be seen .  
I I .  THE MERITS OF A MODIFIED LITERAL APPROACH 
"Statutory construction in doubtful cases, in the last analysis, i s  a choice 
among competing policies as starting points for reasoning."152 In  such words 
did Frankfurter and Greene offer the "real explanation" of the division within 
the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co . v. DeeriJ zg.15 'l And so might 
one explain the continuing confEct in the Board decisions construing section 
146. E.g., International Bhd.  of Elec. \,Yorkers ( Anderson Co. Elec. Serv. ) ,  135 
N .L.R.B. No. 55  ( Jan. 24, 1962 ) ; Plumbers Union ( Wyckoff P lumbing) ,  133 N.L.R.B. 
547 ( 1962) ; see United P lant Guard Workers ( Houston Armored Car Co. ) ,  136 
N.L.RB.  No. 9 ( March 5, 1962 ) .  
147. This fact was emphasized i n  P lumbers Union ( vVyckoff P lumbing ) , snpra 
note 146, but the Board did not state that its existence was a requisite for applying 
Moore Dr:! D oc!� .  
148. Local 662, Radio Eng'rs ( Middle So. B roadcasting Co. ) ,  133  N.L.R.B.  1698, 
1 707-08 ( 1961 ) ( Member Rodgers, dissenting) . 
149. See cases cited in note 146 snpn1. In Local 662, Radio Eng'rs (.lvliddle So. 
B roadcasting Co. ) ,  133 N.L.RB.  1698 ( 1961 ) ,  the Board said : 
Obviously, where, as here, a union is engaged in picketing a primary nonunion 
employer, i t  necessarily has an obj ect of inducing other employers and persons 
not to do business with, or  work for, the pr imary employer. Such an object, 
however, is not unlawful provided the means used, i.e., picketing and other pub­
l icity are conducted in  a manner not proscribed by the statute, in  this case lawful 
"common situs" picketing. 
!d. at 1 704 n . 10. But cf. Local 730, Teamsters Union ( C. R. Sheaffer & Sons) ,  136 
N.L.RB. No. 88 (April 1 0, 1962 ) .  
1 50 .  See International B hcl. o f  Elec. \,Yorkers ( Anderson Elec. Serv. Co. ) , 1 35 
N.L.R.B.  No. 5 5  ( Jan. 24, 1962) : P lumbers Union ( Wyckoff P lumbing) ,  135  N.L.R.B. 
No. 49 ( Jan. 1 8, 1962 ) . In  A11 derson there was an actual \\·ork stoppage by the em­
ployees of a unionized subcontractor. 
1 5 1 .  See Administrative Decisions of the General Counsel, Case No. SR-1862, 50 
L.RR.M. 1 077 ( Feb. 28. 1962) . 
1 52.  FRAN KFURTER & GREENE, TnE L\BOR INJU NCTION' 169 ( 1930 ) . 
1 53. 254 u . s .  443 ( 1921 ) .  
l 1 
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S(b) ( 4 ) . One comes away from an examination of the decisions dealing with 
the primary-secondary dichotomy with the impression that the attempt made 
to subj ect the contending approaches to section 8 (b )  (4 )  to critical analysis  
has been too half-hearted. The marshalling of argument in  support of  one 
view or another has more of the tone of debate, with points submitted to 
buttress a position already arrived at, than of an evaluation of the factors 
that ought to persuade a tribunal charged with effectuating the legislative 
purpose .  There is  often an undue haste to find, on perusal of the statutory 
text and explicit statements made in committee reports or in debate, that 
Congress has left the matter at large or has manifested contradictory views, 
and has mandated the Board to discharge the task of "accommodation' ' or 
"balancing the interests" as it sees fit ; thereupon the choice is made with 
reference to personal views.l54 Yet if that resolution of complex and contro­
versial contests between "competing policies" that most faithfully reflects the 
values of Congress is  to be made, the inquiry must be carried on in  a spirit of 
maximum vigor and detachment.155 
1 54. This i s  only rarely, if ever, made the expressed process of decis ion, but most 
observers would, I believe, regard i t  as an accurate description, and there is on record 
at last one post hoc acknowledgment of its truth. Speaking with reference to the "Eisen­
hower B oard's" i l l-fated Curtis doctrine, which held minority union picketing for recog­
nition a violation of § 8 (b) ( 1 )  ( A ) ,  Local 639, D rivers Union ( Curtis B ros. ) ,  1 19 
N.L.R.B .  232 ( 1957) , enforcement denied, 274 F.2d 5 5 1  ( D.C. Cir. 1 959) ,  aff'd, 362 U.S.  
274 ( 1 960 ) ,  Member Jenkins described h is  approach to the statutory construction issue 
presented : 
[ I ]  t was [not] the function of the Board to decide what the law ought to be  
. . .  but . . .  when there were two equally valid competing legal theories i n  
any field and when one of them appealed to m y  sense o f  j ustice and the other one 
did not . . . I was going to decide in  favor of  that theory which to my mind 
appealed to my sense of j ustice. 
Hearings Before the Subco1mnittee on the N a tiona! Labor Relations B oard of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 10 19  ( 1961 ) .  
1 55. Of course, i f  in fact two competing views are "equally valid," one can not 
quarrel with the Board if i t  l ets its own views break the impasse. The rub i s  that equal 
validity is  an extremely rare condition. The viewpoint manifested by Member Jenkins' 
statement, supra note 1 54, tends to sap the will to search dil igently for legislative direc­
tion, and often "failure to glean any indication of the legislative choice from the available 
materials may result from the absence of adequate and sustained inquiry, even more 
readily than from the incapacity of the material to yield such indication." MISHKIN & 
MoRRrs, ON LAw IN CoUitTS : AN INTRODUCTION To JuDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAsE 
AND STATUTE LAw 270 ( tent. eel. 1962) ( unpublished ) .  Thus, while the Jenkins state­
ment is unobjectionable if narrowly confined to those cases in which it is  l i terally ap­
pl icable, the very act of subscribing to it as an approach to statutory construction tends 
to cause its application in practice to broaden impermissibly. Cm·tis itself, snpm note 
1 54, as the analysis contained in the Supreme Court's reversal of the Board, NLRB v.  
Drivers Union, 362 US.  274 ( 1960 ) ,  so ably demonstrates, see  text accompanying notes 
1 87-97 infra, provides an i ronically appropriate i l lustration of this tendency. The 
Board's theory was hardly "equally val id," in l ight of the h istory of the 1 947 act. 
The remedy is not, of course, to refuse to recognize that there will  be cases in which 
personal preferences will have to be consulted, or that i n  any case those preferences are 
l ikely to exert their influence. But the former should be treated as a rare bird i ndeed, 
and the latter as a threat to be guarded against. vVhile the problem is certainly not one 
of "will" alone. one will far more often find meaningful evidence of congress ional choice 
among competing values i f  he approaches the inquiry in the spirit  manifested by the 
words of J uclg-e Learned H;:md, contained in a letter read at the presentation of a 
portrait bust of :Mr. Justice Frankfurter at the Harvard Law School i n  1 960 : 
Legal interpretation involves an imaginative proj ection upon the occasion 
that has arisen of what would have been the choice of the lawmakers. There is 
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A.  A 1\11 odified Literal Approach 
I propose first to consider the strength of the obj ections to the literal 
proach, a view that is at present a minority one on the B oard, but one that has 
not yet been effectively put to rest, neither on the basis of reason nor_:__t:io 
matter how often union counsel will quote General Electric's fiat assertion 
that the section "could not be l iterally construed"156-on the basis of au- · 
thority. 157 A reading of the act resting on the words used by the legislature 
i s  surely the proper place to begin inquiry. •. 
The statutory language reaches so far as to cover the act of causing �r 
attempting to cause primary employees ( "any individual employed by any. 
person engaged in  commerce" ) to strike in  order to force or require the
·
. 
primary ( "any person" ) to cease doing business with secondary employers < · 
( "any other person" ) .  Such a reading would of course be absurd,  for every 
strike has the aim of shutting the primary's business by depriving him of 
labor .  In  a sense, then, the proponents of a literal approach, as that term is · 
ordinarily used ( and is used i n  this article ) , can agree that the statute "could 
not be literally construed" ;  for they assert only that all appeals to secondary 
employees having the proscribed obj ect are condemned by section 8 ( b ) (4) . 
vVhy may not such a view be accepted ? The reason given by B oard members 
rej ecting the literal approach-first by the maj ority i n  Pure Oil, Ryan, 
Schultz, and Moore Dry Doc/?,158 later by dissenters in cases like Crystal 
Palace, Supe·rior Derriclc, and 1\11 c]unkin,l59 and most recently in  Local 662, 
Radio Eng'rs ( Middle So. Broadcasting Co . )  160 by a majority again-is 
that such a reading would not narrow the statute at all, because all picketing 
is "necessarily designed" to appeal to secondary employees,161 and because 
"the obj ect of all picketing at all times is to influence third persons to with­
hold their business" from the primary.162 The proper point of departure for 
a defense of a literal approach is to subject this sweeping assertion of the 
facts of industrial life to a skeptical appraisal. Of course, any strike l eader or 
picket captain very much wants his picket signs to have the same effect as 
no certain guidance for this in the words themselves and it is impossible to 
know how nearly the j udge has rightly guessed the lawmakers' putative prefer­
ences. vVould you agree that of all the factors that enter into his art the most 
important is  that he shall abstain from substituting his personal choice ? He is 
called upon to ascribe to others a decis ion that they never actually forecast by 
fabricating factitious appraisals. Ordinarily the best we can hope for is that h is  
guess shall be made only after his  best  effort to reconstitute the gamut of values 
current at the time when the words were uttered. 
156. Local 761 ,  Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S .  667, 672 ( 1961 ) .  
1 57. The dissenting opinions i n  Plauche. see text accompanying notes 1 4 1 -44 supra, 
and Canier, see text accompanying notes 1 37-38 supra, prove no less than that General 
Electric has worked no change in the viewpoint of the adherents of a liter·al approach. 
158. See text accompanying notes 1 0- 1 3, 1 7, 53-62 supra. 
1 59. See, e.g. ,  note 5 1  supra. 
160. 133 N .L.RB. 1 698 ( 1961 )  : see note 149 supra. 
161 .  Oil Workers ( Pure Oi l  Co. ) .  84 N .L.RB .  3 1 5 , 3 1 8  ( 1949 ) .  
162. International Bhcl. of Teamsters ( Schultz Refrigerated Serv. ) ,  8 7  N . L. R. B. 
502, 505 ( 1949) . 
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4 Board of Health quarantines. And he may be well aware that his chances 
:I of bringing effective pressure on the primary through the ( often unionized ) �J: employees of his suppliers and customers are far better than is the likelihood : 1 �0f inducing so-far-unwilling primary employees to make common cause with j the union, or-worse yet-of causing striker replacements to mend their 
�� erring ways .163 But one may question whether so wholly factual and subjective 
a condition is what Congress described as the forbidden "obj ect."164 So long 
as the picketing, viewed objectively, is  aptly set up to serve the purpose of 
appealing to primary employees as well as secondary, may not instances of 
the latter appeal be thought "so unavoidable and so entangled with the legiti­
mate activities of the pickets that the Board and the courts are j ustified in  
finding that evidence of the proscribed obj ective is lacking . . . .  " ?165 After 
all, Congress was presumably concerned with deterring practices i t  thought 
undesirable, not with reforming the state of mind of union officials .  Only 
appeals to secondary employees that do not arise out of acts reasonably 
appropriate (whatever their actual motive) to facilitate appeals to primary 
employees should, on this analysis, constitute sufficient evidence of the pre-
scribed obj ect. 
Such a view, a "modified literal approach," seeking to implement the 
language of the statute while avoiding a patently over-broad reach, deserves 
careful examination. Its asserted incompatibility with other provisions of the 
NLRA, and with the legislative history, needs to be calmly and fully explored. 
B. The "Primary Picketing" Proviso 
At least since 1 959, one can not state a case for a modified literal approach 
without soon coming to grips with the significance of the inapplicability of 
section 8 ( b)  (4 )  to "primary" activity. For the proviso added to the secondary 
boycott section in that year makes its inapplicability express .166 The diffi­
culty, of course, is that the term "primary" is not defined, and it has been 
clear since the court of appeals' decision in International Rice 11/Iilling, if not 
earlier, that the problem is not merely one of stating, but of giving content to, 
the primary-secondary dichotomy .167 
1 63.  An experienced union lawyer has said : " [E]xcept in the mass production in­
dustries, it is the struck employer's inability to get raw materials and to market fi nished 
goods, rather than any difficulty in replacing his striking employees, which provides the 
economic inducement necessary to a settlement of the dispute." Previant, Boyco tts Under 
the 1 959 Am endments, i n  NYU IN STITUTE OF LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL SECURITY, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH A N NUAL CoNFERENCE ON LABOR 14 1 ,  1 45 ( 1 960 ) . 
1 64. Cf. Note, 45 GEo. L.].  614, 642 ( 1957) : "No one has yet suggested that the test 
of a . . .  violation should be what the union would have intended to accomplish by its 
picketing i f  Taft-Hartley had never been passed." 
165.  Brief for the General Elec. Co. as Respondent, p .  15, Local 761 ,  Int'l Union 
of E l ec.  Workers v. NLRB, 366 U .S .  667 ( 1961 ) .  
166. " U ' n othing contained i n  this clause ( B )  shall be  construed to make unlawful .  
where not otherwise unlawful. any primary strike or primary picketing . . . .  " Added 
by 73 Stat. 543 ( 1959 ) ,  29 U.S.C. § 1 5 8 (b)  (4) ( B )  ( Supp. III ,  1962) . 
167. See note 1 9  supra and accompanying text. See also United Steelworkers v. 
NLRB, 289 F.2cl 591 ,  594-95 (2cl Cir.  1961 ) .  
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The proviso was inserted by the Conference Committee app 
reconcile the House-passed Landrum-Griffin B ill168 with the Kennedy-E 
Bil l  passed by the Senate.169 The Conference Report stated : 
' 
The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that the chano-es in 
section 8 ( b )  (4 )  do not overrule or qualify the present rules �f law 
permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute. This . 
provision does not eliminate, restrict, or modify the l imitations on 
picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute that are in  existing 
law. [ citing, inter alia, NI oore Dry Dock, Washington Coca-Cola 
and Pittsburgh Plate Glass p 70 
' 
The particular change referred to  was the elimination by the Landrum-Griffin 
Bill  of section 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) 's applicability to inducements of "concerted '' refusals 
to work only. This was surely one of the most inconsequential loopholes ever 
to engage the serious attention of the national legislature,171 but its "closina'' . "' 
might have been taken to  pull out the keystone of the entire primary-seco;1dary· 
dichotomy. The genesis of attention to the requirement of concert was, of
' 
course, the Supreme Court's International Rice Milling decision,172 which 
approved the result of the Board's primary situs doctrine on that ground.173 
The fear was that the legislative overruling of that decision might be taken as 
reinstating the view that section 8 (b )  ( 4) condemned certain conduct "without 
resort to any distinction between primary and secondary activities ."1 H 
There is some evidence that the Senate conferees, at whose instance the 1 
proviso was added, sought to preserve the International Rice Milling result j 
on a rationale very much like that underlying the primary situs doctrine. The I 
Kennedy-Thompson memorandum, in  explaining the primary character of 
typical primary site picketing, said : 
Now suppose that the Carpenters Union puts a picket line 
around the factory [of an employer with whom it has a primary dis­
pute] which has the effect of turning back the drivers of independent 
trucking concerns. This kind of picketing has never been treated as 
a secondary boycott. It occurs at the factory of the employer pri­
marily engaged in  the labor dispute. It aims at halting commercial 
intercourse with him ( a  primary boycott ) ,  not at halting intercourse 
with persons who have intercourse with him ( a  secondary boycott ) ,175 
168. H . R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st  Sess. ( 1959 ) ,  i n  1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HrsTORY oF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT OF 1 959, at 6 19  ( 1959) 
[hereinafter c ited as LMRDA LEG. HrsT . ] .  
169. S .  1 555,  86th Cong. 1 s t  Sess. ( 1959) , in  1 LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 5 16. 
170. H.R. REP. No. 1 147, 86th Cong., 1 s t  Sess. 38 ( 1959) ( Conference Report ) ,  in 
1 LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 942. The report also cited N LRB v. D enver B ldg. Trades 
Counci l ,  341 U.S.  675 ( 195 1 ) .  
1 7 1 .  See Previant, supra note 1 63, a t  146. 
1 72. N LRB v. International Rice Mi l ling Co., 341 U.S. 665 ( 195 1 ) .  
1 73. See text accompanying note 22 supra. 
1 74. International Rice Mi l l ing Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21 ,  26 ( 5th Cir.  1950 ) ,  rev'd, 
341 U.S .  665 ( 195 1 ) ; see text accompanying note 1 9  s11pra. See also the Kennedy­
Thompson memorandum analyzing the differences between the House and Senate treat­
ment of secondary boycotts. 105 CoN G. REc. 1 5221 ( 1959 ) ,  in 2 L M RDA LEG. HrsT. 
1 707. 
175.  105 CoNG. REc. 1 5221 ( 1951 ) ,  in 2 LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 1 707. Some supporting 
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:Although this reasoning is very similar to that off
ered by the union in Gen­
eral Electric, the Board or a court should hesitate to find, from this statement, 
•1congressional embodiment in section 8 (b)  ( 4) of the views it suggests . As 
, 'we have seen, there are several grounds on which one can hold picketing of 
the kind described outside the statute. One can rely on the focus of pressure, 
' as the quoted passage does, or on the nature of the service performed by the 
secondary, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter's General Electric opinion suggests,1 76 
· or, finally, on the idea that the forbidden obj ect should not be inferred from 
picketing "so unavoidable and so entangled" with the primary strike, as even 
a modified literal approach would recognize. To seek to find-either in par­
ticular statements of individual congressmen or in extrapolations from them, 
or in specific Board or court decis ions assertedly known to Congress in 
August 1 959, and thereby constituting "existing law"177-firm ground for 
freezing, through the primary picketing proviso, any specific definition of the 
term "primary," is to misuse legislative history. In light of what Congress 
was doing, it  places an unrealistic burden on that body to require it, when 
addressing itself to a comparatively trivial point, to choose-on pain of being 
taken to have chosen-among competing views of thi s  larger and long­
perplexing, but very particularistic, issue. All that Congress wanted to 
accomplish was to broaden the statute to include inducements of nonconcerted 
refusals to work ; the proviso sought simply to insure that the change would 
have no effect on the primary-secondary d ichotomy. Efforts to grapple with 
the problem were to continue as before _l78 To be sure, Congress was agreed 
indicia of legislative understanding should be mentioned. The House Labor Committee, 
reporting out the Elliott Bil l ,  which was very similar in approach to the Kennedy-Ervin 
Bil l ,  flatly said : " 'Primary activities' is a term used to describe a strike or picketing at 
a plant of the employer engaged in  the labor dispute. It is settled law that the . . .  Act 
does not require a truckdriver to cross a primary picket line and that the 'pickets may 
request him not to enter the strike-bound plant.' " H.R. REP. No. 741 ,  86th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 21 ( 1959) , in  1 LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 779 ( quoting International Rice Milling ) .  See 
Representative Griffin's summary tabulation of the conference agreement, describing the 
proviso as a "clarification that picketing at primary site is not secondary boycott." 105 
CoN G. REc. 16539 ( 1959 ) ,  in  2 LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 1 712. 
1 76. See text accompanying note 126 s11pra. 
1 77. See Zimmerman, s11pra note 135 ,  at 1 178 & n.42. 
1 78. This situation may be usefully contrasted with the legislative treatment of  the 
so-called "struck work" exception. According to case law, one who performed work 
previously done by strikers, whether by agreement with the primary or otherwise, 
thereby "allied" himself with the primary and became amenable to union pressure simi­
lar to that which was permitted against the primary. See NLRB v.  Business 
Mach. Mechanics Conference, 228 F.Zcl 553 (2d Cir. 1955 ) ,  ccrt. denied, 351 U.S. 962 
( 1956) (Royal Typewriter) ; Shopmen's Union ( Oliver Whyte Co. ) ,  120 N.L.R .B .  856 
( 1958 ) .  Under the guise of codifying this doctrine, the Landrum-Griffin Bill would have 
narrowed i t  to cases in  which the secondary employer had contracted with the primary 
to do the struck \\'ork, and to permit only inducements l imited to refusals to work on the 
struck goods. H.R. 8400, 80th Cong., 1 st Sess. § 705 (a)  ( 1947 ) ,  in  1 LMRDA LEG. 
HtsT. 680, 682-83. The Senate conferees obi ectecl, see 105 CoN G. REc. 1 5222-23, in 2 
LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 1 708-09 ( Kennedy-Thompson memorandum) ,  and the conference 
deleted the provision "because the committee . . .  did not wish to change the existing 
law . . . .  " H.R. REP. N o. 1 147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, in 1 LMRDA LEG. HrsT. 942 
( Conference Report ) . Here there is good ground for saying that future judicial or ad­
ministrative reconsideration is barred. In the type of case dealt with in text, congressional 
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that, although Internat-ional Rice Milling's rationale was to be overruled ·t . ' 1 s _)!t result was correct, and 1t must therefore be deemed to have regarded the a t . · c ' of turning away truck drivers approaching the primary site as "primary:"·zy. _ '_,1 
But the Board and the courts must indicate on which of competing rationales, , lr:_ ,: and with what particular radiations to other fact patterns, the indicated result • � -� 
is to be grou:1clecl ; and they must defend their choice on .the merits, on- its �1 �; - � consonance w1th the purposes of the 1 947 act, not on the bas1s of any approach _ · · 
thought to have been newly laid clown by the legislature in 1959. · _ 1 ' ! 
C.  The Impact o f  Sections 7 and 13  
The major supports, in the statute as enacted in 1 947, for a rej ection of 
a literal approach to section 8 ( b )  (4)  have been sections 7 and 1 3 .m Sec� 
tion 7 purports to guarantee labor the right to engage in concerted activities, 
including strikes and picketing, for the purpose of mutual aiel or protection,1so -� 1 
and section 1 3  permits inroads on that right only as specifically provided for 
in the act.181 It has been asserted that section 8 (b )  (4) , as construed by a 
literal approach, is so pervasive that it "does violence" to sections 7 and 13, 
and an alternative approach to the section must therefore be adopted.182 
desire not to "change" the law was merely a purpose not to affect i t  ( while modifying 
the rules in a different area) ; i n  the struck work area, Congress refused to alter the very 
rules that were the subj ect of attention. 
1 79. Reliance i s  sometimes also put on § 2 ( 3 ) ,  61  Stat. 1 3 7  ( 1947 ) , 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152 ( 3 )  ( 1958) , defining an ' 'employee" as not l imited "to the employees of a particular 
employer," but the point is hardly worth serious attention. 
180. 61 Stat. 140 ( 1947 ) ,  29 U.S .  C. § 1 57  ( 1958 ) . 
18 1 .  6 1  Stat. 1 5 1  ( 1947) , 29 U.S .  C. § 163 ( 1958 ) . Although the section refers only 
to the "right to strike," i t  has been applied to other activity, such as p icketing, within 
the scope of § 7. See NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S.  274, 281 n.9 ( 1960) ; cf. Inter­
national Union, UA W v. ·wisconsi n  Employment Relations B el . ,  336 U.S .  245, 259-60 
( 1949 ) .  
1 82. Chauffeurs U nion ( McJunkin Corp . ) , 128 N.L.RB. 522, 530 ( 1960) ( dissenting 
opinion ) ,  Tev'd per cwrimn, 294 F.2d 261 ( D .C. Cir. 1961 ) .  A variant on this view 
would, if adopted generally, deny the Board power to elaborate rules l imiting picketing, 
on the ground that no "specific" warrant for them appears in the statute. For example, 
the influential first C am.pbeli Coa l decis ion of the D istrict of Columbia C ircuit, see note 
87 supra and accompanying text, rei ected the TF as/z ing/on Coca-Co la doctrine on this 
ground : 
No rigid rule which would make [ the existence of an opportun i ty to p icket at 
the pr imary s i te]  . . .  conclus ive is contained i n  or deducible from the statute. 
To read it i nto the statute by implication would unduly i nvade the application of 
section 13 which preserves the r ight to strike "except as specifically provided" 
in other provisions of the Act. It i s  not specifically provided that p i cketing at 
a common site, with an incidental effect upon employees of a neutral employer, 
is unlawful in every case where picketing could also be conducted against the 
primary employer at another of i ts places of business. 
Sales D rivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 5 1 4, 5 17-1 8  ( D.C.  Cir. 1 955 ) ,  cert. dl'nied. 3 5 1  
U .S .  9 7 2  ( 1956) . This reasoning, which could a s  well b e  adapted against t h e  JVI oore 
Dry Dock or General Elec tric decis ions, wholly begs the question. The "specific" provi­
sion in question is § 8 ( b )  ( 4) , which does bar inducement of neutral employees by 
p icketing having the designated obj ect. I f  the l iteral approach i s  accepted-and Campbell 
C oa.l seems to accept it-so that the critical i ssue is the union's obi ect, the question i s  
whether picketing a t  a secondary s ite i s  proved to b e  for the forbidden obi ect b y  the fact 
that primary employees could have been reached at the primary s i te .  Campbell Coal 
apparently rei ects that contention summarily ; once i t  i s  rei ected, the B oard's own bas is  
for  Washington Coca-Cola. i s  undermined and resort to § 1 3  adds nothing. But i f  it  i s  
accepted, § 13  has been given its due, f o r  there is a specific provision i nvolved : § 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  
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This contention rests on more than a literal reading of section 1 3  ;183 it  finds 
in that section a mandate, not only to avoid resort to general statements and 
policies, expressed or implicit in  the act, to restrict labor's use of its traditional 
weapons, but also to shrink from accepting on its face the directions of an 
articulated prohibition when to do so would seem to go "too far. ' '  But, how 
far is "too far" is, of course, for the legislature to say, and if the setting of 
a provision's enactment shows no design to make as deep an inroad as a 
literal approach would assertedly make, the Board, on any sensible view of 
statutory construction, would be bound to give effect to that fact, section 1 3  
apart. Section 13 ,  then, if i t  is to have any independent force, would go 
further : it would in effect erect a presumption against finding such a strongly 
restrictive purpose. That is, unless the legislative record affirmatively per­
suaded one that the congressional design was to go as far as its language, a 
narrower construction would have to be adopted. 
Initially, of course, section 13 had no such purpose. The vVagner Act con­
tained no prohibitions on union conduct,184 and section 13 could not have 
been designed to affect the construction of nonexistent provisions. Its function 
was simply to prevent resort to the principles of  the act-e.g. ,  majority rule 
and peaceful settlement of disputes-to justify j udicial imposition of restraints 
on union activity thought to be inconsistent with those principles. 185 The 
addition of section 8 (  b) by the Taft-Hartley Act s ignificantly changed the 
i s  most specifically addressed to the very conduct in  issue. Indeed, when Campbell Coal 
again came to the court of appeals after the remand, the court recognized as much. Truck 
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 5 1 2  ( D.C. Cir. 1957 ) ,  ccrt. denied, 355 U.S .  958 
( 1958) . 
1 83. I shali not specifically refer further to § 7. Obviously, a l l  oi § 8 t_ b) is "im:on­
sistent" with that provision, in  the sense that it restricts acti v1ty which otherwise would 
( for  the most part )  be protected. Congress can give with one hand, and take with 
another ( or, a dozen years later, take with the same ) .  Of course, one should not find 
too quickly that Congress has done that, but any such argument entirely duplicates that 
drawn irom § 1 3, discussed below. 
1 84. Closed- or union-shop agreements between employers and minority unions were 
outlawed by § 8 ( 3 ) , 49 Stat.  452 ( 1935 ) , but the prohibition of the statute fell only on 
the employer party to such an agreement. 
185 .  The vVagner Act s imply took in  the substance of the section from that short­
lived way-station between the Blue Eagle and the N LRA-Public Resolution No. 44. 
48 Stat. 1 183 \ 1934 ) . See, on the inclusion of § 13 in the N LRA, S. REP. No. 573, 74th 
Cong., 1 s t  Sess. 15 ( 1935 ) .  Section 6 of that resolution, the progenitor of § 1 3, was added 
out of what was conceded to be an excess of caution, to insure that the investigative and 
election machinery authorized by the resolution -vvould not be taken as grounds for 
restricting strikes. See 78 CoN G. REc. 12044-45 ( 1934) ( remarks of Senator LaFollette) .  
An appropriate case for use of  § 1 3  would have been Fur \Norkers Union v. Fur vVorkers 
Union, 105 F.2d 1 ( D.C. Cir. ) ,  afj'd per curiam, 308 U.S.  522 ( 1939 ) , in  which the court 
refused, without resorting to § 13,  to rely on the policies of the N LRA to hold the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable to picketing which sought to unseat a lawful ly  recog­
nized rival union. 
Section 6 of the resolution read as follows : "Nothing in  this resolution shall prevent 
or impede or diminish in any way the right  of employees to s tr ike or engage in other 
concerted activities." 48 Stat. 1 183 ( 1934 ) . NLRA § 13 said : "Nothing in  this Act shall 
be construed so as to interfere with or diminish i n  a)ly way the right to s trike." 49 Stat. 
457 ( 1935 ) .  Assuming, as there is no reason not to do so, that the later version was not 
designed to be of narrower scope than the former, § 6 provides a textual basis  for apply­
ing § 13  to concerted activities generally, and not solely to s trikes. Cf. note 1 8 1  supra. 
l 
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' ' ' 3 0 ffi ' ' t - ·, ' d tl potential Impact of sectiOn 1 . nee a rmatlve restram s on concerted ·' 11 
activities were imposed, section 1 3  might well operate to condition the con�� ' 1 
struction of those restraints. The preservation of the section would suggest· i 
that the existing rule against the implication of restraints from the general .. "' j 
goals of the statute was to be preserved.186 But the only textual basis for j 
giving the provision a broader reach, and thus an impact on the construction ] 
of the section 8 (b ) restraints, is that the exception that had to be written • J 
into section 1 3  to accommodate it to section 8 (b ) refers to restraints "specifi- j 
cally'' provided. The most straightforward reading of this term is that it was j 
designed only to ensure the preservation of the existing rule, despite the 'I � changed orientation of the NLRA. On such a view, the "specific" provisions ' .. l . .
are the restrictions described in section 8 (  b ) ,  and while implication of :;$ ·j 
restraints from the general policies of the act would remain barred unless �� : 
:����n 
t
:::r�\�
e
::a�::t:d�ff;�\::rese:���a! ( �l; :�vein�0::::�:�io;� �� t:� -�:· ·l�.,f 
portantly broader impact ? �'i The recent Supreme Court decision in N LRB v. Drivers Union :; 
( Curtis) 187 provides a useful vehicle for exploration of the problem.188 The 
Board had construed section 8 (b ) ( 1 )  (A )  to prohibit minority union picket­
ing for recognition. That section forbids unions to "restrain or coerce" em­
ployees in the exercise of their right, protected by section 7, not to be repre­
sented by a union which lacks maj ority support ;180 picketing for recognition, 
through the threat of economic injury to the employer's business, may place 
employees in j eopardy of loss of work, and is therefore, the Board reasoned, 
within the statutory proscription. The Board was also impressed by the fact 
that, since an employer may not lawfully recognize a minority union, picketing 
for recognition has the "unlawful direct purpose of forcing the commission of 
an unfair labor practice by the employer . . . . " 1 00 Administrative or judicial 
proscription of minority recognition picketing on this latter ground would, 
no doubt, run afoul of section 1 3 ,  for it does not rest on any statutory prohibi-
tion of union action, but on an administrative judgment that the action is 
186. The Senate Committee Report said that the "specifically provided" clause 
"makes clear that the Wagner Act has diminished the right to strike only to the extent 
specifically provided by the new amendments to the act . . . .  " S. REP. No. 105 ,  80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 ( 1 947 ) , in 1 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 434. 
187. 362 U.S.  274 ( 1960 ) , affirming 274 F.2d 5 5 1  ( D.C. Cir .  1 959 ) ,  den}•ing enforce­
men t  in 1 19 N.LRB. 232 ( 1957) . 
1 88. Despite assertions sometimes made to the contrary, the Supreme Court's In ter-
1/ational R·ice Milling decision did not give § 1 3  a broader impact. The Court first  found 
the challenged activity outside the language of § 8 (b)  ( 4 ) , by reason of the lack of induce­
ment of "concerted" action, see text accompanying note 22 supra, and only then invoked 
the "specifically provided" language of § 1 3, saying : "No such spec ific  provision in  
§ 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  reaches the  incident here." 341  U.S .  665, 673 ( 195 1 ) .  
189.  61  Stat. 141  ( 1947 ) ,  29 U S.C .  § 1 5 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A )  ( 1958) . 
190. Drivers Union ( Curtis B ros . ) , 1 19 N . L.RB.  232, 239 ( 1957 ) , enforcement 
denied, 274 F.2d 5 5 1  ( D .C. Cir. 1959) ,  ajj'd, 362 U.S .  274 ( 1960 ) . On the unlawfulness 
of recognition of a minority union see International Metal Prods. Co., 1 04 N.LR.B.  1 076 
( 1953 ) ; cf, ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S .  731  ( 1961 ) .  
I 
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inconsistent with policies discernible  in the congressional scheme. The former 
" ·ground, however, has a firmer base, and the more difficult question is  whether 
• 
' section 1 3  has an inhibitory role to play in the construction of the limitation 
;J on concerted action embodied in section 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A )  . 
The Supreme Court, reversing the Board's view, placed substantial 
·
weight on section 1 3 , which it examined at the very outset of its considera-•. tion of the problem. Mr. Justice Brennan, for the Court, said : 
[ S ]  ince the Board's order in this case against peaceful picketing 
vvould obviously "impede" the right to strike, it  can only be sustained 
if such power is  "specifically provided for" in § 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A ) ,  as 
added by the Taft-Hartley Act. To be sure, § 13 does not require 
that the authority for the Board action be spelled out in so many 
words. Rather . . .  § 13 declares a rule of construction which 
cautions against an expansive reading of that section which would 
adversely affect the right to strike, unless the congressional purpose 
to give it  that meaning persuasively appears either from the structure 
or history of the statute. Therefore, § 13 is a command of Congress 
to the courts to resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an inter­
pretation of § 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A )  which safeguards the right to strike as 
understood prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.191 
This is strong talk. If  the last sentence in particular is  taken as a general 
description of the impact of section 1 3  on any problem under section 8 ( b ) , 192 
there would be little doubt that a literal approach to section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  would 
be barred by it, for "doubts and ambiguities" there certainly are. Curt-is, 
however, should be considered in context. The Supreme Court assuredly 
did not rely simply on the quoted passage and a view that the legislative 
debates on section 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A )  were "ambiguous ." It based i cs holding on 
far firmer foundations. First, i t  referred to the "very general standard" of 
section S ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A ) ,  and noted the large degree of overlap with the much 
narrower section 8 ( b )  ( 4) ( C ) , which specifically outlaws picketing for 
recognition when a rival union is certified.193 Second, repeating an earlier 
dictum that "Congress has been rather specific when it has come to out law 
particular economic weapons on the part of unions,"194 it made this condi­
tioning observation : "In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has 
dealt explicitly vvith isolated evils which experience has established flow from 
such picketing."195 It vvas as a consequence of these factors that the Court 
1 9 1 .  362 U.S. at 282. 
192. Member Fanning has so applied i t  to the secondary boycott problem. See Chauf­
feurs Union (McJunkin Corp. ) ,  128 N.L.RB. 522, 531  n.21 ( 1960) ( dissenting opinion) ,  
enforced as modified per wriam, 294 F.2d 261 ( D .C. Cir .  1961 ) .  
193. 6 1  Stat. 141  ( 1947) , 29 U.S.C.  § 1 5 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( C )  ( 1958) . The Court also 
referred to the prohibitions on secondary pressure to gain recognition, embodied in 
§ 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( B ) ,  and on attempts to compel self-employers to j oi n  unions, in § 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( A ) .  
362 U .S .  at 285. 
1 94. 362 U.S .  at 282-83, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S .  477, 
498 ( 1960 ) . 
1 95 .  362 U.S.  at 284. 
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'11 approached the legislative history in an avowedly skeptical mood, insisting 
on the "clearest indication" of support for the Board's position as the condi- , � 
tion of its assent. What it found there was not merely inconclusive colloquy , 
dealing (or not dealing ) with the issue at bar, but a vastly more meaningful , t .l evolution of the act . Specifically, the Hartley Bill would have expressly l 
banned picketing for recognition by an uncertified union, and any picketing \ seeking to compel an employer to violate the act ;196 these provisions were 'f 
abandoned in conference in favor of section 8(b ) ( 1 )  (A) . 
"This history makes pertinent," the Court concluded, the fundamental 
insight expressed in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Sand Door opinion : 
It is relevant to recall that the Taft-Hartley Act vvas, to a marked 
degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong con­
tending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor 
in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance 
to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and 
labor to further their respective interests. This is relevant in that 
it counsels wariness in finding by construction a broad policy . . .  
as such when, from the words of the statute itself, it i s clear that 
those interested in just such a condemnation were unable to secure 
its embodiment in enacted law_Hn ·', 
This principle, and indeed the entire process of decision that it suggests, and 
which Curtis illustrates, is importantly different from the quoted excerpt 
construing section 1 3 ,  a dictum specifically acknowledged by the Court to 
have been unnecessary to the result.1 98 Certainly, if the Court's reference to 
an "expansive reading" is meant to suggest an "over-expansive reading," no 
one can quarrel with the principle, although reliance on section 13 hardly 
seems a requisite to its acceptance.199 But if, as the last sentence of Justice 
Brennan's passage suggests, the meaning is that section 13 enjoins one to 
accord section 8 (b ) a relatively cold reception, uniformly constru ing it as 
narrowly as the limits of "doubts and ambiguities" permit, it goes too far. 
The question in every case should be whether-in light of the degree of 
generality of the provision in question, the significance of the particular 
\ 
1 96. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1 s t  Sess. § 1 2 ( a )  ( 3 )  ( C) ( i )  and ( i i i )  ( 1947 ) ,  i n  1 
LMRA LEG. HrsT. 79 ; see 362 U .S .  at 289. 
197. 362 U.S .  at 289-90, quoting Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 
357 U.S .  93 ,  99- 100 ( 1958 ) (Sand Do01· ) . 
198. 362 U .S .  at 290. 
1 99. See text accompanying note 183 supra. Of course, the Board ( as dist in­
guished from a court)  will  never issue a cease-and-desist  order without tying its theory of 
i l legality to one or another clause of § 8. The Supreme Court has refused to permit 
several attempts at over-expansive reading, i n  areas other than minority recognit ion 
picketing. See Local 357, Int' l  Bhd. of  Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U . S .  667 ( 1961 ) 
( union security ) ; N LRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S .  477 ( 1960 ) ( duty to 
bargain ) ; Local 1976, United Bhd.  of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U .S .  93 ( 1958) ( "hot 
cargo" agreements ) ;  cf. Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v .  NLRB, 362 U.S .  4 1 1  
( 1960) ( s tatute o f  l imitations ) .  vVhen the particular context calls for it ,  such decisions 
might appropriately draw support from the thought expressed in the quotation from 
Sand Door, see text accompanying note 1 97 supra, and �erhaps Justice B rennan meant 
to find no more in § 13 .  
! 
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restraint sought to be imposed to labor-management power relationships, the 
controversiality of the issue in the legislators' experience (an experience 
which relevantly goes back, on the federal level, to 1890 ) , and the extent to 
. which the evolution of legislative policy dealing with the question evidences 
a congressional sense of caution, restraint, and compromise-the assertion 
that a particular restriction is embodied in a section 8 ( b )  provision should 
or should not be skeptically received. The Court's performance in Curtis 
belies any impression that might arise from some of the words uttered 
regarding section 1 3 ; it is not sufficient merely to dredge up ambiguous 
(almost necessarily ambiguous ) excerpts from legislative debates, and then 
ascribe to section 13 the effect of compelling a choice in favor of the less 
restrictive view. There is danger in such an attitude of erecting a personal 
prej udice into a rule of construction of a major regulatory enactment. 
The problem of the Curt·is case was, in my view, soundly handled by 
the Court, for its opinion dealt with the above factors fully, and found them 
persuasively suggestive of a narrow interpretation of section 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A ) .  
vVhen one comes to examine, however, the area of primary and secondary 
boycotts, one finds a greater ambivalence . The statutory test is highly par­
ticular, and specifically addressed to the type of conduct in question. More­
over, to speak very generally, Congress has acted with far less restraint in 
the secondary boycott field than it has with regard to minority union picket­
ing.200  At the same time, enforcement of a prohibition on secondary boycotts, 
even if designed to protect neutral employers, can operate powerfully to alter 
the power relationships between the immediately contending parties to labor 
disputes.201 To find the resultant of these forces, a more penetrating examina­
tion of the legislative response to secondary pressures is call eel for . 
D .  The (Properly) Neglected "Picket Line C1·ossing" Proviso 
It has been argued that section S (b )  ( 4 )  contains, i n  the proviso per­
mitting refusals to cross picket l ines in certain circumstances,202 express 
recognition of the reluctance of Congress to outlaw all picketing in support 
of a primary dispute, and that the refusal to read the statute literally therefore 
200. This general difference in tone is  discernible in the 1959 as well as the 1947 
debates. See, regarding the former, Cox, Th e Landrum- Griffin Amendments to th e 
NatiOJwl Labor Relations A ct, 44 MrNN. L. REv. 257, 262-74 ( 1959 ) . On the latter, 
Senator Taft's oft-quoted profession of i nabi l i ty to distinguish between "good and bad" 
secondary boycotts, 93 CoNG. REc. 4323 ( daily eel. April 29, 1947 ) ,  in 2 L M RA LEG. HrsT. 
1 106, is  not atypical of the Congressional attitude toward secondary strikes. See also 
Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR PoLICY 35 ( 1960 ) . 
201 .  See 93 CoN G. REc. 321-23 ( daily eel. April 29, 1947) , in 2 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 
1 104-06 ( colloquy between Senators Pepper and Taft ) . 
202. P.rovided, That nothing contained i n  this subsection ( b )  shall be con­
strued to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of 
any employer ( other than his own employer ) ,  if the employees of such employer 
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees 
whom such employer is required to recognize under this act . . . .  
6 1  Stat. 142 ( 1 947) ,  29 U .S C. § 1 58 ( b)  ( 4 )  ( 1958) . 
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can not be justified on the ground of an otherwise too-pervasive effect. 
assertions are that the proviso " is  designed, though awkwardly drafted, to 
immunize the inducement of a refusal to cross a picket l ine" i n  cases when 
its conditions are met and, this being so, that "the very existence of the proviso 
indicates that Congress was aware of the far-reaching character of section 
8 ( b ) (4 ) ( A ) , because in the absence of such awareness it would not have 
deemed it necessary expressly to provide an exception in favor of refusals 
to cross primary picket lines."203 This construction would save the legality of 
primary site picketing only when carried on in connection with a strike called 
or  authorized by a maj ority union, and would not apply to secondary site 
picketing at all . This argument, and indeed the entire question of  the scope 
and function of the proviso, has been steadily ignored by the Board.204 If 
the premise i s  right the conclusion should be accepted, for the proviso would 
then evidence an advertent congressional recognition, and resolut ion, of the 
very problem giving rise to the reluctance to take the body of the statute at 
its word.  The difficulty, however, i s  in  accepting the premise that the proviso 
in fact was "designed" to restrict the reach of section 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) . 
If the proviso is read as a limitation on section 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) , legalizing 
boycott action by the secondary employees' union, its language would pre­
sumably be expanded to legalize inducements of such action on the part of 
the primary union, which is  usually the respondent in secondary boycott 
cases.205 The proviso would otherwise make no sense at all ; the most routine 
case of primary site picketing would remain unaffected by the proviso . The 
real difficulty, however,  is not in choosing this approach over its alternatives, 
but in accepting the premise that the proviso in fact manifests a congressional 
j udgment as to the proper reach of the secondary boycott ban. The d i fficulties 
in accommodating the language of the proviso to that of the body of sec­
tion 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  provide some ground for c\oubt.206 The limitation of the proviso 
203. Comment, "Primary" and "Secondary" Labor A ction : The Case of the Neg­
lected Proviso, 1 LAB. L.J .  339, 341 ( 1950) ; see Newspaper Del iverers' U nion ( Inter­
borough News Co. ) ,  90 N .L.R.B. 2 135 ,  2 148-49 ( 1950) ( intermediate report ) .  
204. See Newspaper Deliverers' Union ( Interbor_ough News Co. ) , supra note 203 
at 2135-36, express ly refusing to consider the trial examiner's reliance on the proviso to 
exempt the union action from the statute, and resting the decision on P ure 0 il. 
205. See International Bhd. of Teamsters ( Conway's Express ) ,  87 N .L.R.B.  972, 
1 021  n.ZO ( 1949 ) , aff'd sub nom. Rabouin  v. N LRB,  195 F.Zd 906 ( 2d Cir .  1 952)  ( inter­
mediate report ) ; I nternational Bhd. of Teamsters ( D i  Giorgio Wine Co. ) ,  87 N.L.R.B.  
720, 746 nn.40-41 ( 1949 ) , aff'd sub nom. Di Giorgio Fruit  Corp. v. NLRB, 191  F.2d 
642 ( D.C. C ir. ) ,  cert. denied, 342 U.S .  869 ( 195 1 )  ( intermediate report) .  But cf. O i l  
Workers ( Pure Oi l  Co. ) ,  84 N.L.R.B.  3 1 5 ,  3 2 1  ( 1949 ) ( dissenting opinion ) ; Tower, 
The Puzzling Pro<-;iso, 1 LAB. L.J. 1 01 9, 1022-23 ( 1950 ) . 
206. The most readily apparent problem is the l i teral terms of the proviso itself. I t  
speaks o f  not making "unlawful" the refusal of "any person" to cross a p icket l ine, while 
§ 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  of  course makes i t  an "unfair labor practice" for "a labor organization or its 
agents" to induce, inter alia, refusals to cross a picket l ine.  There i s  good evidence that 
the Senate Committee equated "unlawful" with "unfai r labor practice" in thi s context. 
See S. REP. No. 1 05 ,  80th Cong., 1 st Sess.  23 ( 1947 ) ,  in 1 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 429. Al­
though the contention that the  proviso only affirms the  lawfulness of ind ividual employee 
refusals to enter p icketed premises i s  somewhat more troublesome, see the General Conn-
! 
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to strikes called or authorized by a majority union, seemingly in response to 
considerations not reflected in the statute as a whole, greatly strengthens the 
doubt. Minority union strikes and picketing were not restricted by the Taft­
Bartley Act, except in the case of attempts to secure recognition in the face 
of a rival union certification,207 and the majority status of the union is no 
indication-or at the most a very rough indication-of the primary or sec­
ondary character of the picketing.208 The Eightieth Congress was under 
strong pressure to enact a prohibition of minority picketing, but it did not, 
although the point was not authoritatively settled until the Supreme Court's 
Cttrtis decision. To one who regards the Board's now rejected Curtis doctrine 
as sound policy, the proviso seems to draw a sensible line .209 However, it 
should be clear that, whatever the merits of a legislative ban on minority 
recognitional efforts, unless the Taft-Hartley Act in fact enacted such a 
proscription, the proviso responds to no policy actually reflected therein .210 
The origin of the proviso confirms these doubts. As has been pointed 
sel's contention to this effect in  Newspaper Deliverers Union ( Interborough News Co. ) ,  
90 N.L.RB. 2135, 2 146-47 ( 1950) , there are several reasqps for rei ecting this l iteral 
reading of the proviso. First, and most obvious, it i s  unnecessary, s ince individual acts, 
done by employees not acting as agents for a union, can not violate § 8 ( b ) , and there i s  
no  particular reason to  regard the  proviso as  merely precautionary. Second, effect can 
not be given to the l imitations on the proviso so long as the proviso itself is regarded as 
merely precautionary. A similar argument, reading "unlawful" as "unprotected," so that 
the proviso would make the conduct it describes not only not forbidden but affirmatively 
protected under § 7, may meet these objections, but it is  inconsistent with the location of 
the proviso, the bit of legislative history discussing its e ffect, see S .  REP. No. 105 ,  supra, 
and with the prevailing interpretation of § 7. See Red wing Ca�riers, Inc.,  137  N .L.R.B. 
No. 1 62 ( July 20, 1962 ) ,  i n  which the Board recently held that § 7 protects the refusal 
to cross a picket l ine at another company's premises,  and that the employer may not 
discharge an employee for such refusal, although he may do so in order to replace h im 
with another wil l ing to do the work i n  question. On such a view, the proviso is unneces­
sary, and, indeed, i ts l imitations arc inoperative. Earlier  cases had held, purporting not 
to decide that the activity was unprotected, that retaliatory discharges were not unlawful. 
Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.RB. 242 ( 1953 ) ; see N LRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 
197 F.2d 1 1 1 ,  1 14-15  (2d Cir. 1952 ) , afj'd on o ther gro unds, 345 U.S .  71 ( 1953 ) .  Such a 
position necessarily rej ects the construction of the proviso referred to above. It seems, 
then, that the proviso, if given any operative effect, should be read as a l imitation on 
§ 8 ( b ) ( 4 ) . 
207. See the discussion of the Curtis case at text accompanying notes 1 9 1 -96 supra. 
208. It must be conceded that i n  the minds of many, both in Congress, see Senator 
Ellender's definition, supra note 6, and elsewhere, see Dennis, The Supre111e Court and 
the Taft-Hartley Bo}'co tt Provisions, in NYU IN STITUTE OF LABOR RELATIONS & SoCIAL 
S ECURITY, PROCEEDINGS oF THE FIFTH ANNUAL CoN FERENCE ON LABOR 287, 288-90 
( 1952) ; Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boyco tts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 740 ( 195 1 ) ,  the 
secondary boycott ban was designed to thwart efforts of unions to gain recognition with­
out first succeeding to organize the employees i n  question. And, as a matter of a priori 
reasoning, resort to secondary pressures wil l  more often be thought necessary when the 
union lacks strong employee support. The fact remains, however, that the enacted ban 
is on secondary pressure, whether by a minority union or not, and many of the decided 
cases discussed in Part I, su.pra, arose out of primary d isputes at organized companies. 
209. See, Petro, The Enlightening Pro-uiso, 1 L AB . L.J. 1075 ( 1950 ) . 
210. It is, of course, possible that the proviso was a compromise-that an outright 
ban on prim:uy minority union picketing for recognition could not be gained, but that 
when it came to protecting primary picketing generally from the secondary boycott 
provisions, its opponents were able to prevent minority recognitio11 p icketing from 
receivinrr the benefit of the provi so. The difficulty with this contention is that, as I try 
to show� see text following this note, the legislative history demonstrates that this was 
not in  fact what happened. 
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out,211 i t first appeared in the Ball B ill ; i t there formed a consistent part �f 
an integrated expression of policy.212 It was taken unchanged into the Taft 
Bill, as reported by the Senate Labor Committee, where its language and, 
1 
policy are out of place.213 It seems clear, for otherwise the inconsistency in- -. 
language would doubtless have been removed, that the proviso was taken in' Jf 
without any substantive reconsideration of its function and purpose at all. 
It is highly unlikely, in light of the importance and controversial character of 
the minority recognition issue, that had the committee advertently used the 
proviso as a compromise no mention of that decision ·would have been made 
by anyone, particularly since use of the proviso for these purp:::Jses can hardly 
be called a compromise. Combined with a literal reading of the body of 
section 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) , it would have achieved all or nearly all that Curtis sought to 
achieve.214 
If, then, the proviso is inconsistent with the statutory scheme as enacted, 
and seems in fact to have been preserved through inertia,215 the only real 
2 1 1 .  See Tower, The Pu:ssliHg Proviso, 1 LAB. L.J_ 1019, 1 02 1  ( 1950) . 
212 .  The Bal l  B il l  would have made it "unlawful," subj ect to c iv i l  and criminal 
proceedings in  a district court, "to make any contract, or  to engage in any combination or 
conspiracy" restraining or impeding commerce, if a purpose was, by strikes or violence 
or threats thereof, or by concerted refusal to handle goods : ( 1 )  to bring about a sec� 
ondary boycott ; or ( 2 )  in the case of a minority union, to gain recognition or compliance 
with its demands. S.  55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 ( a )  ( 1947 ) .  The secondary boycott 
clause of the section was expressly limited by a provision embodying language identical 
in its operative portions with the § 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  proviso. In the Senate Labor Committee 
hearings, Senator Ball  explained that the limitation was designed to exempt "the refusal 
of employees to cross a legitimate strike picket l ine. 'vVe felt that was a legitimate 
manifestation of the sympathy of one group of workers for another engaged in a dispute 
with their employer, but the exemption would apply only if the striking union repre­
sented a majority of the employees of the employer being picketed." Hearings on S. 55 
and S.J. Res. 22 B efore the Senate Co1mn ittee o n  Labor and Pub lic TVclfare, 80th Cong., 
1 s t  Sess., pt. 1, at 15 ( 1 947 ) . The picket l ine itself, it  is apparent, \vas regarded as 
outside the ban of the proposed section. As to the other employees' refusal to cross, 
though in a sense secondary, it was regarded as "legitimate." The l imitation of the 
exemption to maj ority strikes obviously follo\VS from the tgtal ban, in the second clause, 
on any concerted strike activity by a minority union ; there is no recognition given sym­
pathy with an i l legitimate picket l ine.  
2 1 3. The Committee Bi l l ,  S. 1 126, though taking i n  the language of the picket-l ine 
clause, provided for administrative, rather than j uclicial, redress, and applied only to 
unions and their agents. S. 1 126, 80th Cong., 1st  Sess.  § 8 ( b )  ( 1947 ) ,  in 1 L.M RA 
LEG. HrsT. 1 12-14. Thus, the inconsistency of language. More important, S. 1 126 did not 
contain a ban on minority recognitional efforts, except in the face of  a rival certification. 
Even § 8 ( b )  ( 1 )  ( A ) ,  which became the basis for the Board's attempt to ban minority 
picketing for recognition under the 1 947 act, was added to the bi l l  after it  was reported 
out of  committee. 93 CoNe. REc. 4568 ( daily eel. 1-.Tay 2, 1947) ,  in 2 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 
1216-17. 
2 14. This point is ably demonstrated in the Board's brief before the Supreme Court 
in International Rice Mdling. B rief for the NLRB as Petitioner, pp. 68-78, NLRB v. 
International Rice Mil l ing Co., 341 U.S .  665 ( 195 1 )  _ Indeed, although such speculation 
is fruitless, one can not help \Vonclering what the outcome would have been had the Board 
in  1957, rather than attempting to reinterpret § 8 ( b ) ( 1 )  ( A ) , chosen to resurrect the 
dormant proviso, and combined it with its then increasingly literal reading of § 8 (b) ( 4 ) ,  
as a means of restricting minority picketing. 
2 15 .  Surely a court should not give effect to any suggestion that the p roviso \vas a 
"sleeper!' Cf. Petro, su.pra note 209, at 1 144 n . 12, quoting RepresentatiYe Hartley's 
statement : "There's more to this bill than meets the eye!' The courts arc entitled to 
rely on, and accordingly to presume, "the candor of Congress." VVestern Union Tel.  
Co. v .  Lenroot, 323 US 490, 508 ( 1945 ) .  
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obj ection to a frank decision to ignore its existence is the idea expressed in 
the maxim enjoining one construing a statute to take care to give effect to 
every word-a fortiori every sentence-contained therein. Th i s maxim 
expresses our experience that legislators, garrulous though they may be in 
other media, generally do not, in a solemn and formal enactment, run on 
purposelessly. The maxim surely can not mean, however, that, even though 
the particular history of a specific provision ( and I refer to the h istory of 
record, not to any revelations from behind the scenes ) persuades one that its 
inclusion was not a purposive act, we must assume the contrary to be the case. 
Such use of a maxim would make it, not a sensible generalization supported 
by fact, but a perverse insistence that particular facts in specific cases can not, 
if contrary to the generalization, be heeded. 
The major significance of the proviso, and particularly of Senator Ball 's 
explanation of its rationale,2 16 is that it demonstrates the assumption of the 
Senator that a picket line in support of a primary dispute at the primary site 
is not within the secondary boycott ban at all. In fact, pains are taken to 
ensure that secondary employees will be permitted to respond to the appeal 
of such a picket line. In this respect, it is somewhat like the determination 
of the Eighty-sixth Congress to preserve the International Rice Milling 
result : whatever the rationale, and whatever the precise breadth of the act, 
picketing of this general type is not what was aimed at.217 
E. The Administrat-ion of a Modified Literal Approach 
The major difficulty with a modified literal approach lies not in the area 
of doctrine, but of administration. Under it, the focus of inquiry, as a sub­
stantive matter, is on whether the union is appealing to secondary employees, 
but that inquiry is not pressed too far in cases >vhen any such appeal would 
be "enmeshed" \vith appeals to primary employees. Such an approach is 
bound, I believe, to break down in operation. An administrator convinced 
that the proper question is the obj ect of the pickets' appeal will find it diffi­
cult to refrain from pursuing that question in all cases, and the easy a priori 
assertions of the "inextricable entanglement' ' of permitted and prohibited 
appeals are likely to prove false in the light of the particularization of the 
context provided by ad j uclicatory proceedings in a specific case. Moreover, 
if one Board member is determined to give effect to section 8 (b ) ( 4 ) , leaving 
section 7 activities unimpaired when that can be clone without impeding the 
other aim, and another is determined to apply the secondary boycott ban so 
as not to restrain primary activity protected by section 7 ( expressing what 
to him is the core of the legislative policy ) , they will very differently apply a 
216. See note 212  supra. 
2 1 7. Cf. text accompanying notes 1 74-78 supra. Indeed, Senator Ball's statement­
and his  statute-would  apparently have made the situs, rather than the type of work or 
the obj ect, the explicit criterion. 
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modified literal approach, both as to the instances in which they will find .. 
primary and secondary activity to be "inextricably enmeshed' '218 
their reactions to the existence of such a situation.210 
The application of the Washington C oca-C ala doctrine well 
the problem. The crucial issue, under that principle, is whether the union·, 
has an "adequate" opportunity to appeal to primary employees at the primary 
site. If so, the Board will infer that the pick�ting was designed to appeal to ... 't� 
secondary employees, and is thus, under a literal approach, unlawful. But, . ··�i 
how much of an opportunity is "adequate" to cause one to disbelieve the · · · ,, '  \ 
union's assertion that it is still trying to reach primary employees ? The . . £\ 
Board has found the principle applicable in cases where the opportunity was . 1 \ 
rather fleeting,220 but the more important point is that this is a very slippery 
, : . . 1·1 concept to apply. A union might well point out that, even when it has had ., : 
prolonged opportunities at the primary site to induce primary employees to ! 
j oin its cause, it might still press the effort at secondary premises, where the 
isolation of the employee from his employer's plant and from his fellow non­
strikers, and his association with often unionized secondary employees, might 
strongly increase the likelihood that he will decide to jo in the strike. I suspect 
that the reaction of the "Eisenhower Board" to such an assertion would have 
been that much of the pressure thus generated would violate section 8 (b )  ( 1 ) -
( A) , or would come close to it, and was i n  any event not the kind of activity 
that should be encouraged. An earlier-or later-Board might say that 
section 8 (b )  ( 1 )  (A) violations should be proceeded against under that provi-
sion, and that lawful conduct is protected by section 7 and should not be 
hampered by abuse of section 8 ( b )  (4) . Such a view might lead one to rej ect 
Washington C oca-C ala entirely, even on its own premises ; at the least, it 
would greatly restrict its operative force. Inevitably then, the reach of the 
act depends, under a modified literal approach, on the order of priorities of 
the incumbent members. 
There are those who would respond that this is as it should be, that the 
Board should properly reflect, to some degree, the vievvs of the Administra­
tion, and that an issue such as the one here involved is most appropriately 
the kind that must yield to the variations in tone and attitude which personnel 
. 2 18. Cj., the maj ority and dissenting opinions in  Local 618, Automotive Employees 
Umon ( Incorporated Oi l  Co. ) , 1 16 N .L .R. B .  1844 ( 1956) ,  rev'd, 249 F.2d 332 ( 8th Cir .  
1957) ; the General Counsel's contention in  International Bhd. of Teamsters ( Alexander 
Vvarehouse & Sales Co. ) , 128 N .L.R.B.  916, 932 ( 1960 ) ( intermediate report) . 
219 .  Compare the alternative holding in Pure Oil, see text accompanying note 14 
supra, with the maj ority opinion in  il1 chmki�t, see text accompanying notes 46-49 supra. 
220. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers (W.  H. Arthur Co. ) ,  1 1 5  N .L .R .B .  1 137 ( 1956) 
( employees reported to employer's premises at beginning and close of work day) ; Local 
612, Int'l B hd. of Teamsters ( Goodyear Tire  & Rubber Co. ) ,  1 1 2  N.L .R .B .  30 ( 1955 )  
( over-the-road drivers reported to primary site "several times a week" ) .  But cf. the 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass case, see text accompanying notes 77-78 sup1·a, in \vh ich  a twice­
daily contact was found "inadequate." 
' 
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_changes inevitably produce. This 
is a very important and complex question,221 
. but one which is  not fairly raised here.222 For an essential truth, too often 
lost sight of, is that the day-to-day administration of the prohibition on 
secondary boycotts is  carried out not by the Board, but by the regional direc­
tors and the district j udges.  I refer, of course, to the impact of section l O ( l ) , 
the mandatory injunction provision.223 Although Board and court precedents 
provide the over-al l  doctrinal framework for administration of the statute , the 
crucial actions in any particular case are not the Board's decision to i ssue a 
cease-and-desist order or to dismiss the complaint, but the regional director's 4 . . decision
. 
vvhe��e
.
r ther
.
e is "reasonable cause �o
. 
beli�ve . . .  that � com�laint � : should Issue, 111 wh1ch event a temporary m J Unctlon must be Immediately 1 · sought, and the district court's conclusion whether injunctive relief is "just 
· · and proper," in which event i t  i s  to be granted.224 To the parties, the case 
is largely won or lost at this stage. Erroneous dismissal of a charge, or 
refusal to issue a temporary inj unction, will subj ect the affected employers 
to continued secondary picketing, while erroneous issuance of an inj unction 
will force the union to discontinue primary picketing, for the extended period 
needed to obtain a Board decision ; on both sides "time i s  usually of the 
essence in these matters."225 It seems unwise and unworkable to commit to 
these officials-one a subordinate administrative officer, the other an article 
III judge-the execution of so flexible and subj ective a standard as that 
provided by a modified literal approach. 
The problem is not merely one of restraining the influence of personal 
predilections. As administered, a modified literal approach would inevitably 
gravitate to the restrictive extreme of the spectrum. The regional director 
is enjoined to commence proceedings so long as there is "reasonable cause" to 
bel ieve that section 8 ( b) ( 4) i s  being violated .  Moreover, as the enforcing 
official, he will naturally lean toward going ahead in borderline cases. l eaving 
the final decision to the Board ; indeed, he should do no less, for his refusal 
221 .  The best general discussion I have seen is Summers, Politics, Policy 1\1 ahing, 
and the NLRB, 6 SYRACU SE L. REV. 93 ( 1 954 ) .  The problem has ( inevitably) arisen 
again, under the regime of the "Kennedy Board." See Address by Member B rown in 
NLRB Press  Release, Feb. 10, 1 962 commented on by Representative Griffin in  1 08 
CoNG. REc. 5699-5700 ( daily eeL, April  10, 1 962 ) .  
222. Note, however, the implications o f  such a n  attitude for j udicial review. I f  B oard 
inferences of union obi ect are properly conditioned by the order of priorities attached 
by incumbent members to § 7 and § 8 (b)  ( 4 ) ,  the role of the judiciary should be minimaL 
But sec, e.,r; . ,  Sales D rivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514  ( D.C. Cir. 1955 ) ,  cert. denied, 
351  U.S .  972 ( 1 956) ; Piezonki v. NLRB, 219  F.2d 879 ( 4th Cir. 1955 ) .  
223. 61 Stat 1 49 ( 1947 ) , 29 U.S.C.  § 1 60 ( e )  ( 1958) . 
224. Quoting § 10 ( /) ,  supra note 223. 
225. S. REP. No. 105 ,  80th Cong., 1 st Sess .  8 ( 1947 ) , in 1 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 414.  
For a succinct statement, unsurpassed in  three decades, of the d ifficulties attending 
"temporary" relief in labor disputes see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNC­
TION 200-02 ( 1 930) . For some supporting data from the Board's experience see 
McCulloch, New P1·oblems in the Adm inistration of the Labor--�1 anagement Relations 
A c t :  The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. LJ. 82, 93 ( 1 962) .  
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to proceed i s  not reviewable by the Board or a court.2�G The district courts ' 
hampered by the need for speed and by a relative unfamiliarity with thi;· 
complex statute,227 and often bemused by the half-truth that they are not 
rendering adjudications "on the merits," tend to go along with the regional . 
d irector's position.228 The result of this combination of factors is that what­
ever moderation is in theory provided by a modified literal approach, as 
viewed from Board decisions, would in fact be unavailing to the respondent 
in any particular case during the crucial period prior to the issuance of that 
decision. 
These structural and institutional factors are, I believe, appropriately to 
be considered in evaluating the merits of a "substantive" doctrine. The duty 
of the Board and of the courts is to choose that elaboration of section 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) 
that best effectuates its purposes, taken as a whole and i n  light of the entire 
statutory structure. In articulating a standard in the absence of clear legis­
lative direction, the Board should avoid an approach which may appear sound, 
but "on paper" only. The modified l iteral approach is too subj ective, both in 
its focus on the union's "state of mind" and in  what it asks of the Board mem­
bers and others implementing the act ; if otherwise acceptable, a more obj ective 
test, better calculated to retain in  practice the moderating elements necessary 
to respect the limitations suggested by the legislative history, would be far 
preferable .220 
226. See, e.g., Foreman v. NLRB, Civil No. 1 5009, 6th Cir., July 1 6, 1962 ( court of 
appeals review) ; Robert P. Scott, Inc. v. Rothman, 46 L.R.R.M. 2793 (D.D.C. 1 960 ) 
( district court action ) .  
227. 'With the pnrnary-sccondary dichotomy specifically i n  mind, Chairman McCulloch 
has referred to "the complexity of the legal i ssues, the fact that the 10 ( ! )  i nj unction 
petition may well be  the fi rs t  'labor' case brought before the particular federal district 
j udge, and [ to the fact that] he is  obligated to make a decision under a terr i fic time 
pressure." McCulloch, supra note 225, at 93. 
228. Schauftler v. Local 1291 ,  Int'l Longshoremens' Ass'n, 292 F.Zd 1 82, 187 ( 3d Cir. 
1961 ) : 
[ I ] t  must be borne in mind that a Section 1 0  ( I) i nj unction is interlocutory i n  
nature and only remains in  force pending the final adjudication of  the Board 
with respect to the unfair labor practice charge . . . .  The Board need not show 
that an unfair labor practice has been committed, but need only demonstrate 
that there is reasonable cause to bel i eve that the elements of an unfair labor 
practice are present. Nor need the Board conclusively show the validity of the 
propositions of law underlying its charge ; it i s  required to demonstrate merely 
that the propositions of law \vhich it has applied to the charge are substantial 
and not frivolous. 
Cf. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cii. supra note 225, at 202 : "'vVe ease h i s  [the j udge's]  
d ifficulty and h is  conscience by telling him that his decision is only tentative." 
In l ight of the realities as to the significance of a "temporary" inj unction, and the fact 
that the regional director has no discretion to decl ine to seek an in j unction, i t  seems 
obvious that the district court, in deciding whether to grant relief, should take into 
account, as equity traditionally has in  weighing requests for relief pendente l ite, the l ikel i ­
hood that petitioner's assertions wil l  ultimately prevai l ,  and whether the charge i s  
founded on well-settled principles or is  seeking to break new ground. Perhaps the recent 
decisions of the Court of Arneals for the Second Circuit in McLeod ex rei. NLRB v. 
Business 1\Iach. �{echanics C�nference, 300 F.2d 237 ( 2. Cir .  1962 ) , wil l  influence the 
district courts to c!o so. In the area of our concern, however, such a development would 
work little change, because of the difficulty of forecasting the Board's reaction to the 
h ighly subj ective question put to it under a modified literal apnroach.  
229.  Cf.  Friendly, The Federal Adm inistratio.•e A.qcncirs : The Need for B etter Dcfi­
u ition of Standards ( pt. 1 ) ,  75 H ARV. L. REv. 863, 882 n.92 ( 1962 ) .  
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III .  A RATIONALE OF CoNGRESSIONAL AcTION 
141 1 
One might profitably approach the question, what makes a secondary 
boycott secondary, by considering the extent to which Congress has ex­
pressed a desire to shield third persons from the effe�ts of labor disputes. In 
general, Congress has proceeded very gingerly in this direction. Section ·l,: S (b )  ( 4)  apart, the only protection the Labor Management Relations Act f affords secondary employers-or "the public" generally, o f  vvhich they are a r part-from the repercussions of labor-management controversy is in  those 
)·' relatively rare cases of "national emergency" when the President may invoke 
the eighty-day injunction procedure and the accompanying dispute-settling 
procedures.230 In all other cases-those presenting emergencies less than 
national in scope, and those not serious enough to imperil health or safety­
Congress has chosen to permit the parties to bring pressure 0 :1 each other 
through actions that often injure third parties.231 
This preference for free collective bargaining, a cornerstone of the na­
tional labor policy, has been thought by some to be equally applicable to sec-
ondary pressure.232 Congress rej ected these views and enacted a broad pro­
hibition on secondary boycotts.233 In seeking to lay bare the rationale of the 
congressional action, we must accommodate any hypothesis to the wide lati tude 
given the right to strike. Obviously, harm to the secondary employer per se 
was not the evil sought to be met. One commentator has put the thought 
well : 
Congress vvas concerned with the injury suffered by neutral em­
ployers, but only where the injury resulted from the use of a second­
ary boycott. Almost every strike causes economic loss to one or more 
employers who are unconcerned with the labor dispute. A coal dis­
tributor may go bankrupt because of a coal strike. A small steel 
fabricator may be forced to close his doors because of a maj or steel 
230. Labor Management Relations Act § 206, 6 1  Stat. 155 ( 1947 ) ,  29 U.S.C .  § 1 76 
( 1 958) . In addition to the "national emergencies" provisions, the Act also seeks to 
minimize the impact of strikes by encouraging mediation and conci liation. Labor :Manage­
ment Relations Act §§ 201-205, 61  Stat. 1 52 ( 1947 ) , 29 U . S.C.  §§ 1 7 1 - 1 75 ( 1 958) . But 
these provisions do not exert formal coercive pressure against union concerted action. 
2 3 1 .  See the o ft-quoted statement of Senator Taft, made in opening debate on the 
Taft Bi l l ,  93 CoxG. REc. 395 1-52 (daily ed. Apri l 23, 1 947) , in UviR1\ LEG. HrsT. 
1 007-08 ; Amalgamated Ass'n of St .  Ry. Employees v. ·wisconsin  Employment Relations 
Bel . ,  340 U.S .  383 ( 195 1 )  ( act bars state attempts to proscribe strikes thought by state 
to create "local emergencies" ) .  But cf. State v.  Local 8-6, Oil Workers, 3 1 7  S .W.2cl 309 
( Mo. Sup. Ct. 1 958 ) , <-•acated as moot, 361 U.S .  363 ( 1 960 ) . 
232. Sec Note, Labo r's Use of Secolldary Boyco tts, 1 5  GEO. vVA S H .  L. REV. 327, 
345 ( 1 947) . This was essentially President Truman's position in 1 947. See S. REP. [.;' o. 
1 05, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 20 ( 1947 ) ,  in 1 LMRA LEG. HrsT. 482 (minority 
report ) . 
233. For a short statement of the need to consider more closely whether its breadth 
is too undiscriminating see Cox, L\W AND THE NATIONAL LABOR PoLICY 35-38 ( 1 960) ; 
cf. Cushman, Sccondan' Boyco tts and the Taft-Hartley Law, 6 SYRACUSE L. RH. 1 09, 
122-23 ( 1 954) : Kovarsky, A Socio l  and Legal Analysis of til e Secondary Bo_\'Cott, 35 
ORE. L. REV. 223, 284-288 ( 1 956) ; Tower, A Pcrspecti<-•e on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. 
L.J .  727, 732-34 ( 1 9 5 1 ) .  For present purposes ,  hO\\·ever, the need is not to evaluate, but 
to discern, the bas is of the statutory proscription. 
o£J:Ui1•••••• 
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strike. Such economic losses as these far outweigh the losses caused 
by secondary boycotts. Yet Congress has not sought to aid these 
neutrals . . . .  This point is significant-and sometimes overlooked­
because it shows that, while harm to a neutral is an essential ingredi­
ent of a secondary boycott, such injury is not by itself objectionable 
in the eyes of the legislature.234 
Nor is it satisfactory to say that harm which rs "an avoidable and unneces­
sary consequence"235 of a primary strike i s  that at which section 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  is 
aimed. To say that certain conduct is  an "avoidable'' concomitant of a pro­
tected activity is not to give an affirmative reason for prohibiting it .236 It has 
often been asserted that it is the "intentional" infliction of harm which was 
the object of legislative disapprobation.237 In evaluating this view, one must 
recognize the high degree of ambiguity in looking to the union's "intent," or 
in use of somewhat similar terms like "purpose," "motive," "object," or 
"objective ."238 If what is meant, for example, by saying that the union 
"intended" to harm the neutral is that the motive for undertaking strike 
action was the union's belief that, although the primary's own business might 
prove able to withstand its effect longer than the strikers, a customer or 
supplier of the primary would be harder hit and would pressure him to come 
to terms quickly, I would disagree with any assertion that "intentional" 
infliction of harm on the neutral renders a strike secondary. Doubtless many j 
strikes are undertaken on j ust such reasoning, and won or lost on its accu-
racy, but Congress can hardly have been concerned by the indifference or 
malevolence ( if it be that) borne by union leaders toward secondary employers . 
The "intent" that is significant, in my view, is the intent to subj ect the 
secondary to pressure different in kind from that generated against him by 
a primary strike. I say different "in kind'' because, depending on economic 
relationships, the pressure of a secondary boycott may be no more severe 
than that felt as a result of a strike against one with whom the secondary 
does business. Yet a difference in kind there is. Judge Prettyman's  Salt 
D01ne opinion came to the heart of the matter when he wrote : 
No matter how great the pressure on a neutral employer may be 
when somebody else's place of business is picketed, it i s  essentially 
234. Tower, A Perspective on Secondary B oycotts, 2 LAB. L.J .  727, 732 ( 195 1 ) .  
235. U nitcd Steelworkers v .  NLRB, 289 F.2d 591 ,  595 ( 2d Cir. 1961 ) .  
236. Perhaps, once i t  i s  establ ished that the conduct i s  of the type thought wrongful 
by the legislature, it  might be held nonetheless permissible when-but only when-it is 
unavoidably bound up with protected acts. But cf. text accompanying note 220 supra, 
suggesting some difficulties inherent in the application of any such test. 
237. Cf. Note, 45 GEO. L._T. 614 ( 1957) , positing, as a "reasonabl e  interpretation," 
an obj ective "to save the neutral employer from all purposeful efforts on the part of 
unions to involve h im in  a dispute not his own . . . . " A s imilar analysis  was the basis 
for the Second Circuit's reversal of the Board in  Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 51 L R.R.lvL 
2338, 2348 (2d Cir .  Oct. 18, 1962) . 
238. Com pare my reading of the court of appeals's analysis of the union's "obj ect" 
in the Salt Dome case at text accompanying notes 102-07 supra. with that of P rofessor 
Koretz, in  Federal Requlation of  Secondar)' Strikes and Boycotts-Anoth er Cha1o tcr, 59 
CoLuM. L. REv. 125, 140-41 ( 1959 ) , note 104 snpra. 
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different from the pressure such a neutral feels when his own busi­
ness is being picketed. This d ifference in pressure . . . is the 
rationale which must govern the interpretation of Section 8 (b ) ( 4) .239 
1 4 1 3  
I f  a company finds that one o f its customers or suppliers has been shut by a 
strike,240 normal business relations between the two employers automatically 
cease ; employees of the company seeking to enter the struck plant will find i t 
closed, and the strikers will, of course, not be performing whatever work has 
been necessary to the doing of business with the secondary. The extent of 
injury to that company will depend on the particular economic relationships. 
It may or may not feel compelled to seek to induce the other employer to 
settle the dispute. In either event, the pressure generated flows entirely from 
the disruption of the struck employer's business. If, now, the struck employer 
is continuing to operate, but the employees of the secondary refuse to enter, 
the effect on the company is no different. In the one case, the gates are 
physically locked ; in the other, though literally open, they are in effect im­
passable. The legislative policy, for the most part protecting successful strike 
activity despite the described effect on secondary employers, suggests the 
inapplicability of a policy designed to protect secondary and not primary 
employers from identical effects flowing from wholly or partially unsuccess­
ful strike activity. 241 
Suppose, however, that a picket induces one of the company's drivers, 
not only to turn away from the struck plant, but to refuse to make deliveries 
to any other company, so long as his employer continues to attempt to deal 
with the struck company. Such pressure, whatever its strength, is ''essentially 
different" in that it does not grow out of the interference vvith the primary"s 
business threatened by the strike against it. It seeks to j ump that hurdle 
and conscript the neutral by subj ecting it to independent, directly applied 
loss of service that would not otherwise be suffered even were the struck plant 
to cease operations entirely. Here, I submit, the protection afforded to sec­
ondary employers by section 8 (b ) ( 4) is called into play, and that afforded the 
strike by the act is not at stake. 
A similar analysis can be made as to secondary site picketing . An em­
ployer who processes materials manufactured by another wi ll feel signifi­
cantly the loss of trade flowing from the shutting by a strike of the manufac­
turer' s operations . If the strike fails to close the primary's doors, but "roving 
situs" pickets induce secondary employees to refuse to unload goods delivered 
by the primary's nonstriking employees, the effect on the secondary is largely 
239. Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 591 ( D .C. Cir. 1959 ) ,  reversing 1 1 9  
N.L.R. B .  1638 ( 1958) . 
240. I am here, of course, using the term "strike" to inciucle picketing which seeks 
to i nduce strike action. 
2-\ 1 .  See Local 1 976. United Bhcl. of Carpenters v. N LRB, 357 U . S .  93, 99 ( 1 958 ) . 
By "successful" strike, I re fer, of course, to one that succeeds in closing the primary's 
plant, not one that vvins its bargai ning obj ectives. 
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the same as if the delivery, by reason of the success of the strike, could 
have been attempted. But if the pickets induce secondary employees to 
all >vork, whether connected with the primary or not, or induce employe�s 
third persons to refuse to enter the secondary premises, pressure wholly apart 
from that which could attend the disruption of the primary's business is felt. 
In considering the applicability of this analysis to secondary site activities 
hovvever, complicating considerations arise. \iVhen no primary employees ar� 
present at the secondary site, the act plainly condemns inducement of sec­
ondary employees to refuse to work on materials coming there from the · 
primary, even though the inducement be only "partial," that is, limited to
' 
those materials. 242 Yet it is clear that the strike, if successful in closing down 
the primary employer's business, would deprive the secondary of the oppor­
tunity to work on such "hot goods ."243 The suggested rationale, then, can · 
not encompass all secondary employee refusals to work that are no broader 
than those which would "automatically" be occasioned by the disruption of the 
primary's operation through a wholly successful strike. Only the effect of loss 
of the primary's etnployees may be considered. The crucial question, thus 
modified, is : does the picketing union intend to subj ect the secondary em­
ployer to a loss of the services of his employees broader in impact than would 
be directly caused by the unavailability, as a result of the complete success of 
the strike, of the services of the primary employees ? I f  so, the picketing is 
secondary ; otherwise, it is primary. 
It remains to be considered whether the adoption of such a limitation i� 
consistent with the underlying rationale, or-to put the same question another 
way-whether a Congress which sought to protect secondary employers only 
from harm different in kind from that associated with strikes against other 
employers would nonetheless refuse to permit the striking union to "follow 
242. The language of the act makes this clear. See Metal Polishers Union ( Cl imax 
Mach. Co. ) ,  86 N.L.R.B.  1243 ( 1 949) ; 93 CoN G. REc. 4323 (daily ed. Apr i l  29, 1947 ) ,  
in  2 LMRA LEG. Hrsr. 1 107 ( remarks of  Sen. Taft) ; cf. Local 1 976, United B hd. of 
Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 ( 1958) . The act would presumably apply even to a 
boycott l imited to goods arriving subsequent to the start of the strike. 
243. It is  the failure to consider the implications of these facts that is  the chief 
weakness of the rationale underlying the pr imary s i tus doctr ine. 
Mention might be made here of one argument in support of that doctrine. Union 
counsel asserted in General Electric, see text accompanying note 1 13 supra, that the 
common law uniformly recognized that primary site picketing was not secondary despite 
its appeal to secondary employees. There is evidence that this i s  so. See Missouri Pac. 
R.R. v. United B rick Workers. 2 1 8  Ark. 707, 238 S.W.2d 945 ( 1 95 1 )  ; Ex parte Henry, 
147 Tex. 3 15 ,  2 1 5  S.W.2d 588 ( 1 948) ; S chivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 
N .Y. 26, 32, 69 N.E.2d 233, 235 ( 1 946) ( concurring op inion ) ; 1 TELLER, LABOR 
DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE B ARGAINING § 145 ,  at 456 ( 1940) ; Barnard & Graham, Labo-r 
and the Secondary B oycott, 15 WAS I·I .  L. REv. 137, 141 ( 1 940) . A well-known statement 
made by Senator Taft in debate, partial ly quoted at text accompanying note 1 3  supra, 
supports the view that � 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  reinstated the common law ban on secondary boycotts 
made i neffective bv the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For the ful l  quote see 93 CoNG. REc. 4323 
( daily erl. Anril  29, 1 947 ) ,  in 2 L-:v1RA LEG. HTST. 1 106. However, this  reasoning has 
two s erious defects : First. it makes relevant one of the most confused and opaque areas 
of common law development : and second. it fai l s  to provide a rationale suf11cicnt to ac­
count for the application by the Board of the primary-secondary dichotomy to secondary 
site picket ing. 
SECONDAR Y  B O YCO TTS 14 15  
,.;· the product" in the manner just described. While one might well not draw J: the line at that point, I think there are grounds, evidently at the forefront of 
: congressional concern, for doing so. A major asserted basis for restricting 
· secondary activity was the legislative desire to discourage what may be called . 
the metastasis of labor disputes : the fanning out of unrest from the struck 
plant to those doing business with it.244 This danger is not met by forbidding 
only total refusals to work, and their inducement, but i s held within bounds 
when appeals to secondary employees are entirely forbidden in cases when 
such employees are not carrying on work directly dependent on the avail­
ability of primary employees. 
In thus reconstructing what is ambiguously called the ''legislative intent," 
I am not purporting to describe the actual reasoning process of Senator Taft, 
the Senate Committee on Labor, or any other legislator or group of legislators. 
Legislative history will often prove unhelpful if it is viewed as merely the 
explicit statements of Congressmen seemingly addressed to the case at hand. 
The task of the interpreter of a statute, especially a complex and important 
regulatory enactment like section 8 ( b) ( 4 ) ,  is "that of fitting the particular 
problem case within the larger framework of the legislature's own values and 
goals"245-as Judge Learned Hand succinctly put it , "to reconstitute the 
gamut of values . . . .  "246 Congress often acts on a principle without express­
ing it, or describing with precision its range of impact. The judge or adminis­
trator must, from the action taken, deduce the underlying principle, and­
since a multiplicity of principles and policies typically interact in regulatory 
legislation-discern the resultant of several often inconsistent principles and 
policies.247 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE SuGGESTED RATIONALE 
A.  Pr·imary Site Picketing 
It will be a rare case in which picketing at the primary site will be held 
secondary under the principles just discussed. The classic case of pickets 
244. See, in particular, 93 CoNG. REc. 4323 ( dai ly eel. April  29, 1947 ) ,  in 2 LMRA 
LEG. Hrsr. 1 107 ( remarks of Senator Taft ) .  
245. See Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Di·meusions of Legislath•e 111 eaning, 
36 IND. L.]. 4 14, 4 18  ( 1961 ) .  
246. See letter quoted in  note 155  supra. 
247. The attribution of a policy or  principle wi l l  sometimes be based on statements 
made by a committee or a congressman, as in  the case of the primary character of the 
act of turning deliverymen away from the primary site ; sometimes from the narrowness 
of statutory language, as with the statute's original concern only with secondary pressure 
manifested through inducements of employees ; sometimes from legislative treatment of 
closely related matters, as in the case of the wide latitude given free collective bargaining 
and strikes ; sometimes from the failure of those supporting a more restrictive principle 
to secure legislative adoption of their views, as in  the case of minority union attempts 
to gain recognition ; and sometimes from the need to accommodate an inferred principle 
to a particularized enacted proscription, as in  the case of the prohibition on partial as 
well  as total refusals to work. All .of these sources are part of the "legislative history." 
Of course, inferences from many of them do not have the self-evident character of 
rel iance on a statement cul l ed from a committee report, but that i s  only to say that 
statutory construction is a legal art of which j udgement is :1 maj or component 
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turning truckdrivers away from a struck plant is primary because the impa�t 
on the secondary is exactly that which would be caused by the closing of tlie 
";; 
plant by the strike ; to the driver deterred by the picket line, the plant is in ,,,· , .a .
sense which i s  metaphorical but relevantly accurate here, closed. And it is ' 
of course, irrelevant that the union "intended' '  that the drivers not cross 24� ''i 
Other variants on �ri�nary site app�als are typically likewise primary, be- ·� " f,l 
cause they may be srm!larly charactenzed. ,· · ,'"· . [1 
When, however, this characterization is inapt, primary site picketing may . · "t j 
become secondary. Crystal Palace, in which the secondary employer was a '' ·1 
lessee of the primary,2'19 is an important i llustration. The business relation . i �. :j 
between lessor and lessee is ,  in the ordinary case, not related to the operations . ·: -� ·1 
of the lessor carried on at the site. As Justice Frankfurter observed, in a · .,. S j 
slightly different context, in General Electric : "Where the work done by the .· ··.t1 '] 
secondary employees is unrelated to the normal operations of the primary · � · .. 1 
employer, it is difficult to perceive how the pressure of picketing . . .  is any , { 
less on the neutral employer merely because the picketing takes place at 1 
property ovvned by the struck employer."250 This is so because a strike shut­
ting down the primary's business will not interfere with that of the other. 
Accordingly, appeals to the employees of the lessees to refrain from entering 
the j oint! y-occupied building seek to subject the secondary to pressures 
beyond those attributable to the disruption of the primary's business, and are 
properly deemed secondary. The requirement of compliance with the 111 oore 
Dry Dock rules to bar such appeals is accordingly proper. The contrary case 
occurs \vhen the secondary ( lessee)  does have an interest in the primary 
dispute. A strike of elevator operators employed by the ovvner of a building 
partially leased to another is an example of this ; here the secondary would 
be affected by loss of elevator service, and is  not entitled to the immunity 
sought to be furnished by such an application of the Moore Dry Dock rules. 
The same would be true when there is a substantial vertical relationship 
between the two employers, as in the case of a lessee who buys commodities 
from the lessor for resale.251 
Certainly, on such an analysis, the mere fact that a secondary employer is 
present on the primary premises, even for an extended period, does not make 
243. Cf. note 1 3 1  supra ( Kennedy-Thompson memorandum) ; Chauffeurs Union v. 
N LRB, 294 F.2cl 261 ( D .C. Cir.  1 961 ) ,  re<.•e1·sing pe1· curiam 123 N.L.R.B . 522 ( 1 960) 
( iVI clunlcin )  ; International Bhcl. o f  Teamsters ( Alexander vVarehouse & Sales Co. ) ,  
123 N .L R B .  9 1 6  ( 1 960 ) .  
249. See discussion of Cr}•stal Palace a t  text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. 
250. Local 761 , Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. KLRB, 366 U.S.  667, 679 ( 1961 ) .  
251 .  Such was argued to be the case i n  Crystal Palace, but the B oard found to the 
contrary. 1 1 6  N.L.RB. at 357-53. 
Obviously, matters of degree arise. I would say that the purchases from the lessor 
must be a s ignificant portion of the lessee's business before appeals to his employees 
become primary, but total or near-total dedication to the lessor 's l ine should not be 
required. 
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Crystal Palace applicable.252 It  i s  not the relative permanence of the lessee's 
association with the primary site alone, but the freedom of his business from 
1 k involvement with that of the primary, that brings him within the protection of 
''; 1· section 8 (b) ( 4) . 
l' The problem raised by the General Electric litigation is but another 
. . f ! I 
··· variation of the general question, and yields to the same approach. In  the 
General Electric situation, an employer, whose work ( typically maintenance 
or construction work) calls for him to carry on operations at the primary 
site, is ordinarily not merely present there, as is a lessee, but is engaged in 
· work dependent on the continued operation of the primary employer's busi­
ness. If the plant ceases to run, j anitorial duties are not needed ( or are much 
less needed) ,  machinery-repair service is largely suspended, and so on. As 
General Electric recognizes-and here the extent to which the Supreme Court's 
decision was a rejection of the "Eisenhower Board's" approach becomes 
apparent-a union picketing the primary site is free to appeal to employees 
of such employers to stay away.253 When, however ( in the words of the 
second of the three "General Electric rules" ) ,  "the work done by the men who 
use the gate [ is]  . . .  unrelated to the normal operations of the [primary] 
employer,"254 disruption of those operations by a successful strike against the 
primary will not cause the suspension of business with the secondary. Ac-
cordingly, to attempt to cause such a suspension by an appeal to secondary 
employees is to subject the secondary to pressure beyond that generated by a 
primary strike ; such an attempt is properly deemed secondary.255 
The Supreme Court in General Electric prescribed a test with virtually 
252. Cf. the reliance on the Crystal Palace decision in  the very different situation 
presented by the Gonzalez case, supra notes 44-45. 
253. " [ I ] f  [the gate] . . .  was in fact used by employees of independent contractors 
who performed conventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of 
General Electric, the use of the gate would have been a mingled one outside the bar of 
§ 8 ( b )  (4)  ( A ) ." 366 U.S.  at 682. This was said even though no primary employees used 
the gate in question. As Chief Judge Lumbard aptly put it, dissenting in Carrier Corp. v. 
NLRB, 51 L.R.R.M. 2338, 2349 ( 2d Cir. Oct. 18, 1 962) : "The legitimate objectives of 
picketing include publ icizing a dispute to employees of neutral employers who are per­
forming part of the everyday operations of the struck employer." 
It has been asserted that there are "persuasive indications" that the relevance of the 
nature of the work done in General Electric rests wholly on the fact that both primary 
and secondary employees performed "conventional maintenance work," and that the 
Court's pr inc iple is  nothing more than an expansion of the "struck work" principle. 
Zimmerman, Secondary Picli e ling and the Resen;ed Gate : The Gen eral E lec tric D o ctrine, 
47 VA. L. Rr::v. 1 1 64, 1 173-74 ( 1961 ) .  The Court's opinion hardly leaves room for such 
a narrow reading, which does not explain the primary character of appeals to del ivcrymen 
and other "neutral employees whose tasks aid the employer's everyday operations." 
366 U.S. at 681 ; see text accompanying note 1 3 1  supra; cf. Koretz , Federal Regulation 
o f  Secondarv Stril1cs and Bo)·cot ts-A Third Chapter, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 10-1 1 (1 961 ) .  . ' 
254. 366 U.S .  at 681 .  
255. Local 618, Petroleum Employees Union ( Incorporated Oil ,  Co. ) ,  1 16 N .L.R.B. 
1 844, 1 845 ( 1956 ) , rezid, 249 F.Zd 332 (8th Cir. 1 957 ) ,  in  which the secondary employer 
was engaged to " rebui ld completely" a service station, was probably such a case, although 
the Board's rationale \\·as quite di fferent. See text accompanying note 36 s11{>ra. On the 
suggested rationale, the p icketing, . designed to appeal to secondary employees, i s  
properly h e l d  secondary regardless ot t h e  p resence or absence of the pri mary emrloyces. 
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no discussion of its substantive underpinning. Lacking an underlying rationale , 
application of a ' 'nature of the work" criterion might well become undul
' 
,_' 
abstract ; one can visualize disputes over whether certain operations are or a� ',1?1 
not "conventional maintenance work."256 I believe the test i s  a sound one, as 
a corollary of the rationale suggested in this article. If applied on that 
basis, it should not prove unduly slippery in the individual case .  The inquiry 
into the nature of the work in each instance would be made to determine 
whether the shutdown of the primary's operations would subj ect the secondary 
to loss of business. If so, the work is not "unrelated to the normal operations" 
of the primary, and picketing is  permissible. This is a relatively straight­
forward factual question. Unfortunately, the Board's decision on remand in 
General Electric proceeds to apply the Court's test as if no thoughts about its 
function were called for. Work of the kind done by primary employees is 
"part of [ the primary's] . . .  normal operations" ; that which is  "part of" 
those operations is "necessarily related" to them.257 To say that A ( when 
done by P )  is part of B may well carry the implication that A (when done 
by S) is related to B, but the pertinent question is the relevance of the stated 
relation to the matter at issue. Plainly, that can not be dealt with in a 
vacuum ; attention to the purpose of the "related work" requirement is essen­
tial if its application is to be more than a word-game.258 
The other prongs of the G eneral Electric rules-that the secondary be 
doing work that could be performed without necessitating the curtailment of 
the regular operations of the primary, and that the secondary employees in 
question enter the primary site through a "reserved gate''-respond to dif­
ferent considerations. At least since Judge Rifkind's landmark opinion in 
Douds v .  lVI etropolitan Fed'n of A rchitects (Ebasco ) ,25D i t  has been recog­
nized that the secondary boycott prohibition should not be administered so as 
to enable the primary employer to avoid the impact of the strike on his own 
256. 366 U.S.  at 682. 
257. Local 761 ,  Int'l  Union of Elec. ·workers ( General Elec. Co. ) , 1 38 N .L.R.B.  No. 
38, 1 962 CCH NLRB DEc. � 1 1 5 56, at 1 7952-53 ( Aug. 28, 1962) ; see text accompanying 
note 139 supra. 
258. On the rationale proposed herein, the mere fact that primary employees have 
done work l ike that performed by secondary employees would not suffice  to deprive the 
secondary employer of the protection of § 8 ( b )  ( 4 ) . The result might be otherwise if the 
secondary employees were in competition with the primary employees f01· the very work 
in question. But cf. United Steelworkers (United States Steel Corp. ) ,  127 N .L.R.B.  
823, 826-27 ( 1960 ) , enforced a s  modified, 294 F.2d 256 ( D. C. Cir. 1 961 ) ( the  T CI case) . 
The Board's decision does not rest on such a finding or principle. 
The trial examiner based his characterization of the picketing as primary on the 
finding that some secondary employees worked on the conveyor system in several manu­
facturing departments ; s ince rearrangement of the conveyor system was "an essential step 
in resuming . . .  production," the conveyor work \vas held "related to" General Electric's 
operation. Again, as an abstraction, this i s  true enough. But i s  i t  relevant that the primary 
was dependent on the completion of the secondary's world One can not say, except by 
express or implicit  resort to an underlying rationale. The rationale I have advanced 
would deny the relevance of the relation re l ied on by the examiner, although the contrary 
would be the case were the dependency relations reversed. 
259. 75 F. Supp. 672 ( S.D .N.Y. 1 948) . 
1 I t 
1 
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There, as is well known, the court held outside the ban of section 
. ,; S(b) ( 4)  union appeals to secondary employees working on "farmed-out 
· struck work," that is, on work previously performed by primary employees 
unavailable because of the strike, and contracted by the primary to another 
employer.260 The reasoning of the court was as follows : 
The economic effect upon Ebasco's [ the primary's]  employees was 
precisely that which would flow from Ebasco's hiring strike-breakers 
to work on its own premises. The conduct of the union in inducing 
Proj ect's [ the secondary's ]  employees to strike is not different in 
kind from its conduct in inducing Ebasco's employees to strike.261 
When a struck employer utilizes the consequent interruption of his normal 
operations to do work that could not have been performed without such an 
interruption, he is  to that extent neutralizing the impact of the strike. \i\Then 
he does that by hiring replacements, they may, of course, be picketed. Ebasco 
and its progeny teach that when he accomplishes the same thing through 
employees of a secondary employer, those employees become amenable to 
picketing. This principle is  directly applicable to an attempt to utilize sec­
ondary employees to do work which "replaces" the strikers in a different, but 
wholly analogous, sense.262 
vVhat, though, of the requirement-assuming it is that263-of a separate 
gate ? The condition of a separate gate, laid down by the Court without sup­
porting reasons, hardly seems responsive to any substantive considerations .264 
It may, however, be j ustified, as an exercise ( albeit by a court ) of Board rule­
making based on considerations of practicality. vVhen both primary employees 
who may be the obj ect of pickets' appeal, and secondary employees who may 
not, use a "mingled" gate, the issue to be litigated is very troublesome. The 
pickets will , of course, want secondary as well as primary employees to 
respect the line, and if they do nothing to give avYay their secret ( secret to 
no one) hopes, they may succeed in lawfully bringing about what the law 
says they may not try to bring about. The proceedings, both on the picket 
260. The Ro3•al Typewriter decision broadened the principle to apply to cases in 
which the secondary employer took on the work irtdependently, without any agreement 
with the primary. NLRB v. Business :Mach. Mechanics Conference, 228 F.2d 553 (2d 
Cir.  1955 ) ,  cert. denied, 3 5 1  U.S .  962 ( 1956) . 
261 .  75 F. Supp. at 677. 
262. Even i f  the relationship between the two employers were crucial to the applica­
bility of this principle ( but  see note 260 supra) , there would seem to be as close a nexus 
in the contractor s ituation as there was in Ebasco. 
263. Cf. note 1 35 mpra. 
264. After Gen eral Electric, the Gonzalez decision, see text accompanying notes 
44-45 snpra, was reversed for want of a s eparate gate, the court of appeals writing : 
The Board had argued to us that there should be no difference i n  effect 
between ( 1 )  separate gates and ( 2 )  distinct uniforms and times of starting and 
stopping work This may or may not be true as  an economic matter. As a legal 
matter, we cannot deny that a separate gate is a control ling consideration when 
the Supreme Court has j ust  said it i s  a controlling cons ideration. 
Teamsters l.-'nion v.  NLRB, 293 J<.2d 881 ,  882 ( D.C.  Cir. 1961 ) ,  rc".;ersing 128 N .L.R.B .  
1 352 ( 1960) . 
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line and at Board hearings, take on the characteristics of a grand game, �ith 
a premium on skill in avoiding, on the one hand, and ferreting out, on th� 
other, actions which betray the forbidden aim. The charade reaches "-it s ' 
pinnacle i n  litigation over the duty affirmatively to make clear the pickets' · 
nonobjection to line crossing by secondary employees.265 vVhen there ar� 
separate gates, the problem is simplified ; the pickets can ply their craft freely � .1 
at the one, and must stay entirely away from the other.266 Given the absurdity n. • ,j 
of the issue raised by many of the cases under Moore Dry Dock as presently�_ ) ad.minis�ered, . and assuming that the require_ment can in fact be readily com-·: . ·· J � phed w1th w1thout great burden to the affected companies,267 one can not;- i l 
object to such a rule of administration.268 " .1· . 
B .  Secondary Site Picketing 
1 .  Picketing pennitted to appeal to neutral e1nployees. In almost every 
case, picketing the premises of the secondary employer subj ects him to pres­
sure beyond that brought to bear against him by the disruption of the business 
of the primary with whom he deals . The secondary's entire operations are 
potentially affected by picketing at his door. Typically, many of his employees 
work on matters unrelated to the primary, and hence are unaffected by that 
employer's labor troubles. I n  addition, he often depends on the services of 
employees of his customers and suppliers-other than the primary-coming 
to his premises . On the rationale I have suggested, section 8 ( b )  ( 4) is 
designed to protect the secondary employer from the pressure of boycott 
appeals directed to those employees. It i s also applicable to appeals to those 
of his employees who work on materials received from, or to be shipped to, 
the primary, but who do not require the presence of primary employees to do 
that work.269 
Some secondary site picketing, however, is not of this order, and is "no 
265 .  See Superior D en·ick, discussed at text accompanying notes 97- 1 0 1  supra. 
For a suggested solution to these problems see text accompanying notes 302- 14 infra. 
266. The Court i n  General Electric spoke of applying Moore Drv D o c!? to the reserved 
gate. 366 U.S.  at 680. However, s ince it is impossible to picket a gate at which no 
primary employees appear, i n  compliance with the Jv! oore Dry D o c k  rules,  the e ffect i s  
as stated i n  the text. 
267. Such an assumption may be unwarranted in the case of  a completed office 
building, when the possibility of altering-even informally-the entrance arrangements are 
l imited. 
268. There seems to be no justification, however, for insisting on a s eparate gate in  a 
case in which the union has decided not to call a strike of primary employees, nor to 
induce them to refrain from crossing the picket l ine. Cf. United S teelworkers ( United 
States Steel Corp. ) ,  127 N.L.R.B.  823 ( 1960 ) , enforced as modified, 294 F.2d 256 ( D.C. 
Cir. 1961 ) ( TC I) . The reason for this distinction i s  not, of course, that the fai lure to call 
out primary employees proves that the picketing was deliberately aimed at secondary 
employees ; the question whether secondary employees may be appealed to depends on 
the application of the two other General Electric tests. The reason is s imply that, when 
primary employees are not being appealed to, the fact that they, as well as the secondary 
employees, are using the gate in  question loses its relevance. For the purposes of a 
reserved gate test as stated above, the gate is in effect "separate." 
269. See text accompanying notes 242-43 sup-ra. 
' ' f 1 j 
j 
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more aimed at the employees of the secondary employer" than is  permissible 
primary site picketing.270 The Moore Dry Dock rules were designed to 
express the conditions under which this could be said to be the case. As has 
been discussed,271 the rules have been given varying content. Since they have 
repeatedly received judicial approval,272 a tribunal will feel under some pres­
sure to express its views within the words of the M oore Dry Dock formulation. 
The bulk of the litigation has involved the fourth rule, enjoining the 
picketing union to "disclose clearly that the dispute is with the primary 
employer." As we have seen, the "Eisenhower Board," interpreting this 
requirement in light of its literal approach to section 8 (b )  ( 4) , administered 
it to require that the union refrain entirely from appeals to secondary em­
ployees.273 Earlier, and again most recently, the Board has used a different 
approach, giving the rule an obj ective content, and tacitly permitting appeals 
to neutral employees carried out within the Moore Dry Dock framework, 
either as a substantive decision274 or merely by shutting its eyes to what is 
happening.275 These varying approaches share one failing : they fail to dis­
tinguish explicitly two very different questions. First, in what cases, if any, 
may a union appeal to secondary employees at the secondary site ? Second, 
if in a given case or class of cases a union may not so appeal, under what 
conditions, if any, may it picket the site ? The Moore Dry Dock rules were 
originally designed to express the answer to the first question ; the Board 
later adopted a view of the act under which the answer to the first question 
is "never," and adapted Moore Dry Dock to embody its answer to the second. 
The Supreme Court's General Electric decision establishes-if i t  was not 
clear before-that some appeals to secondary employees are primary and 
lawful, and I have attempted to formulate a rationale by which the primary 
or secondary character of such appeals may be discerned. Under it, some 
secondary site appeals would be permissible ( although, as ·will appear, I 
believe the range is quite narrow) .  If, for example, a union may appeal to a 
secondary employer's driver not to make a delivery to the primary, it should 
likewise be able, under proper safeguards, to make a similar appeal to a 
270. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. �orkers v. N LRB, 366 U.S. 667, 677 ( 1961 ) .  
This was one of two grounds stated by J ustlce Frankfurter for permitting some s econdary 
s ite picketing. The other-that that s ite is "the only place where picketing could take 
place"-is considered at text accompanying notes 293-303 infra. 
271 .  See text accompanying notes 63-70, 93-107 supra. 
272. See the reference in the General Elec tric case, 366 U.S.  at 677 & cases cited 
therein ; the Conference Report on the 1959 amendment to § S ( b) (4) at text accompanying 
note 1 70 snpra. 
273. See text accompanying notes 93-99 snpra. 
274. See the discussion in the Moore Dry Dock case itself at text accompanying 
note 60 supra. 
275. See, e.g., International Bhd.  of Elec. Workers ( A nderson Elec. Serv. Co. ) >  
135 N .LR.B.  N o .  55  ( J an .  24, 1962 ) ; Plumbers Union ( \Vycko ff P lumbing) ,  135 
N.L.R.B .  No. 49 ( Jan. 18, 1962) ; Baltimore Bldg. Trades Council ( Stover Steel Serv. ) ,  
108 N .L.R.B .  1 575 ( 1954) , rev'd sub nom. Piezonki v. NLRB, 219  F.2d 879 ( 4th Cir.  
1955 ) .  
1422 COL UMBIA LA W RE VIEW 
secondary employee at the secondary's loading platform not to work with a 
primary employee driver coming there to p ick up goods ; the latter i s  "no , 
more aimed at the employees of the secondary" than the former,276 and both • 
intend to subject the secondary to no greater pressure than would be felt by 
the shutdown of the primary's business. Just as, in the former case, the 
secondary employer in effect finds the plant "closed," so in the latter the 
primary employee and his truck are de facto unavailable to him. There is 
obviously a far greater danger here that forbidden secondary appeals will be 
made at the same time, and the minimization of this danger should be a 
primary function of the administration of the �M a ore Dry Dock rules ; but 
some appeals are clearly primary.277 
Viewed as expressing the conditions under which appeals to secondary 
employees may be lawfully made, the fourth rule should require, first, that the 
picket signs make it clear to secondary employees that the o ffending employer 
is the primary and not the secondary, and, second, pickets should refrain from 
appealing to employees of third persons not to enter the secondary site, or to 
secondary employees not working with the primary employees to engage in 
any refusal to work. Strict enforcement of this rule i s  essential if the sec­
ondary is to have the protection he is entitled to under the act. If these condi­
tions-and the other requisites to be discussed-are met, the pickets should 
not be required to pretend that they do not want the secondary employees 
who ordinarily work with the primary employees coming to the site to 
refrain from doing so . Only when these conditions are not met does the 
further question arise whether any picketing is to be permitted, and under 
what conditions ; much of the confusion in the precedents is attributable to 
a commingling of these critically different issues. By first facing squarely 
the merits of the literal approach, and the scope of permitted appeals to sec­
ondary employees, that confusion can be largely avoided . 
The first requirement laid clown in NI oore Dry Doc!::,  that the picketing 
take place only vvhen "the situs of the dispute is located" at the secondary 
site, needs to be divested of its metaphorical quality, and of its resulting 
276. The expression is Mr.  Justice Frankfurter's i n  General Electric. 266 U .S .  at 677. 
277. One consequence of recognition that Moore Dry Dock permits appeals to 
secondary employees should be mentioned. The B oard has typically banned a l l  secondary 
site picketing when it has found noncompliance with NI oore Dr:.• Dock ; this follows 
logically from its use of the rules of that case as guides to the "obj ect" of the picketing. 
However, if  the l i teral approach is rej ected, as the text argues, it \vi i i  be seen that the 
proper order is to enjoin only continued secondary site picketing not in compliance with 
Moore Dry Dock ( except perhaps when repeated violations make a broad order proper) .  
This i s  especially important in § 10  ( l )  proceedings. 
I do not agree, however, with the view, see, e.g., Local 660, I nt ' l  B hd .  of Elec. 
Workers ( George Sabo) , 125 N .L.R.B .  537, 541 ( 1 959)  ( Men2ber B ean, dissenting) ,  
that noncompliance with Moore Dr)' Doell does not render secondary s ite  picketing unlaw­
ful . Again, if  the rules are only evidentiary guides, one might conceivably refuse to draw 
the inference on which i l legality turns, despite the fact of noncompliance. But i f  the rules 
are conditions of the primary character of secondary site p!cketing, they must ( when 
applicable) be complied with. But sec the curious dictum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 
Gen eral Elec tric, seeming to lament such an automatic finding of violation. 366 U.S .  at 677. 
l 
l 
! 
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ambiguity. Does it refer to cases in which materials owned, worked on, or to 
be worked on, by the primary are present ; to cases in which any employees 
of the primary are present ; or to cases in which primary employees actually 
involved in the dispute are present ?278 In view of the statutory prohibition 
of partial as well as total refusals to work by secondary employees , the first 
answer is too broad. The Fifth Circuit's O tis Massey decision279 has made it 
sufficiently clear that the third answer is too narrow. Since the employees 
actually involved in the dispute may appeal to all primary employees to 
refuse to work, secondary employers dependent on the services of any primary 
employees are subj ect to the risk of loss occasioned by the success of such 
appeals. Accordingly, on the rationale I have suggested, attempts to isolate 
such employees from the secondary are primary. Thus, the "situs of the 
dispute" is located wherever any primary employees are working.280 
The third requirement, that the picketing take place "reasonably close 
to the location of the situs," presents little problem once the "location" is 
factually understood. It  is  obviously designed to minimize the danger that 
the picketing will reach a broader audience than is  permissible. In light 
of the great danger of this, it should be vigilantly enforced. 
The second Moore Dry D ock rule requires that the primary be engaged 
in its "normal business" at the secondary site when the picketing takes place. 
Its function has never, to my knowledge, been fully explained. It arose to 
implement the idea that the Board would have held the picketing in Moore 
Dry D oc!� barred had the primary not been using its ship, while in dry dock, 
to train personnel for the coming voyage.281 In the Board's Salt Dome de­
cision28� i t  was adapted, as the mold through which a literal construction 
of the act was enforced, to render Moore Dry Dock inapplicable to a case 
in which the primary employees were removed from the ship after the 
picketing commenced. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
disagreed, partly out of distaste for the idea that the primary employer could 
render lawful picketing unlavvful merely by removing his employees from 
the site,283 but in part on the ground, going beyond Moore Dry D ock, that 
periodic overhaul and repair was in fact an integral part of the normal 
operation of a ship.284 vVithout an underlying rationale by which the function 
278.  Cf. the discussion of the 0 tis Massey decision at text accompanying notes 
85-88 supra. 
279. NLRB v. General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205 ( 5th Cir. ) ,  cert . denied, 350 U.S .  914 
( 1955 ) ,  denying enforcen1ent i n  109  N .L.R.B. 275  ( 1954 ) ,  discussed at text accompanying 
note 85 supra. 
280. But  see NLRB v. Associated Musicians, 226 F.2d 900, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1955 ) ,  
cert. denied, 35 1  U.S.  949 ( 1956 ) ,  which apparently denies this, at least in  an extreme 
case. The result in that case may, I bel ieve, be supported on another ground. See text 
accompanying note 288 infra. 
281 .  92 N.L.R.B .  at 551 .  
282. See  note 96 sH/Jra. 
283. 265 F.2d 585, 590 ( D.C. Cir.  1959) ( Prettyman, C. ] . )  . 
284. Id. at 589. 
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·of the "normal business" requirement can be discerned, the i ssue is an exer�it: 
in abstraction. The importance the Board gave to the presence of the prima 1 ;."' 
·employees is entirely proper if a literal approach to section 8 (b) ( 4 )  is propJ · ;,i. 
and all appeals to the secondary employees are forbidden. O n  the rationale I · � J 
have advanced, the legality of appeals to secondary employees is unaffected b� . .  .;,.1 
the presence or absence of primary employees. When the work done by the
i '-'� 
secondar� is not itself dependent on the availability of the p�imary employees, .. ;·l the relahon between the secondary employer and the pnmary strike-his, i 
dependence on, or independence of, it-is not affected by that factor. In such a: ·-��  
circumstance, the presence of primary employees is for our purposes merely �. ·�2 
fortuitous, and it makes little sense to say that the pickets may appeal to . " . 
secondary employees in the primary employee's presence, but not otherwise. , -�· . 
I find it difficult to square the grounds of the decision i n  Salt Dome, <� 
permitting appeals to dry dock employees working on the primary's ship, with . l 
the prohibition in the act on partial refusals to work, limited to  "hot goods." · .'· I 
That prohibition, as we have seen,�85 is concededly a limitation on the general J 
principle that only harm different in kind from that generated by the effect 
•of a successful strike against the primary is  regarded as "secondary" within 
the meaning of the act, but effect must be given to the plain implications of 
that l imitation. Secondary employees are forbidden, for example, to refuse to 
do plating work on the primary product, contracted to their employer for 
that purpose,286 and primary employees are forbidden to induce such refusals. 
The principle behind that prohibition seems fully applicable to dry dock 
employees, working on a vessel owned by the primary, whose work is entirely 
independent of that performed by the crew of the vessel.287 
The "normal business" requirement, whatever opportunity for expansion 
its ambiguity provides, is  not aptly designed to embody the limitation on 
secondary site picketing necessary to respect the line between those pressures 
Congress has left the secondary employer to endure and those from which it 
has sought to shield him. As the facts of Salt Dome show, when the secondary 
employees are merely working in physical proximity to the primary employees, 
and are not doing work the continuation of which requires the availability 
of primary employees at the site, the withdrawal of the latter-whether at their 
own option or their employer's-exerts no direct restraint on the operations 
of the secondary. An appeal to secondary employees to suspend such operations 
therefore seeks to subj ect the secondary to pressure beyond that attributable 
to the strike.288 vVhen, however, as in the case of an attempted delivery to a 
285. See text accompanying notes 242-43 supra. 
286. Metal Polishers Union ( Cl imax Mach. Co. ) ,  86 N.L.R.B .  1243 ( 1 949 ) .  
287. Judge P rettyman's reasoning i n  Salt Dome, 265 F.2d at 5 9 1 -92, i s  subtantially 
the same as that unsuccessfully employed by the union in  Climax M achiner:y, supra note 
286, at 1251 ( intermediate report ) . 
288. See N LRB v. Associated Musicians, 226 F.2d 900 ( 2cl Cir .  1955 ) ,  cert. denied, 
351 U.S.  949 ( 1956)  ( P.clio  station employees at baseball park ) .  The results in Moore 
SECONDARY B O YCOTTS 1425 
site, the secondary's unloading personnel could not do their assigned 
work without the presence of the primary's driver, the appeal to boycott 
·
injures the secondary no more than would the decision of the driver to j oin 
the strike, and is therefore primary.289 
The limitation thus suggested on the application of the Moore Dry Dock 
rules, viewed as conditions for permissible secondary site appeals to secondary 
employees, is a significant one. In particular, it would bar such appeals in 
·the bulk of construction site cases, in which Moore Dry Dock has con­
sistently been applied and, recently, resulted in dismissal of a complaint.290 
· . . So long as NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council stands unreversed by ��,�' Congress,�91 we are req�ired, d
_
espite the realities; to regard the employers ' · engaged m a constructwn proJ ect as we would several contractors each 
I 9 performing work of one kind or  another for a factory owner. Such a view l leads one, on the analysis put forward here, to regard appeals to employees I 1 of contractors other than the primary as secondary in nature.292 vVhile the 1 general belief that D enver was wrongly decided might tempt the Board to 
afford relief through the back door, as it were, if we are to take that ruling 
as law it leads to a refusal to permit picketing to appeal to secondary 
employees at construction sites. 
Finally, mention should be made of the relevance of an alternative place 
to picket, and the "fifth condition" of the Washington C oca-C ala doctrine . 
It will doubtless be already apparent that, on the analysis I have advanced, 
Dry Dock and Salt Dome may nonetheless be proper on an application of the pr inciple 
reflected i n  the third of the General E lectric rules,  see text at  notes 259-62 supra, since 
the dry dock operations, to be carried on, would "necessitate curtailing" the normal 
operations of the ship. 366 U.S. at 681 .  Perhaps, however, this principle is properly in 
point only when the contractor was engaged at a time when the strike was already in 
progress or anticipated. 
289. Cf. the Carrier case, discussed in  text accompanying notes 1 37-38 supra, in 
which the analysis I have suggested would lead one to characterize the appeals as 
primary regardless of the ownership of the r ight-of-way. The dispute over whether 
General Elec tric "applies" when the land is owned by the secondary, see Zimmerman, 
supra note 253,  at 1 1 78, is  beside the point if  the underlying rationale governs the 
characterization of secondary site picketing as well .  The failure of the court of appeals's 
maj ority in  Carrier to seek a pr incipled basi s  for General Electric, see note 138 sttpra, 
led it to lose s ight of this point, although Chief Judge Lumbard's dissenting opinion 
makes i t  quite \vel!. Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 51 L .R.R.M. 2338, 2352-53 (2d Cir. Oct. 
18, 1 962 ) . 
290. See cases cited in note 146 supra. 
291 .  341 U.S.  675 ( 195 1 ) .  This decis ion accorded construction contractors and sub­
contractors the protection of neutral employers under § 8 (b)  ( 4 ) , and has been the obj ect 
of repeated presidential and congressional attempts to overrule. These came w ithin a 
hairbreadth of success in 1959, but foundered on parliamentary d ifficulties ; a pledge to 
do the j ob at the next session has gone unredeemed by reason of the practical im­
possibi l i ty. in  the  labor area, of  enacting an i solated measure at  a l l  controversial. 
292. If, for example, plumbers engaged to work on a j ob were to refuse to do so 
because of a primary dispute, the brickwork contractor could nonetheless continue to 
have his men lay bricks. The two crafts work s ide-by-side, but not "together" in  the sense 
relevant here. Of cou rse. the unavail ability of plumbers would eventually cause other 
operations to be suspended, but again the same may be said of a manufacturer dependent 
for continued operations on a steady source of raw materials .  Given the congressional ban 
on inducement of boycotts of the product coming from the primary, the line must be 
dr:1wn at work which i s  directlv dependent on the immediate availability of the personnel, 
and not merely the product, of the primary. 
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i ts  relevance lS nil. vVhen, as  under a literal approach, the primary · �� 
:secondary character of the picketing depends on whether  the union's intent · ·. 
is to appeal to neutral employees, the question of adequate opportunity ( < :-· 
picket elsewhere may-or may not-be probative.293 But it has no effect 0 °, ',�If, · n .. 
the impact of strike action on employers with whom the primary does business
. 
I t  has no role to play, then, in  determining whether appeals to secondar� . : 
employees, under the rationale here proposed, are primary or secondary ; ' , .t · i 
indeed, i t  proceeds from the conclusion, arrived at from other sources, that · ·l· ! 
all such appeals are secondary. I f  that conclusion is rej ected, J;Vashington Coca- ', ·. ··· ; 
Cola i s  simply beside the point.294 �,.·, , 
.,�· . J The present Board has purported only to abandon the per se character t 1 of the prior reliance on an alternative place to picket, in favor of an inquiry ·��;· < 
into the particular facts of each case.205 But the Board has not yet told its ' ·�. 
dissenting members wherein it disagrees with their assertion that the J;V ash­
ington Coca-Cola rule should be decisive ; nor has it said vvhy, if the alter­
native place to picket is not controlling, it is relevant at all .  Something 
more than the aura of flexibility and case-by-case factual inquiry is required. 
Per se rules are neither intrinsically good nor bacl.�96 They are sound if their 
substantive and administrative underpinnings are firm, and unsound if they 
are not. There i s  a need for greater attention to basic questions of statutory 
construction, and less opaque recitation of "all the facts and circumstances," 
followed by the announcement of a still unexplained conclusion. 
2. Picketing forbidden to appeal to neutral employees. vVhen the con­
ditions discussed above are not met, appeals to neutral employees are properly 
regarded as "secondary" and unlawful . But, when there are pri mary employees 
present at the site, the further question arises whether picketing appealing 
to those employees may be carried on, and if so, under what conditions. One 
answer would be to hold all picketing barred, because of the great danger of 
forbidden harm to the secondary emplo.yer.297 I n  refusing to accept such a 
view, the Board has, since the Schultz decision, been impressed with the 
realization that there are cases in which no other place to picket the primary 
employees is available.2D8 The more troublesome question is whether, when 
293. The Board at one time thought so ; some courts of appeals  have not. See text 
f ' c 1 
J t I ! 
accompanying notes 83-88 supra. t 
294. ·whether it is appropriately invoked in those cases in which appeals to sec-
ondary employees are properly held secondary is discussed in  text accompanying notes t 
297-303 infra. 
295. See Local 861 ,  Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers ( Plauche Elec., Inc. ) ,  135  N .LRB.  
No .  41 ,  1962 CCH NLRB DEC. � 10830 ( Jan. 12, 1962 ) . 
296. Judge Friendly has recently made an impressive statement of the case for more 
of them. Friendly, The Federal Administrati·ue Agencies : The Need for B etter Definition 
of Standards ( pts. 1 -3 ) , 75 BAR\'. L REv. 863. 1 055 .  1263 ( 1962 ) . 
297. See D e velopments in the Law-The Taft-Hartley A c t, 64 HARV. L REv. 
781,  802 ( 195 1 ) .  
298. See text accompanying note 5 7  supra. This reason was given by Justice 
Frankfurter in  General Electric as one of the grounds of  the J11oore D ry Dock rules. 
366 U.S.  at 677. 
l 
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is not the fact, all picketing should be barred. Again, the Washington 
oca-C ola issue arises, but here in a context in which there is agreement that 
y appeals to primary employees are lawful .  Nonetheless, I am not persuaded 
t the criterion it suggests is the proper one. The difficulties of administering 
"adequate opportunity" test, already adverted to,299 are sufficient to counsel 
against its adoption in the absence of a compelling case for it. But the case 
is hardly of that character. One ground of support is that, when secondary 
site appeals to primary employees are "unnecessary," there is insufficient 
reason,  when balanced against the potential harm to secondary employers, to 
permit them. Such a view frankly makes the Board the "arbiter of the sort 
· of economic weapons the parties can use" ;300 for reasons previously elab­
orated,301 I do not believe that the Board-a fortiori the regional directors and 
district j udges-should appropriately take on the task of deciding when one 4- party to a primary dispute has had a "sufficient" opportunity to put pressure �1.l. on the other. 
l The other basis for applying Washington Coca-Cola as a limitation on 
f 
j secondary site picketing to bar appeals to secondary employees has-at least -t in form-firmer statutory supports. One is  the evidential inference that I ' secondary site picketing, "unnecessary" to an effective appeal to primary 
employees, is designed, at least in part, to appeal to secondary employees 
and therefore has the object forbidden by the act. The other is the doctrine 
that the actual conduct of the secondary employees is not relevant in determin­
ing whether the picket line constitutes an " inducement" of those employees . The 
former has been discussed earlier ; it seems clear that it should not stand in 
the way of a more practical test, if one is available. The latter is  an excellent 
r example of a principle with a core of sense applied dogmatically beyond any 
reasonable demands of practicality. Of course, overt attempts to provoke the 
forbidden response do not remain beyond the reach of the act merely because 
they faiP02 And certainly it is true that a picket sign "induces" a strike, in the 
sense that a cripple "induces" feelings of sympathy, or a beautiful -vvoman 
"induces" thoughts of love, even though the response is not intended. Intended 
or not, the tendency is there. But is it not also clear that the only substantive 
concern of the act is the result itself and not the tendency alone, and that 
the danger of the disfavored result is greater when the result is intended and 
the intent is manifested by overt acts ? To move from a rule encompassing 
attempts to one diverting attention entirely from the result to the "inducement' '  
299. See text following note 220 supra. 
300. N LRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S.  477, 497 ( 1960) . 
301 .  See text following note 2 1 7  supra. 
302. The Associa ted Musicians case, often cited by the Board for its ms1stence on 
the i rrelevancy of the pickets' effect, holds no more. NLRB v. Associated Musicians, 226 
F.2d 900, 904-05 ( 2cl Cir. 1955 ) ,  cert. denied, 351 U.S.  949 ( 1956) . Cf. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters v. N LRB, 286 F.2cl 533, 535 ( D .C. Cir. 1960 ) .  
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i s  to exalt a concept beyond all necessity, and to abjure a s imple, 
standard for a troublesome abstraction.303 
The first, third, and fourth Moore Dry Dock rules, discussed above, 
operate to bar the picketing from actively seeking to involve employees ·.  
neutrals. Certainly observance of their requirements should be a requisite 0f 
lawful secondary site picketing. vVhen these conditions are met, however, a 
s imple additional condition i s ,  in  my view, both necessary and sufficient ta" 
bar forbidden pressures : an actual refusal of secondary employees to do any 
work must not follow or accompany the picketing. Thus, it would not be , 
necessary for the pickets, on being asked whether secondary employees are 
to cross, to reply in the affirmative, but if the employees did not cross, the 
picketing would be held unlawful ; if no refusal to work occurred, there would 
be no violation. The result would be decisive. Given the limitations on the 
" inducement" inherent in the picket line imposed by the three Moore Dry 
Dock rules, I simply do not see what interest i s  being served by insisting that, 
although no secondary employees in fact refuse to cross, they are nonetheless 
being "induced" to do so, and the picketing i s  thereby rendered unlawful. 
As  a semantic abstraction, that may or may not be so, but in l ight of the 
purpose of the ban on inducement it seems entirely proper to say that the 
failure of the secondary employees to cross suf-ficiently evidences the absence 
of the prohibited "inducement." 
The advantages of this approach seem obvious. For the Board ( and for 
the regional director and district j udge ) , it substitutes a s imple, obj ective 
i ssue for the downright silly litigation over who hinted what to whom by what 
l::i ncl of silent signal ; for the secondary employer, it protects him from conduct 
unlawfully injurious to him, disregarding (as he doubtless does ) hostile 
attitudes which do not in fact cause such conduct ; for the union, it  removes 
the premium on skill in evasion, declines to demand unnatural conduct of its 
pickets, and permits it  to know clearly what is and is not permitted. The 
Eighty-sixth Congress employed like criteria in the areas of pre-election rec­
ognition picketing and secondary consumer publicity,305 and the Board has 
recently moved away from the conceptualism of its former position in the 
related area of distinguishing secondary appeals to employees from those to 
customers .306 A similar approach can profitably be employed here. 
303.  See K01·etz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-A New 
Chapter, 37 CoRKELL L.Q.  235, 246 n.56 ( 1952 ) , quoting from the N L RB brief as 
Petitioner in  N LRB v. International Rice M illing Co., 341 U .S .  665 ( 1951 ) .  
304. See text following note 277 supra. 
305. See the provisos to § 8 ( b) ( 7 )  ( C ) ,  73 Stat. 544 ( 1959 ) , 29 U.S .C .  § 1 58 (b ) ­
( 7 ) ( C )  ( Supp. I II, 1962 ) , and § 8 ( b) ( 4 ) ( i i ) ( B ) ,  73 Stat. 543 ( 1959 ) ,  29 U.S .C .  
§ 1 5 8 ( b )  ( 4 )  ( i i )  ( B )  ( Supp. III ,  1 962) ; Cox, The Landrum-Griffm A mendments to  the 
lvational Labor Relations A ct, 44 MrNN. L. REV. 257, 267 ( 1959 ) .  
306. See United Wholesale Employees v .  NLRB ( Perfection Mattress Co. ) ,  282 
F.2d 824 ( D. C. Cir. 1960) ; N LRB v. Local 50, Bakery Workers ( A rnold Bakers ) 245 
F.2d 542 (2d Cir .  1957)  ; Upholsterers \,Yorkers ( Minneapolis  House Furnishing Co. ) ,  1 32 
N.L.R.B .  40 ( 1961 ) .  
' 
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The converse situation must also be dealt with. The Board has recently 
returned to the view that, when the lvJ oore Dry Dock rules are satisfied, the 
.. · picketing is lawful even though there is an actual refusal of secondary em­. 
ployees to cross the line.307 It is not clear whether this is so because the Board 
now regards Moore Dry Dock as expressing the conditions under which 
appeals to secondary employees are permitted, or whether the thought is that 
compliance with 1Woore Dry Dock warrants the inference of noninducement, 
despite the fact of secondary employee refusals to work.308 The fact that the 
Board holds the refusal to work, when attributable to the secondary em-
ployees' union, unlawfuP00 is-or should be-an indication that the former i s  !. · not the case ;310 in any event, on the rationale I have proposed, the J.VJ oore 
1 Dry Dock rules are insufficient to winnow out all appeals to secondary 
employees that should be barred.311 The latter theory seems to be inconsistent 
with the realities in most cases, and encourages evasion of the act. The 
"Eisenhower Board'' was surely correct in asserting that the pickets '  
experience would ordinarily lead them to expect secondary employees to 
be influenced by the picket line to refuse to work behind it ;312 when the 
denouement is such a refusal, i t  is  not inaccurate to say that the picketing 
"caused" or "induced" it, in an objective sense .313 In this area, post hoc,  
ergo prop ter hoc expresses more fact than fallacy. Nor is it unj ust. Such a 
rule would in practice leave it to the union to see to i t  that the prohibited 
result did not come to pass ; the prevention of that result is  the purpose of 
the statutory provision, and the picketing union is in an appropriate position 
effectively to prevent it. A defense can be recognized for isolated refusals, 
and for those rare cases in which the primary employees' union can show that 
it has made all reasonable efforts to avoid causing a secondary refusal to 
work.314 ·with these possible limitations, the test here proposed would 
accomplish the substantive purpose of deterring forbidden secondary boycotts, 
and the administrative purposes of fostering compliance (while permitting 
picketing not having the prohibited result ) ,  making tactical record-making 
307. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers ( Anderson Co. Elec. Serv. ) ,  135  
N.L.R.B. No.  55  ( 1962 ) .  
308. See text accompanying notes 274-75 supra. 
309. See, e.g., Local 741, United Ass'n of Journeymen ( Independent Contractors 
Ass'n) , 1 37 N .L.R.B. No. 12 1  ( June 29, 1962) . 
3 10. There should be an integration of the rules as they affect the primary employees' 
and the secondary employees' union. It makes little sense, given the exclusive concern of 
§ 8 (b )  ( 4) with the protection of secondary employers, to hold that, although the former 
may appeal to secondary employees, identical inducement is unlawful when attributable 
to those employees' union. Cf. text accompanying note 205 supra. 
3 1 1 .  See text accompanying notes 285-92 supra. 
312.  See text accompanying note 99 supra. 
3 13. This conclusion i s  not rebutted by the view that the decision was an individual 
one on the part _of each secondary employee to support the picketing union. See Truck 
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 5 12, 5 1 5  ( D.C. Cir. 1957)  ( Bazelon, J. ,  dissenting ) , 
cert. denied, 355 U.S .  958 ( 1958) . Even if this is so, i t  remains true that the picketing 
brought on the decision. 
314. Cf. Retail Clerks Union ( B arker Bros. ) ,  138 N.L.R.B.  No. 54 ( Sept. 7, 1962) , 
permitting a potentially broader defense under the "publicity" proviso to § 8 ( b )  ( 7) ( c ) . 
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maneuvers irrelevant, and removing a t roublesome and fruitless 1ssue 
litigation. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The rationale I have proposed tests the primary or secondary character 
of an appeal to secondary employees by asking whether the appeal seeks to 
subject the secondary employer to loss  of the services of  his  employees broader 
than that which would flow from the unavailability of the services of primary 
employees were the strike to succeed in inducing them to quit work. In 
addition, because of considerations similar to those underlying the "struck 
work" doctrine, it  must be asked whether the employment of the secondary 
employer enables the primary to avoid the impact of the loss of services of 
his own employees. Under this approach : 
( 1 )  Picketing at a primary site is primary and lawful, regardless 
of its appeal to secondary employees not to cross the p icket line, 
unless : 
( a )  the work done by the secondary employees at the site i s  
unrelated to  the  operations of the primary, in the  sense that 
disruption of those operations by a successful strike against 
the primary vvould not cause it  to suspend business with the 
secondary ; 
( b )  the work done by the secondary employees can be 
carried on without necessitating curtailment of the primary's 
operations ; and 
( c )  ( if the Supreme Court insists ) the secondary employees 
enter the premises through a separate gate. 
( 2 )  Picketing at a secondary site i s  secondary and unlawful if it  
appeals to secondary employees not to cross the p icket l ine or to 
perform services, unless they are performing work that can not be 
carried on : 
( a )  without the presence of primary employees at the 
secondary site ; or 
( b )  without necessitating curtailment of the primary's 
operations . 
( 3 )  Picketing at a secondary site contains an appeal to sec­
ondary employees unless : 
( a )  the picketing takes place only at times when primary 
employees are present ; 
( b )  the picketing is carried on as close to those employees 
as is  reasonably possible ; 
( c )  the pickets, by their signs and conduct, make clear that 
the primary employer is the offending employer, and the sec­
ondary is not ; 
( cl ) there are no overt attempts to deter secondary em­
ployees from entering the premises or performing services ; and 
( e )  no secondary employees actually refuse to enter the 
premises or perform services. 
